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The traditional model of cryptography examines the security of the cipher as a
mathematical function. However, ciphers that are secure when specified as mathemat-
ical functions are not necessarily secure in real-world implementations. The physical
implementations of ciphers can be extremely difficult to control and often leak so-
called side-channel information. Side-channel cryptanalysis attacks have shown to
be especially effective as a practical means for attacking implementations of crypto-
graphic algorithms on simple hardware platforms, such as smart-cards. Adversaries
can obtain sensitive information from side-channels, such as the timing of operations,
power consumption and electromagnetic emissions. Some of the attack techniques
require surprisingly little side-channel information to break some of the best known
ciphers. In constrained devices, such as smart-cards, straightforward implementations
of cryptographic algorithms can be broken with minimal work. Preventing these at-
tacks has become an active and a challenging area of research.
Power analysis is a successful cryptanalytic technique that extracts secret informa-
tion from cryptographic devices by analysing the power consumed during their oper-
ation. A particularly dangerous class of power analysis, differential power analysis
(DPA), relies on the correlation of power consumption measurements. It has been pro-
posed that adding non-determinism to the execution of the cryptographic device would
reduce the danger of these attacks. It has also been demonstrated that asynchronous
logic has advantages for security-sensitive applications. This thesis investigates the
security and performance advantages of using a network-based asynchronous architec-
ture, in which the functional units of the datapath form a network. Non-deterministic
execution is achieved by exploiting concurrent execution of instructions both with and
without data-dependencies; and by forwarding register values between instructions
with data-dependencies using randomised routing over the network. The executions of
cryptographic algorithms on different architectural configurations are simulated, and
the obtained power traces are subjected to DPA attacks. The results show that the
proposed architecture introduces a level of non-determinism in the execution that sig-
nificantly raises the threshold for DPA attacks to succeed. In addition, the performance
analysis shows that the improved security does not degrade performance.
iii
Acknowledgements
I am deeply grateful to my husband, Joseph, for his love, patience and continuous sup-
port during the many difficult times of my PhD studies.
My beloved parents, grandmother and sister and all my relatives and friends from
Serbia and the USA for their support and encouragement.
My first supervisor, D. K. Arvind, for his advice and comments.
My second supervisor, Dr. Murray Cole, for his advice and encouragement.
Joseph, Dr. Aris Efthymiou, Dr. Murray Cole, D. K. Arvind, Dr. Mary Cryan and
Chris Bainbridge for proofreading the thesis material and for their helpful comments.
The Overseas Research Student (ORS) Award Scheme for covering the overseas tu-
ition fees. To the Graduate School of Informatics for covering the home fees and
partial maintenance. To the System Level Integration group for providing some of the
maintenance funding. To the Informatics Teaching Organisation for teaching jobs.
The Orthodox Community of St. Andrew in Edinburgh, and in particular to Fr. John
for being my dear spiritual guide.
My dear friends John, Spyros, Fotini, Katarina, Alin, Cornelia, Chris and Evie for
making my stay in Edinburgh an indeed wonderful experience.
To my (at the time unborn) baby Tihomir for making the time during the thesis write-
up the most memorable and wonderful time of my life.
Glory to God for all things!
iv
Declaration
I declare that this thesis was composed by myself, that the work contained herein is
my own except where explicitly stated otherwise in the text, and that this work has not
been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification except as specified.
Some of the work presented in this thesis has already been published in:
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Cryptography in its traditional setting examines the security of the cipher as a mathe-
matical function. In addition, it assumes that the secret information can be physically
protected in tamper-proof locations and manipulated in closed, reliable computing en-
vironments. However, cryptographic systems are implemented on real electronic de-
vices that process, transmit and store data. While operating, these devices interact with
and influence the environment and leak a certain amount of information into so-called
side-channels. An attacker can potentially compromise the secret cryptographic key
stored in these devices by monitoring information that is leaked into side-channels.
This type of cryptanalysis is known as side-channel analysis.
Numerous techniques for testing cryptographic algorithms in isolation have been
designed. The most well known and studied methods, differential cryptanalysis [27]
and linear cryptanalysis [90], can exploit extremely small statistical characteristics
in the cipher’s inputs and outputs. However, these methods analyse only one part of
a cryptosystem’s architecture: the algorithm’s mathematical structure. On the other
hand, by employing side-channel analysis the attacker is able to exploit weaknesses of
physical implementations, rather than weaknesses of algorithmic aspects of a particular
cryptosystem. Ongoing research in the last ten years (since 1995) has shown that the
information transmitted via side-channels, such as execution time [76], computational
faults [30, 28], power consumption [78] and electromagnetic emissions [113, 53, 13],
can be detrimental to the security of ciphers.
Hundreds of millions of cryptographic devices, the vast majority being smart-cards,
are used today in a variety of applications. These cards execute cryptographic compu-
tations based on the secret key stored in their memories. The goal of an attacker is to
extract the secret key from a tamper-resistant card in order to modify its content, create
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duplicate cards or perform an unauthorised transaction. Two general types of attacks
can be distinguished:
1. Invasive attacks are attacks where the smart-card can be decomposed, its chip ex-
tracted, modified, probed, partially destroyed or used in a particular environmen-
tal setting. These attacks leave visible proof of tampering. They typically require
a considerable amount of time, sophisticated (often very expensive) equipment
and detailed knowledge of the card’s internals. Due to these factors, invasive
attacks are usually applied to extract information about the smart-card systems,
and rarely to extract information about individual users. These attacks include
fault attacks [30] and probing attacks [80].
2. Non-invasive attacks are attacks where the smart-card is passively monitored
during its operation and communication with a (possibly modified) smart-card
reader. No proof of tampering is evident from these attacks. They require mini-
mal investment and can be carried out in relatively short amounts of time. These
characteristics of non-invasive attacks have made them of great interest in re-
cent years. Non-invasive attacks include side-channel attacks [76, 77] and glitch
attacks [80]. The focus of this thesis is on side-channel attacks in particular.
Side-channel attacks were first discovered by Paul Kocher in 1995. The first side-
channel discovery was the timing attack [76] which uses timing information to deduce
the values of the secret keys. This attack exploits weaknesses in implementations of the
observed cryptosystem, and correlates the time needed to perform the cryptographic
operation with the operations performed and the input parameters. A typical example
of these weaknesses are branches in the code that depend on the values of the secret
key, found in square-and-multiply algorithm that is used in ciphers such as RSA [117].
The next attack to appear, the power analysis attack [78], was discovered in 1998
by Paul Kocher and his team of researchers from Cryptography Research in San Fran-
cisco. Kocher et al. described two types of attacks: simple power analysis (SPA)
and differential power analysis (DPA). Basic to these attacks is the observation that
the power consumed by the cryptographic device (in this case the smart-card) at any
particular time during the cryptographic operation is related to the instruction being
executed and to the data being processed. One of the ideas to prevent the timing attack
on the square-and-multiply algorithm was to pad the code with dummy computations,
such as empty loops. Kocher et al. noticed that the power consumption of these dummy
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computations was different from the power consumption of meaningful ones. By sim-
ply observing the power traces obtained from the RSA coprocessor, they were able to
determine which operations were performed, what enabled them to disclose the secret
exponent. This is the basis of simple power analysis.
A far more powerful attack, the differential power analysis (DPA), is based on per-
forming a statistical analysis of a large number of encryptions with known plaintexts
(or ciphertexts). There are variants of this attack that do not require the knowledge
of either plaintexts or the ciphertexts [29] and variants that use more sophisticated
statistical methods, known as higher-order DPA attacks [78].
Another type of very powerful side-channel analysis attacks is based on measur-
ing electromagnetic emissions, and is known as electromagnetic emission analysis
(EMA) [53, 113]. The techniques used in electromagnetic analysis are very similar
to those used in power analysis, although in some cases these attacks have proven to
be even more threatening than power analysis attacks [115].
Probably the most threatening and well studied side-channel attack is the DPA at-
tack. The DPA attack exploits the characteristic behaviour of transistor logic gates and
software running on today’s smart-cards and other cryptographic devices. The attack
is performed by monitoring the electrical activity of a device, and then using advanced
statistical methods secret information (such as secret keys and user PINs) stored in the
device is determined. Far from being a theoretical attack DPA has been successfully
carried out on a wide range of existing cryptographic devices and, therefore, represents
a real threat to the security of modern cryptographic systems. What makes the DPA at-
tack especially dangerous is the fact that it is inexpensive to perform (using cheap and
readily available equipment) and most implementations are vulnerable, unless specific
countermeasures are in place. The degree of security these countermeasures provide
can be different, but any countermeasure is valuable because it increases the cost and
the complexity of performing the attack. The complexity of power analysis attacks
can be increased by introducing software (algorithmic) and hardware (physical) coun-
termeasures. A general strategy to render side-channel attacks more difficult to apply
is to balance and randomise major computations which involve the secret key. These
attacks largely depend on the possibility to statistically correlate different runs of the
same algorithm with the same key and different plaintexts. This means to correlate
power consumption curves and the points on the curves that correspond to vulnerable
operations (i.e. those that involve the secret key).
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A number of countermeasures against the DPA attack and its variations have been
proposed in recent years. However, the vast majority of these countermeasures do not
guarantee security against these attacks, but rather raise the threshold for such attacks
to succeed or force the use of more complex and costly techniques. A general obser-
vation concerning software countermeasures is that they are easy and inexpensive to
implement (as they do not require the redesign of the existing hardware), but are not ap-
plicable to every cipher and are still susceptible to higher-order DPA attacks or signal
processing analysis [94]. Hardware countermeasures, similarly to software counter-
measures, focus on destroying the correlation between the power measurements and
the values of the secret key. Another target of hardware countermeasures is the align-
ment of operations in power consumption curves, an important property used by DPA.
Removing the correlation between features in the DPA profile and the algorithm source
code makes retrieving useful information from the power traces significantly harder.
Hardware countermeasures can generally provide a higher level of security but can
also be costly in terms of performance, power efficiency and memory requirements.
1.1 Thesis aims and contributions
With the discovery of side-channel attacks security at the physical level of crypto-
graphic hardware has become crucial. At the same time, low-power hand-held crypto-
graphic devices, such as smart-cards, have become ubiquitous. Today smart-cards are
used in a large number of applications including authentication and payment mecha-
nisms. They are harder to crack than their magnetic strip predecessors, but are, how-
ever, still threatened by the wide range of invasive and non-invasive attacks. In addi-
tion, cracking smart-cards has become increasingly profitable. The wide-spread use
of smart-cards provides those capable of reverse engineering or simply extracting the
secret key material from smart-cards with new opportunities for theft and fraud [102].
This is the type of environment in which modern smart-cards need to survive.
A critical question, addressed in this thesis, is how to secure the physical layer of
cryptographic devices against side-channel attacks without degrading performance. In
that direction, this thesis concentrates on the design of an architecture that is robust to
DPA attacks.
Asynchronous architectures have been suggested as an attractive platform for se-
cure cryptographic devices [113, 102]. The reduced power consumption of these de-
vices and the absence of the clock, the source of correlation in power consumption
1.1. Thesis aims and contributions 5
curves, suggest that these architectures could exhibit improved security characteris-
tics.
One of the proposed solutions to thwart the DPA attack was to introduce random-
ness and non-determinism in the execution [80, 78, 36, 91]. Due to the data-dependent
nature of delays in asynchronous circuits, the precise ordering of events is usually non-
deterministic. This thesis explores possibilities for increasing this already present level
of non-determinism in the execution.
The main contribution of this thesis is a novel architectural approach to thwart DPA
in the form of a network-based asynchronous architecture, in which the functional
units in the processor datapath are themselves connected as an asynchronous network,
rather than as a linear pipeline. The aim of this design is to decorrelate the power con-
sumption measurements by exploiting the inherent non-determinism of instructions
executing in parallel over a network in which routing of data is randomised. Data-
dependencies between instructions are identified at run-time and the dependency infor-
mation is used in data-forwarding in order to bypass the register file. The functional
units are organised in a structure that belongs to so-called graphs on alphabets [81].
Now, each forwarding operation requires routing of the data through the network. Ad-
ditionally, the routing is randomised and introduces random timing variations in the
execution of the algorithm. The term non-determinism, used throughout the thesis,
refers to the execution of instructions in a non-deterministic fashion, i.e., randomising
the order of instruction execution and, thus, their timings. Randomisation is achieved
through a randomised data-forwarding process. This process introduces different tim-
ing interleavings and, thus, randomises (or adds non-determinism to) (1) the order of
execution for different microinstructions and consequently instructions; (2) execution
times, making them different for different runs of the code; and (3) execution power
signatures, making them different for different runs of the code.
Similar concepts which use special mechanisms to randomise the execution of in-
structions to achieve similar goals, have been presented in [91, 92, 66]. But unlike
[91, 92], in which the randomisation process is an overhead, the asynchronous network
executes instructions in parallel to improve performance, while non-deterministic exe-
cution is a natural side-effect. The non-deterministic execution should result in power
signatures that are harder to correlate using statistical methods, which provides a level
of protection against power analysis attacks.
The main aim of this thesis is to investigate the validity of architectural ideas that
aim at improving the security of cryptographic devices by introducing non-determinism
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in the execution. In that direction, the main contribution of this thesis is provided evi-
dence that the network-based asynchronous architecture does improve the resistance of
cryptographic functions to DPA attacks. This makes the network-based asynchronous
architecture an attractive platform for security-sensitive applications.
1.2 Thesis structure
The summary of the remaining chapters is given next.
Chapter 2 presents the details of the cryptographic algorithms that were used in the
security investigations in this thesis. This includes the definition and specifi-
cation of the Data Encryption Standard (DES) and the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES). It also presents well-known (non-side-channel) cryptanalytic
methods for attacking these two important ciphers.
Chapter 3 provides details of the main background area, side-channel analysis. This
includes details on three types of side-channel attacks: (1) timing analysis, (2)
simple and differential power analysis, and (3) electromagnetic emission analy-
sis; and the fault analysis as another important threat to cryptographic devices.
This chapter also gives background on power dissipation, and covers some of
the countermeasures proposed to defend cryptosystems against these attacks.
Chapter 4 introduces the second background area, asynchronous design. This chapter
also reviews related work on the asynchronous network-based architecture and
side-channel analysis attacks on asynchronous architectures.
Chapter 5 provides a detailed description of the design of the network-based asyn-
chronous architecture. In particular, this chapter presents the architecture or-
ganisation and its building blocks, instruction execution through its stages, data-
forwarding, routing in the network of functional units and data-sharing as used
in this design. It also provides the details of the network topologies and the
randomised routing techniques used in this design.
Chapter 6 presents the experimental evaluation of both security and performance of
the proposed architecture. It gives a detailed description of the simulation envi-
ronment, along with the results for several architectural configurations running
DES and AES.
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For more than 40 years Data Encryption Standard (DES) [10] has been the most widely
used commercial encryption algorithm for protecting financial transactions and elec-
tronic communications worldwide. Developed by the US Government and IBM in the
1970s, DES was the government-approved symmetric algorithm for protecting sen-
sitive information. The DES algorithm uses a 56-bit encryption key, which means
that there are 72,057,594,037,927,936 possible keys. Considering the computational
power level of the 1970s, exhaustive search on the key space of this size was infea-
sible. However, with the increase in computational power this has become feasible.
A machine jointly built by Cryptography Research, Advanced Wireless Technologies,
and Electronic Frontier Foundation can perform a fast key search on DES. This project
developed purpose-built hardware and software to search 90 billion keys per second,
and was able to determine the key after only 56 hours. This attack demonstrated that
the exhaustive search on DES is possible and that the 56-bit key length is not sufficient.
However, performing this attack is expensive. The major concern for smart-card manu-
factures are the attacks which can be performed with relatively inexpensive equipment
in a small amount of time, such as side-channel attacks.
In 1997 the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) made the
first call for proposals for an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). The cipher key
size were specified to be 128, 196 and 256 bits with block lengths of 128 bits. In
October 2000, Rijndael [45] was announced as the choice for AES.
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2.2 Data encryption standard - DES
2.2.1 History
In 1972, the NIST identified the need for a standard for encryption of unclassified,
sensitive information. A cipher from IBM, based on an earlier algorithm Lucifer de-
veloped by Horst Feistel, was proposed. Although the cipher’s short key length and
the S-boxes were criticised, the algorithm was approved as a federal standard in 1976,
under the name Data Encryption Standard (DES) and soon afterwards as the Federal
Information Processing Standard (FIPS) PUB 46 [10]. Subsequent reaffirmation of
the standard were published in 1983 (FIPS PUB 46-1), 1988 (FIPS PUB 46-2) and
1998 (FIPS PUB 46-3) also known as “triple DES”. The most threatening theoreti-
cal attacks on DES were published in 1991, the differential cryptanalysis [27]; and in
1993, the linear cryptanalysis [90]. However, these attacks were only theoretical and
it was the brute force attacks in 1998 and 1999 that demonstrated that DES can be at-
tacked practically. These practical attacks also highlighted the need for a replacement
algorithm. DES was replaced as a standard in 2002 with the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) [9], but is, however, still in widespread use.
2.2.2 Algorithm
The DES algorithm uses 64-bit keys to encrypt and decrypt 64-bit blocks of data. The
56 bits of the key are generated randomly and used directly by the algorithm. The
remaining 8 bits are used for error detection and are set to make the parity of each
8-bit byte of the key odd. The operations of encrypting and decrypting in DES are
performed using the same key.
2.2.2.1 The overall structure
The algorithm’s overall structure is shown in Figure 2.1. The algorithm consists of the
following: the initial permutation (IP), 16 identical stages of processing called rounds,
and the final permutation (FP), which is the inverse of the initial permutation. After the
initial permutation, and before the main rounds, the resulting 64-bit block is divided
into two 32-bit halves, left (L) and right (R), which are then processed alternately.
This criss-crossing is known as the Feistel structure1 and ensures that encryption and
1In a Feistel structure parts of the intermediate state are simply transposed unchanged to another
position.
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decryption are symmetric. Namely, the only difference between encryption and de-
cryption is in the order in which the round keys are applied (during the decryption the
round keys are applied in the reverse order). The advantage of the Feistel structure
is that it simplifies the hardware implementation, as it removes the need for separate
encryption and decryption algorithms.
Figure 2.1: The Feistel structure of DES encryption algorithm.
The round function operates on two blocks: one consisting of the 32 bit right half
of the intermediate result (R) and one consisting of 48 bits of the key K; and produces
32-bit output. The key used in each round represents the selection of 48 distinct bits
from the original 64-bit key K, and is the product of the key schedule function (KS):
Kn = KS(K,n).
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The round function updates the left and the right sides of the intermediate result ac-
cording to the following rules:
Ln = Rn−1
Rn = Ln−1⊕F(Rn−1,Kn)
where n = 1,. . . ,16, and L0 and R0 are the left and the right half of the result of the ini-
tial permutation. Finally, the preoutput block R16L16 is subject to the final permutation,
FP. The cipher’s overall structure is also given in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 DES encryption algorithm
INPUT: PT (Plaintext),K(CipherKey)
OUTPUT: CT (Ciphertext)
1: L0R0 = InitialPermutation(PT )
2: for i = 1 to 16 do
3: Ki = KS(K, i)
4: Li = Ri−1
5: Ri = Li−1 ⊕ F(Ri−1,Ki)
6: end for
7: CT = FinalPermutation(R16L16)
2.2.2.2 The round function
The round function (F) given in Figure 2.2, is defined as:
F(Ri−1,Ki) = P(S(E(Ri−1)⊕Ki)).
The round function consists of four different stages:
Expansion: in which the 32-bit half-block is expanded into 48 bits using the expan-
sion permutation (E), in which some of the bits are duplicated. (The E table is
given in Figure C.3 in Appendix C.)
Key addition: in which the result of the expansion E is XORed with a round key.
Sixteen 48-bit round keys (one for each round) are derived from the main key
using the key schedule, described in Section 2.2.2.3.
Substitution: in which the 48-bit block, result of the key addition, is divided into
eight 6-bit portions that are subjected to the substitution boxes, S-boxes. The
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transformation given by the S-boxes is a non-linear transformation, provided in
the form of a look-up table, and represents the core of the security of DES.
Without the S-boxes the cipher would be linear, and thus trivially breakable.
Each of the 8 S-boxes replaces its 6 input bits with 4 output bits, as follows. Let
Sk be one of the 8 selection boxes and b a 6-bit input. The first and the last bit
of b represent, in base 2, a number i in the range 0 to 3. The middle 4 bits of the
block b represent, in base 2, a number j in the range 0 to 15. The result of Sk(b)
is the 4-bit number given in row i and column j in the selection table Sk.
Permutation: in which the 32-bit outputs from the S-boxes are subject to a fixed per-
mutation P. This permutation is used to rearrange the outputs of the S-boxes
in order to make the input bits to each of the S-boxes in the following rounds
depend on the outputs of as many S-boxes as possible.
The alternation of substitution from the S-boxes, P-permutation of the bits and E-
expansion provide the so-called ”confusion and diffusion”, a concept introduced by
Claude Shannon [125], as a necessary condition for a secure and practical cipher.
Figure 2.2: The DES round function.
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2.2.2.3 Key schedule
The key schedule function (KS) is given in Figure 2.3. The function is defined by two
permuted choices: PC1 and PC2. The two parts, C0 and D0, are defined according
to the permuted choice PC1 (given in Figure C.4 in Appendix C). Permuted choice
PC1 selects 56 bits of the 64 bits of the key, and splits the selection into two halves
each containing 28 bits. In successive rounds, each half is rotated one or two bits to
the left, depending on the round. Finally, the round key bits are chosen according to
the permuted choice PC2, which selects 48 bits of the round key by selecting 24 bits
from the left half (C) and 24 bits from the right half (D) (as shown in Figure C.5 in
Appendix C).
Figure 2.3: DES key selection function.
2.2.3 Cryptanalysis of DES
2.2.3.1 Exhaustive key search
The simplest method to break the DES cipher is to try to decrypt the given encrypted
block with all possible keys. DES algorithm encrypts 64-bit blocks of data using 56-bit
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secret keys, which means there are 256 possible keys to be tried, making the average of
255 trials. On a single PC, this would take hundreds of years to process.
In 1998, Cryptography Research, Advanced Wireless Technologies, and Electronic
Frontier Foundation built a dedicated machine which demonstrated that exhaustive
search for DES is feasible. This project was a part of the DES Key Search Project
challenge, and developed purpose-built hardware and software to search 90 billion
keys per second, being able to determine the key in 56 hours. Although this type of
project may be possible only to well funded organisations, there are less expensive
ways to crack the DES key. In January 1999, Distributed.Net broke a DES key in 23
hours, by using the idle times of the machines on the Internet donated by volunteers.
More than 100,000 computers on the Internet received and computed part of the work,
checking 250 billion keys per second.
2.2.3.2 Dictionary method and time-memory tradeoff
Although the exhaustive search is extremely time consuming, it is not as demanding
in terms of memory requirements. Given a lot of memory, one can precompute all the
possible keys, K, and the encrypted blocks, Y , corresponding to a given block of data,
X , and store the pairs 〈Y,K〉. Given an encrypted block, Y ′, of the known block, X ,
with an unknown key, K ′, the right key could then be quickly found by searching this
kind of dictionary.
In 1980, Hellman [63] proposed a time-memory tradeoff algorithm, which needs
less time than the exhaustive search and less memory than the dictionary method.
2.2.3.3 Differential cryptanalysis
Biham and Shamir [27] in the late 1980s published a number of attacks against various
block ciphers and hash functions, including DES, termed differential cryptanalysis.
Differential cryptanalysis is a chosen plaintext attack which uses only the resulting
ciphertexts. The attack uses a chosen ciphertext pair whose dedicated plaintexts have
a particular difference. The two plaintexts do not have to be known to the attacker and
can be chosen at random, but their difference has to satisfy a predefined condition. The
differences in the plaintexts are used to assign probabilities to the possible keys and to
locate the most probable key. The attacker selects the input difference for which the
outputs difference occurs with high probability. In the case of DES, this difference is
chosen to be a fixed XOR value of the two plaintexts.
16 Chapter 2. Cryptographic Algorithms
In order to describe the attacks, recall that the round function (F) is defined as:
F(Ri−1,Ki) = P(S(E(Ri−1)⊕Ki)).




Considering that the S-boxes are non-linear, the knowledge of the difference of the
input pair to the S-boxes does not guarantee the knowledge of the difference of the
output pair. Usually several different outputs are possible. However, an important
observation is that for any particular input XOR, not all the output XORs are possi-
ble. Furthermore, the possible ones do not appear uniformly, and some XORed values
appear more frequently.
Important properties of the S-boxes are derived from the analysis of the tables that
summarise the distribution of the input XORs and output XORs of all the possible input
and output pairs. These tables are called the pairs XOR distribution tables of the S-
boxes. In these tables each row corresponds to a particular input XOR and each column
corresponds to a particular output XOR. The entries themselves count the number of
possible pairs with such an input and such an output XOR. These tables are generated
for all eight S-boxes. For a particular input XOR to an S-box, possible output XORs
can also be determined.
The attack can be depicted with the following example, whose further details can
be found in [27]. Assume that two plaintext outputs from the E transformation and the
output from the first S-box are known. The XOR of two outputs from the E transfor-
mation is equal to the XOR of the two inputs to the S-box, and thus the input XOR
for the first S-box can be determined. By consulting the XOR distribution table for the
first S-box, it is possible to determine the number of possibilities for the input to the
S-box, which also determines the number of possible keys. Next, the possibilities for
the inputs and the corresponding keys can be determined, among which the right value
of the key must occur. Using additional output pairs, additional candidates for the key
can be obtained. Now the right key must occur among the possibilities for each chosen
pair. This narrows down the number of possibilities for the key. Using a pair with a
different input XOR helps determine the right key from the reduced set.
The differential cryptanalysis is, however, a theoretical attack and is infeasible to
mount in practice. The main results of the findings of Biham and Shamir can be sum-
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marised as follows: DES reduced to six rounds can be broken using 240 ciphertexts;
DES reduced to eight rounds can be broken using 15000 ciphertexts chosen from a
pool of 50000 candidate ciphertexts; DES reduced to up to 15 rounds can be broken
faster than exhaustive search, but DES with 16 rounds still requires 258 steps [27].
2.2.3.4 Linear cryptanalysis
Linear cryptanalysis is another theoretical attack on DES that was discovered by Mat-
sui [90] in 1993. Linear cryptanalysis is a known-plaintext attack, although in certain
cases can be applied as an only-ciphertexts attack. This method consists of obtaining
a linear approximate expression of a given cryptographic algorithm. For that purpose,
it constructs a statistical linear path between input and output bits for each S-box. This
path is then extended to the entire algorithm reaching the linear approximate expres-
sion without any intermediate values.
The purpose of linear cryptanalysis is to find the following linear expression:
P[i1, i2, . . . , ia]⊕C[ j1, j2, . . . , jb] = K[k1,k2, . . . ,kc] (2.1)
where A[a1,a2, . . . ,at ] denotes A[a1]⊕A[a2]⊕·· ·⊕A[at ]; A[ai] is the i-th bit of A; i1,
i2, . . . , ia, j1, j2, . . . , jb, k1, k2, . . . , kc denote fixed bit locations, and Equation 2.1
holds with probability p 6= 12 for randomly given plaintext P and the corresponding
ciphertext C. The magnitude of |p− 12 | represents the effectiveness of Equation 2.1.
Once the effective linear expression is obtained, one key bit K[k1,k2, . . . ,kc] can be
determined following the algorithm based on the maximum likelihood method:
Step 1 – Let T be a number of plaintexts for which the left-hand side of Equation 2.1
is equal to zero.
Step 2 – If T > N/2, where N denotes the number of plaintexts, then guess
K[k1,k2, . . . ,kc] = 0, i f p > 1/2 or K[k1,k2, . . . ,kc] = 1, i f p < 1/2,
else guess
K[k1,k2, . . . ,kc] = 1, i f p > 1/2 or K[k1,k2, . . . ,kc] = 0, i f p < 1/2.
To solve the problem, Matsui first studied the linear approximation of S-boxes.
The taken approach was to investigate the probability that a value of an input bit coin-
cides with a value of an output bit. Next, the effective approximation of the cipher is
obtained.
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For a practical known-plaintext attack on n-round DES cipher, the best expression
of (n− 1)-round DES cipher is used. This is equivalent to regarding the final round
as having been deciphered using Kn. A term of F function is accepted in the linear
expression, and consequently the following form of expression is obtained:
P[i1, i2, . . . , ia]⊕C[ j1, j2, . . . , jb]⊕Fn(Rn−1,Kn)[l1, l2, . . . , ld] = K[k1,k2, . . . ,kc] (2.2)
If an incorrect candidate is substituted for Kn in Equation 2.2, the effectiveness of this
equation decreases. Based on this fact a maximum likelihood method to deduce Kn
and K[k1,k2, . . . ,kc] is applied. Next, the linear approximation of the S-boxes and the
F function is extended to the entire algorithm. Detailed examples of this extension to
the 3-, 7- and 8-round DES are given in [90].
Although this attack is a theoretical one, it is the most powerful attack on DES
that is faster than the brute force attack. The main results presented in [90] can be
summarised as follows: DES reduced to 8 rounds can be broken with 221 known plain-
texts; DES reduced to 12 rounds can be broken with 233 known plaintexts and the full
16 round DES can be broken with 247 known plaintexts.
Matsui noticed that if the plaintexts are not random, there might even be a linear
approximate expression that does not have a plaintext bit in it. This suggests that this
method finally leads to an only-ciphertext attack. If the attack is regarded as only-
ciphertext attack then the results of [90] can be summarised as follows: if plaintexts
consists of natural English sentences, DES restricted to eight rounds can be broken
with 229 ciphertexts; if the plaintexts are random, DES restricted to eight rounds can
be broken with 237 ciphertexts only. The author also illustrated the situation in which
16-round DES is breakable faster than an exhaustive search for 56 key bits using the
only-ciphertext attack.
2.3 Advanced encryption standard - AES
2.3.1 History
In 1997 NIST announced the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) development ef-
fort and made a formal call for algorithms. The call stated that the AES would spec-
ify an “unclassified, publicly disclosed encryption algorithm(s), available royalty-free,
worldwide. In addition, the algorithm(s) would implement symmetric key cryptogra-
phy as a block cipher and (at a minimum) support a block size of 128-bits and key
sizes of 128, 192, and 256 bits” [6].
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In 1998, fifteen AES candidates were announced at the First AES Candidate Con-
ference [2]. The Second AES Candidate Conference [4] was held in 1999. The results
and comments of this meeting were used to reduce the number of candidates to five
algorithms: MARS, RC6, Rijndael, Serpent, and Twofish. On October 2, 2000, NIST
announced that it had selected Rijndael (a portmanteau name composed of the names
of the inventors - two Belgian cryptographers - Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijnmen),
a refinement of an earlier design Square [7], as the new standard. Rijndael was pro-
nounced as a new standard (AES) on November 26, 2001 as FIPS PUB 197 [9], and
effectively became a new standard on May 26, 2002.
2.3.2 Algorithm
AES Rijndael [9] is a symmetric block cipher that processes block lengths of 128 bits
and key length that can be independently specified to 128, 192 and 256 bits. Actually,
AES is not precisely Rijndael [45], as Rijndael supports a larger range of block and
key sizes. Namely, the key and block sizes in Rijndael can be any multiple of 32 bits,
with a minimum of 128 bits and a maximum of 256 bits.
2.3.2.1 The overall structure
Unlike most ciphers, DES for instance, Rijndael does not have a Feistel structure, but
it is a so-called substitution-permutation network. A substitution-permutation network
is a series of linked mathematical operations used in block ciphers that consist of S-
boxes and P-boxes that transform blocks of input bits into output bits. AES operates
on a 4×4 array of bytes, termed the State. Each round of transformation is composed
of three different layers, which are designed to provide resistance against differential
and linear cryptanalysis [45]. These layers are:
Linear mixing layer: which guarantees a high degree of diffusion over multiple rounds.
Non-linear layer: which consists of parallel application of substitution tables (S-boxes)
that have optimum worst-case non-linearity properties.
Key addition layer: which involves a simple XOR of the round key to the intermediate
cipher result, called the State.
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For encryption each round transformation is composed of four different stages:
1. BytesSub – a non-linear substitution step where each byte of the State is re-
placed with another according to the lookup table.
2. ShiftRows – a transposition step where each row of the State is shifted cycli-
cally a certain number of steps.
3. MixColumns – a mixing operation which operates on the column of the State,
combining the four bytes in each column using a linear transformation.
4. AddRoundKey – each byte of the State is combined with the RoundKey, which
is derived from the CipherKey using a key schedule.
In order to make the decryption process symmetrical, the final round omits the MixColumns
stage. Finally, the cipher consists of the following steps (also given in Algorithm 2):
• Initial round key addition;
• Nr − 1 rounds, where Nr represents the total number of rounds and depends on
the key size (number of rounds for the original Rijndael is given in Figure C.1 in
Appendix C); Nb in Algorithm 2 represents the block length divided by 32. The
round transformation is given in Figure 2.4.
• Final round.









The steps of the round transformation can be combined together in a single set of
table lookups, allowing faster implementation on 32-bit processors and considerable
parallelism in the round transformation. As a result the number of operations used in
the cipher can be reduced to two: table lookups and XORs [45].
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2.3.2.2 The ByteSub transformation
The ByteSub transformation is a non-linear byte substitution, operating on each of
the State bytes independently. The substitution table (S-box) is invertible and is con-
structed by composing the following two transformations:
1. Taking the multiplicative inverse in GF(28).
2. Applying affine transformation over GF(28):
b(x) = (x7 + x6 + x2 + x)+(x7 + x6 + x5 + x4 +1) ·a(x) mod (x8 +1).
The inverse of ByteSub is the byte substitution with the inverse table applied, which is
obtained by the inverse of the affine transformation followed by taking the multiplica-
tive inverse in GF(28).
2.3.2.3 The ShiftRow transformation
In the ShiftRow transformation each row of the State is cyclically shifted over dif-
ferent offsets: row 0 is not shifted, row 1 is shifted by C1 = 1 bytes, row 2 by C2 = 2
bytes and row 3 by C3 = 3 bytes. (In the original Rijndael, the values of C1, C2 and C3
depend on the block length as shown in Figure C.2 in Appendix C.)
The inverse of ShiftRow is a cyclic shift of the three bottom rows by 4− 1 = 3,
4− 2 = 2, and 4− 3 = 1 bytes, respectively. (In the original Rijndael, the values of
offsets for the inverse operations are Nb−C1, Nb−C2, Nb−C3, Nb represents number
of columns in the block and is equal to the block length divided by 32.)
2.3.2.4 The MixColumn transformation
In the MixColumn transformation the columns of the State are considered as polyno-
mials over GF(28), and multiplied, modulo x4 +1, with a fixed polynomial c(x), given
by:
c(x) =′ 03′x3 +′ 01′x2 +′ 01′x+′ 02′
The inverse transformation is similar to MixColumn transformation, except the polyno-
mial used in the inverse operation is:
d(x) =′ 0B′x3 +′ 0D′x2 +′ 09′x+′ 0E ′
and satisfies c(x) ·d(x) =′ 01′.
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After two rounds of Rijndael, ShiftRow and MixColumn transformations provide
full diffusion, in the sense that every bit in the State depends on all state bits from two
previous rounds.
2.3.2.5 The AddRoundKey transformation
In the AddRoundKey transformation the RoundKey is simply XORed with the State.
The RoundKey is derived from the CipherKey by means of a key schedule. The length
of RoundKey is equal to the size of the State. The total length of all round keys is equal
to 4 · (Nr + 1), where Nr represents the number of rounds. The CipherKey is first ex-
panded into the ExpandedKey and each RoundKey is derived from the ExpandedKey in
the following way: the first 4 words of the ExpandedKey represent the first RoundKey,
and each further block of 4 words represent the second and subsequent keys.
2.3.3 Cryptanalysis of AES
The most common way to attack block ciphers is to try various attacks on versions
of the cipher with a reduced number of rounds. AES has 10 rounds for 128-bit keys,
12 rounds for 192-bit keys, and 14 rounds for 256-bit keys. According to [1], the best
known attacks are on 6 rounds for 128-bit keys, 6 rounds for 192-bit keys, and 7 rounds
for 256-bit keys.
2.3.3.1 The XSL attack
Courtois and Pieprzyk [43] in 2002 published a theoretical attack against Rijndael
and Serpent [5]. The attack expresses the entire algorithm as multivariate quadratic
polynomials, and uses an innovative technique to treat the terms of those polynomials
as individual variables. It relies on first analysing the internals of a cipher and deriving
a system of quadratic simultaneous equations. These systems of equations are very
large, for example 8000 equations with 1600 variables for 128-bit AES. The variables
represent not just the plaintext, ciphertext and key bits, but also various intermediate
values within the algorithm. In the XSL attack a specialised algorithm, termed as
eXtended Sparse Linearization (XSL), is applied to solve these equations and recover
the key. In this attack, unlike other forms of cryptanalysis such as differential and
linear cryptanalysis, only one or two known plaintexts are required.
However, the analysis given in [43] in not universally accepted. The complicated
technical details of the paper raised suspicions about the accuracy of the underlying
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Figure 2.4: Rijndael round transformation. Obtained from
http://home.ecn.ab.ca/∼jsavard/crypto/images/rijnov.gif
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mathematics. Furthermore, several cryptography experts have found problems in the
underlying mathematics of the proposed attack, suggesting that the authors had made
a mistake in their calculations. These findings have led to the general belief that this
attack is speculative and impractical.
2.4 Summary
This chapter provided an overview of two important cryptographic algorithms, DES
and AES, the former standard and the new standard. It also presented the most well
known cryptanalytic techniques used in theoretical and practical attacks on these two
cryptographic standards. The experimental security investigations presented in Chap-
ter 6 are based on investigating the security against differential power analysis of these
two important cryptographic algorithms when run on different configurations of the
network-based architecture.
In the next chapter an overview of new and very powerful cryptanalysis techniques
that, unlike the attacks reviewed in this chapter, do not depend on the mathematical
characteristics of the cryptographic algorithm, but on the implementation and physical
characteristics of the device the algorithm is implemented on is given. This type of
analysis is known as side-channel analysis. Countermeasures proposed to thwart these




Cryptographic operations are physical processes in which data is represented by phys-
ical quantities in physical structures. These are then stored, sensed and combined by
the elementary logic devices (gates). At any point in the evolution of technology, the
smallest logic device must have a definite physical extent, require a certain amount
of time to perform its function and dissipate switching energy when transiting from
one state to another [93]. A corollary of the second law of thermodynamics states
that in order to introduce direction into transition between states, energy must be lost
irreversibly. A system that does not dissipate energy cannot make a transition and
therefore cannot compute [93]. It has been shown that this energy can be correlated
with the operations performed and the data that is being processed.
While operating, electronic devices interact and influence the environment. Be-
sides consuming and emitting power, these devices emit electromagnetic radiation and
react to temperature changes. This information leakage is intrinsic to the physical im-
plementation of the device, and is characterised as the side-channel. If observed and
recorded, information leaked into side-channels can be used to recover compromising
information (secret keys for example) about the device in question. This is particularly
true for cryptographic devices for which the secrecy of the key is imperative (Kerchkoff
principle1). This type of analysis defines the branch of cryptanalysis known as side-
channel analysis. According to the type of information used, side-channel analysis
attacks can be classified into three main categories:
1Kerchkoff principle: The security of cryptographic algorithms must be based on the secrecy of the
key not on the secrecy of the algorithm.
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• Timing analysis
• Power analysis
• Electromagnetic emission analysis
Considering the rapid development of electronic business and different kinds of
digital communication systems the electronics industry as well as the academic com-
munity were alarmed by the discovery of side-channel attacks. It became crucial to
protect cryptographic systems against these new and powerful types of attacks. A num-
ber of countermeasures were proposed for each of these attacks. However, according
to the research currently conducted in this area, it is hard to come up with a general
countermeasure that guarantees that the cryptosystem is secure against all side-channel
attacks. The current definition of side-channel security says that a cryptosystem is se-
cure if it is secure against all known side-channel attacks. Although this does not
guarantee the security against attacks that are yet to be discovered, this notion of se-
curity is generally accepted. Some side-channel attacks can be completely prevented
by using clever implementations of cryptographic algorithms. To prevent against the
most powerful side-channel attacks, power analysis, most practical solutions rely on
increasing the complexity of the attack. This increase in complexity is equivalent to
complicating the statistical analysis and increasing the number of necessary readings
of the side-channel data to the extent that the attack is not feasible or is too expensive
to perform. The complexity of side-channel attacks can be increased on two levels: by
introducing software (algorithmic) and/or hardware (physical) countermeasures. The
general strategy to increase the complexity of side-channel attacks involves balancing
and randomising major computations which involve the secret key.
3.2 Timing analysis
3.2.1 Introduction
When designing a commercial cryptographic scheme cryptographers have always been
concerned with the execution time of their implementations. The amount of time
needed to encrypt or decrypt a message or produce a digital signature is often used as
a benchmark when comparing different cryptographic schemes. The fastest scheme,
under the same conditions and with the same parameters, is considered to be the most
efficient and, therefore, the most appealing to the demands of the market.
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The actual timing of a cryptographic function does not only depend on the opera-
tions performed, but also on the parameters passed to it: both the secret key and the
plaintext (ciphertext) data. Cryptosystems often take slightly different times to process
different input parameters. The timing variations are due to different performance op-
timisations that are used to bypass unnecessary operations, branching and conditional
statements. A good portion of these variations are due to processor instructions, such
as multiplications and divisions, that run in variable times [76].
In 1995, Paul Kocher from Cryptography Research in San Francisco [76], demon-
strated that the timing variations can be used to deduct secret exponents used in systems
such as RSA [3], DSS [8], Diffie-Hellman [48], and others. He outlined a simple and
inexpensive attack which enables an attacker to discover the fixed (secret) exponents
used in these cryptosystems. The attack exploits certain engineering aspects involved
in the implementation of cryptosystems which succeeded even against cryptosystems
that have remained impervious to sophisticated cryptanalytic techniques, such as dif-
ferential [27] and linear cryptanalysis [90]. With the growing popularity of electronic
commerce this discovery drew the attention of both industry and academia. The cryp-
tographic community became aware that some widely used standards (such as SSL) are
vulnerable to this new attack. This led to the discovery of timing attacks and opened
a completely separate and new area of cryptanalysis, known as side-channel analysis.
Kocher’s discovery even made it to the front page of New York Times [86].
3.2.2 Attack details
Private-key operations in RSA or Diffie-Hellman consist of performing modular expo-
nentiations of the form: S = Md mod N. As suggested in [117], this operation can be
implemented using a repeated square-and-multiply algorithm given in Algorithm 3. In
this algorithm, S can be thought of as a digital signature, M is a message, N is public,
and d is the private (secret) exponent which can be represented using at most n bits,
where n is the length of S. Kocher noticed that the execution path of the algorithm
depends on the value of the private exponent d. Namely, in a loop iteration, if the
corresponding bit of d is equal to 1, then both the modular squaring and multiplication
are performed (lines 3 and 5, respectively); otherwise, if the bit is equal to 0, then
only the modular squaring is performed. Therefore, the number of operations that are
performed and the overall execution time depend on the value of the private exponent.
If an attacker could observe and compare the execution times of several loop iterations
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(Figure 3.1) then he would be able to deduce the values of bits of the private exponent
d for each of the iterations [76].
Algorithm 3 Repeated left-to-right square-and-multiply algorithm for modular expo-
nentiation.
INPUT: M,N,d = (dn−1, . . . ,d1,d0)2
OUTPUT: S = Md mod N
1: S← 1
2: for j = n−1 to 0 do
3: S← S2 mod N
4: if d j = 1 then
5: S← S ·M mod N
6: end if
7: end for
Figure 3.1: The timing analysis principle [94].
Kocher [76] explained how the overall running time of the algorithm can be used
to deduce the bits of the private exponent d. The timing attack allows someone who
knows bits 0 . . . k−1 of the private exponent to discover the bit k. The attack proceeds
as follows. By knowing the first k bits, the attacker can compute the first k iterations
of the f or-loop and find the value of S after that iteration. In the next iteration, the
value of the unknown bit of d will be used. The squaring in line 3 will be performed
regardless of the value of the bit, but the multiplication in line 5 is performed only if
the value of the unknown bit is equal to 1. The difference in timing of this iteration
when zero and one are the bits in question, enables the attacker to determine the value
of the unknown bit. Starting from k = 0 and following this fashion, all bits of the secret
exponent can be discovered.
An interesting property of the timing attack, observed by Kocher [76], is its error-
detection property. Namely, if at any point the k-th bit was guessed incorrectly, then
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the values of S computed in consecutive iterations will be essentially random and the
timings following the error will not be reflected in the overall exponentiation time.
Therefore, after the error occurred, no more meaningful correlations can be observed.
This property can be used for error correction [76]. Each timing measurement is
equal to T = e+∑n−1i=0 ti, where times ti are required for multiplication and squaring
for each bit di, and time e includes measurement error and loop overhead. Given a
guess of the k-th bit, dk, the attacker can find ∑k−1i=0 ti. If dk was correct, subtracting
from T yields e+ ∑n−1i=k ti. The relative independence of modular multiplications from
each other and from the measurement error, yields the variance of e+ ∑n−1i=k ti to be
Var(e)+(n− k)Var(t). If only l < k bits were guessed correctly, then the expected
variance should be Var(e)+(n− k +2l)Var(t). Therefore, iterations done with a cor-
rectly guessed key decrease the variance by Var(t), while the iterations following the
incorrectly guessed key increase the variance by Var(t). This is an easy to compute
test which provides a good way to identify if the bit was guessed correctly.
3.2.2.1 Attacks on other systems
Almost any implementation that runs in variable amounts of time could be vulnerable
to timing analysis [104]. Most public key systems and signature schemes, such as
ECC, RSA and ElGamal, use algebraic operations that often run in variable times.
Block ciphers, such as IDEA and AES Rijndael, are also vulnerable to timing attacks
because they use multiplications [72, 79]. The bit rotations, used in ciphers such as
RC5 and DES, when implemented using shift and conditional “wrap around” can leak
Hamming weights of the operands. (Hamming weight represents the number of ones
in the binary representation of the data.) For example, in the software implementations
of DES, the 28 bits of C and D values in the DES key schedule (see Section 2.2 for
the description of DES) are often rotated using a conditional which tests whether the
bit that must be wrapped around is equal to 1. The additional time required to “wrap
around” non-zero bits could introduce slight timing variations, which could reveal the
Hamming weight of the key.
Naive implementations of AES Rijndael [9] are also at risk, as described by Koe-
une and Quisquater [79]. The AES encryption consists of the initial round key addi-
tion followed by a number of round transformations (see Section 2.3 for the descrip-
tion of AES). The different transformations during each round operate on an array
of bytes, called the State. This attack focused on a particular round transformation,
the MixColumn transformation. In the MixColumn transformation, the columns of the
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State are considered as polynomials over GF(28), and multiplied, modulo x4 +1,
with a fixed polynomial c(x) =′ 03′x3 +′ 01′x2 +′ 01′x+′ 02′. This operation can be
implemented very efficiently, since ′03′ =′ 02′+′ 01′, the only multiplications that will
actually have to be performed are those by ′02′. In addition, the multiplication in
GF(28) can be implemented very efficiently by following two simple steps: (1) shift
the byte one position left, (2) if a carry occurs, XOR the result with ′1B′ [9]. Therefore,
in careless implementations, this operation could show timing variations, as it can take
longer when the carry actually occurs.
Timing attacks have been successfully performed against a number of crypto-
graphic functions, but also against some Internet protocols such as SSL [32].
3.2.3 Countermeasures
Naturally, there is a question of protecting cryptosystems against timing attacks. Kocher
noticed that the most obvious method would be to make sure all operations run in con-
stant time. Doing this at the implementation level is often difficult in view of all the
possible factors that can introduce variations in timing (such as compiler optimisations,
different platforms, RAM cache hits and instruction timings). Even if this is achieved,
for example by withholding the result of an operation until a specified amount of time
is expired, other information, such as power consumption or CPU usage, can reveal
sensitive information [76]. In addition, performance of such systems would be con-
siderably degraded as all operations will take the same amount of time as the slowest
one, while performance optimisations are not allowed for obvious reasons. This would
imply a severe performance drawback, especially for asymmetric cryptosystems, since
this constant time would be that of the slowest possible case.
Daemen and Rijmen [46] similarly suggested that cryptographic implementations
can be protected against timing attacks by ensuring that the cipher execution time is
independent of the value of the key, by inserting NOP operations in the shortest path of
the conditional statement until all paths take the same time. However, they also noticed
that this solution might be vulnerable to power analysis (described in Section 3.3).
Even ensuring that the same set of operations is performed in each iteration of
the algorithm (an example of such an implementation for modular exponentiation is
given in Algorithm 4), does not make the execution time constant. This is a general
misconception about the timing attack. The timing attack does not only discover the
path of execution, but also the operands that are used [104]. Multiplication with zero
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would take different time when compared to multiplication with one. If, however, in
the case of modular exponentiation, squaring and multiplication are implemented to
run in constant time, then the modular exponentiation would only be correlated with
the Hamming weights of the secret exponent, which in some cases can reveal the se-
cret exponent [104]. For example, Montgomery multiplication runs in almost constant
time but there are small variations due to conditional subtraction which implies that
Montgomery multiplication is vulnerable to timing attacks [47]. Both squaring and
multiplication operations in the square-and-multiply algorithm could be performed us-
ing Montgomery multiplication. If the squaring part is attacked, then even keys of
length 512 can be efficiently discovered. The timing attack can also be applied to RSA
implementations with the Chinese Reminder Theorem as shown in [119].
Algorithm 4 Repeated square-and-multiply algorithm for modular exponentiation, still
vulnerable to timing attacks.
INPUT: M,N,d = (dn−1, . . . ,d1,d0)2
OUTPUT: S = Md mod N
1: S← 1
2: for j = n−1 . . .0 do
3: S← S2 mod N
4: T ← S·M mod N




Another suggested approach to prevent timing attacks is to add random delays to
execution and make timing measurements imprecise. However, this can be overcome
by increasing the number of samples so that the added noise is filtered out. The number
of samples required increases roughly as the square of the timing noise [76].
Kocher [76] proposes using blinding techniques by which the attacker would be
prevented from knowing the input to the modular exponentiation. Prior to computing




i mod N, where
this relation might be different for different cryptosystems. For example, in the case




e mod N, where e is the private exponent. Before the modular exponenti-
ation, the message should be multiplied by vi mod N and the result is subsequently
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corrected by multiplying it with v f mod N. Pairs (vi,v f ) should not be reused, since
they themselves could be subjected to timing analysis, compromising the secret ex-
ponent. On the other hand, calculating inverses is expensive, so it is impractical to
generate a new pair for each exponentiation. Moreover, the inverse operation itself
can be subjected to timing analysis. For those reasons it was suggested that vi and
v f are updated before each modular multiplication by calculating vi = v2i mod N and
v f = v2f mod N. In this way, the blinding pair is not reused and the total performance
cost is kept small. This countermeasure makes the internal computations impossible
to simulate by the attacker, thereby preventing the exploitation of the knowledge of
the running times. Although it does not guarantee elimination of all possible timing
attacks, this type of countermeasures is nonetheless efficient [76]. In addition, blinding
techniques have also been proven efficient against other types of side-channel attacks,
as described in Section 3.5.7.
In summary, in order to defeat the timing attack, implementors should prevent an
attacker from knowing the inputs to vulnerable operations. For example, in the square-
and-multiply algorithm, if the attacker does not know the base of the modular opera-
tion, timing information is not useful. Blinding techniques proposed by Kocher [76]
have been successful in preventing timing attacks, but the suitability of blinding de-
pends entirely on the details of the cryptosystem. However, the majority of public key
cryptosystems have the required algebraic structure for applying this countermeasure.
3.3 Power analysis
3.3.1 Introduction
Power analysis attacks were discovered by Kocher, Jaffe and Jun [78] in 1998. One
proposed way to counteract timing attacks was to introduce “dummy” computations,
such as empty loops, in the execution of the cryptographic algorithm. Kocher et al.
noticed that this might be insufficient defence, as the power consumption of “dummy”
computations is different from the power consumption of meaningful ones. They have
spent several months exploring this idea, and finally, by using relatively inexpensive
equipment, managed to discover secret keys from a number of smart-cards. They
claimed that for some devices, a power trace (where a trace is a set of power consump-
tion measurements taken across the cryptographic operation) of a single cryptographic
operation can reveal the value of the secret key. They also claimed that by examining
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as few as 1000 power traces and applying statistical analysis on the obtained data (Fig-
ure 3.2), they could break any smart-card on the market [78]. This drew the attention of
both the smart-card vendors and the cryptographic community, and yet again featured
in the New York Times [134].
Figure 3.2: The power analysis principle [94].
3.3.2 Power dissipation
Most modern cryptographic devices are implemented using Complementary Metal Ox-
ide Semiconductor (CMOS) technology. The main characteristic of this technology
can be demonstrated with inverters or NOT gates (Figure 3.3). The inverter has two
transistors that act as voltage controlled switches. When the inverter input is high, the
top switch opens and the bottom closes. This grounds the inverters output and it goes
low. On the other hand, when the input voltage is low, the top switch closes, and the
bottom switch opens setting the output to high.
Figure 3.3: CMOS inverter.
Power dissipation in most CMOS circuits can be divided into three parts [135]: (1)
static dissipation, (2) dynamic dissipation and (3) short-circuit dissipation.
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Static dissipation (Ps): is due to the leakage of current drawn continuously from the
power supply, and is equal to:
Ps = Ileak ·Vdd
where Ileak is the leakage current and Vdd is the supply voltage.
Dynamic dissipation (Pd): is due to the current that is required to charge and discharge
the capacitive load, and is the dominant source of power dissipation in current
CMOS technologies [135]. Dynamic power dissipation can be seen as:
Pd = f ·Cl ·V 2dd ·Ac
where Ac is the circuit activity, f is frequency of switching, Cl is circuit capaci-
tance and Vdd is power supply voltage.
Short-circuit dissipation (Psc): is due to the short current flowing from Vdd to Vss. This
occurs during the short period of time in the transition from 0 to 1 or, alterna-
tively, from 1 to 0, during which both transistors are on, and is given by:
Psc = Imean ·Vdd
where Imean is the mean current and Vdd is the supply voltage.
The total power dissipation can be obtained from the sum of the three dissipation com-
ponents:
Ptotal = Ps +Pd +Psc
However, the dynamic power dissipation is the most dominant in this formula [135,
136], which reduces the total dissipation estimate to:
Ptotal ≈ Pd = f ·Cl ·V 2dd ·Ac (3.1)
Equation 3.1 shows that for given voltage supply Vdd and capacitive load Cl power
dissipation of the circuit is proportional to the circuit activity Ac. In other words,
the more capacitance that is switched, the more power is dissipated. This is the key
characteristic of CMOS technology that has inspired the attackers of cryptographic
systems to develop power-based side-channel attacks.
The source of current for most devices is supplied by the constant voltage, and the
power dissipation of these devices is proportional to the flow of current through them
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(P = I ·V , where P is the power). It is now clear how power consumption/dissipation
can be correlated to the calculations performed in the cryptographic device.
The basic assumption in power analysis is that the device dissipates more power
when processing a 1 in comparison to the power that is dissipated when processing a
0. For example, the multiplier would do more work when the multiplier bit is 1 than it
would do when the bit is 0. The power dissipation is useful to the attacker because it
is correlated with the operations performed in the device.
Power analysis attacks are based on measuring the power that is consumed by the
devices. Kocher et al. [78] in their experiments measured the circuit’s power consump-
tion by inserting a small (50 Ω) resistor in series with the power or ground input. The
voltage difference across the resistor divided by its resistance yielded the current. They
sampled voltage differences at a high rate and then processed the data using statistical
methods. Depending on the way in which the obtained data is seen and processed, two
general types of power analysis can be distinguished:
1. Simple power analysis (SPA)
2. Differential power analysis (DPA).
3.4 Simple power analysis
3.4.1 Attack details
Simple power analysis (SPA) is a cryptanalytic technique whereby information about
the operation performed in the device, or the operands manipulated in the operation,
can be directly interpreted from a single power trace. Often this single trace is replaced
with the average of a number of traces in order to reduce the measurement noise.
The success of this approach and the techniques used in the attack depends on the
implementation of the cryptographic algorithm and the operations used in it.
The SPA attack was first performed by Kocher, Jaffe and Jun [78] from Cryptog-
raphy Research in San Francisco. In the power traces obtained from the power con-
sumption measurements taken across a cryptographic operation of DES, 16 rounds of
DES were clearly visible (Figure 3.4(a)). A detailed analysis of the traces, revealed the
number of rotations performed on C and D registers (see Section 2.2 for the description
of DES) that are used during the key schedule. Figure 3.4(b) shows that in round 2 (left
arrow) registers C and D were rotated once and in round 3 (two right arrows) they were
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rotated twice. Small variations between the rounds turned out to be SPA weaknesses
caused by conditional jumps based on key bits and computational intermediates. An
even closer look, enabled Kocher et al. to distinguish between microprocessor instruc-
tions.
(a) Power trace of the entire DES encryption.
(b) Power trace of DES rounds 2 and 3.
Figure 3.4: SPA attack on DES [78].
A SPA attack can reveal the sequence of operations executed and, therefore, can be
used to break cryptographic implementations in which the execution path depends on
the data being processed, more specifically the secret data. For example, some points
for the attack, as Kocher et al. [78] suggested, could be:
DES key schedule: The DES key schedule involves rotating 28-bit key registers. Ro-
tations are most commonly implemented by shifting one bit of one end and ap-
pending a 0 at the other. If the bit shifted off is a 1 then the appended 0 is flipped.
This conditional operation may be detected in the power trace, as the resulting
trace for bits 1 and 0 will have different characteristics, and can be distinguished.
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DES permutation: DES implementations usually contain a number of bit permuta-
tions. Conditional branching in software can cause power consumption differ-
ences when bits zero and one are manipulated.
Comparisons: Memory comparisons or string comparisons can cause SPA and tim-
ing vulnerabilities, because they usually perform a conditional branch when a
mismatch occurs.
Multipliers: Circuits that implement modular multiplications tend to take into account
a great deal of information about the data being processed, and therefore leak a
substantial amount of information about that data. The existence of weaknesses
depends on the multiplier implementation but weaknesses are often correlated to
operand values and Hamming weights.
Exponentiators: Modular exponentiation functions are usually implemented to scan
across the exponent from left to right, performing a squaring operation in every
iteration and an additional multiplication for each value 1 bit of the exponent.
If the squaring and multiplication operations have different power signatures,
exponentiation operation can be compromised. This analysis is similar to that
of the timing attack. Modular operations that operate on two of more bits at the
time may have more complex leakage characteristics.
Given the architectural details, SPA can more easily interpret the power consump-
tion curve. Generally, any implementation where the path of execution depends on the
values of the bits of the secret key is potentially vulnerable to this attack.
Besides exploiting the correlation of power consumption with the operations per-
formed in the device, SPA can also exploit the correlation between the power con-
sumption and the operands. Typically the power consumption is correlated with the
Hamming weight of operands. The Hamming weight represents the number of 1s in
the binary representation of data. This type of correlation occurs when the power con-
sumption varies with the number of 1s that change.
In a typical smart-card microprocessor a large portion of the power dissipation
occurs in the gates attached to internal buses. Experiments reported by Messerges et
al. [97] have shown that the activity on data- and address-buses is the dominant cause
of power consumption changes. There are two types of correlation between power and
the operands [97, 14]. Which of the two types is observed depends on the design of a
particular device in question [104].
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The two types of correlation are as follows:
• Hamming weight correlation, which occurs when the power consumption and
the number of 1s written on the bus are directly correlated.
• Transition count correlation, which occurs when the power consumption and the
number of bits that change on the bus are correlated. In other words, the power
is correlated to the Hamming weight of the XOR of the current and the previous
value on the bus.















bits of information about its value [76]. Physical implementations of many cryptosys-















bits of information about each byte of the DES key. In total this is 7 ·2.54≈ 17.8 key
bits. In this way the key space is reduced to approximately 238 possibilities [104],
which further facilitates the brute force attack to which DES is already susceptible2.
Messerges et al. [97] noticed that the Hamming weight information is best used
with some information about the cipher implementation. For example, in the case
of DES, in the PC1 phase, if the attacker has information about the key bytes and
also about shifted versions of the key bytes, a more powerful attack can be mounted.
Namely, given the Hamming weight of each byte for eight of the C and D shifts, there
is enough information to discover every key bit using the equation:
A~k = ~w, (3.2)
where ~w is a 56×1 vector of Hamming weights, wi;~k is a 56×1 binary vector of the
key bits, k j; and A is a 56×56 binary matrix such that Ai j is 1 if and only if weight wi
includes key bit k j. Using this technique, even algorithms that use more than 56 key
bits, such as triple DES, could be vulnerable [97].
Further, in [97] it is explained how a SPA attack can be mounted if the transi-
tion count rather than Hamming weight information is available. Namely, the attacker
2For ciphers with longer key sizes (such as triple DES) even the Hamming weight information cannot
facilitate the brute force attack [104].
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would need to know what is on the data-bus before and after the data being observed
is accessed. In many cases this data is a fixed address or an instruction opcode, which
can facilitate the situation. If the attacker can access this data, then he would be able
to set up a system of equations similar to those given in Equation 3.2. Should the at-
tacker not have all the necessary information, then he might need to resort to trial and
error methods to determine the correct equations. As the number of such possibilities
is limited, this approach is considered feasible.
Experiments reported in [97] have confirmed that poor implementations of DES
almost always leak sufficient information to mount the SPA attack. Shifting the key
bytes or the use of conditionals is especially vulnerable. Also, if the portion of the
code runs in variable time, power analysis could be used to mount the timing attack.
3.4.2 Countermeasures
Kocher et al. [78] concluded that, in general, it is not particularly difficult to build
an SPA resistant device. Avoiding the usage of secret values to perform conditional
operations can prevent SPA from correlating power consumption and the operations
that are performed. This can be seen in the example of modular exponentiation. Al-
gorithm 5 shows the implementation of modular exponentiation which is resistant to
simple power analysis (quoted from [104]).
Algorithm 5 SPA-resistant repeated square-and-multiply algorithm.
INPUT: M,N,d = (dn−1, . . . ,d1,d0)2
OUTPUT: S = Md mod N
1: S← 1
2: for j = n−1 to 0 do
3: S0← S2 mod N
4: S1← S0 ·M mod N
5: S← Sd j
6: end for
In algorithms that inherently assume this type of key-dependent branching, it might
not be possible to achieve this type of protection, or it can require creative coding and
introduce a serious performance penalty [78]. However, the size of SPA characteristic
could be reduced by moving the operations with large power characteristics, multipli-
cations for instance, outside of conditional branches [104] as shown in Algorithm 5.
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In some cases even constant execution path code can demonstrate serious SPA vul-
nerabilities, if the nature of the device is such that the attacks could make correlations
between the power and the operands [78]. Chari et al. [36] suggested that a way to
counteract this problem is to randomly split every bit of the original computation into
k shares. Every share is equally probable and every subset of k− 1 shares is statis-
tically independent of the encoded bit. Computations are then performed on shares,
without ever reconstructing the original bit. The shares are refreshed after each opera-
tion that involves them, to prevent information leakage. The method to encode the bit
into shares must be chosen according to the computation being protected. For example,
bit b can be encoded as k random shares: b⊕ r1,r2, . . . ,r1⊕ r2⊕·· ·⊕ rk−1, where ris
are randomly chosen bits. This approach increases the amount of noise by obscuring
the value of sensitive data. To deduce the sensitive data the attacker must now combine
multiple power measurements from various locations within the power trace.
3.5 Differential power analysis
3.5.1 Introduction
Differential power analysis (DPA) is a class of side-channel attack that is more power-
ful than simple power analysis. Actually, DPA is believed to be the most threatening
attack that resulted from Kocher’s research. This is primarily because the attacker does
not need to know as many details about the algorithm implementation in order to per-
form this attack. Moreover, this attack gains additional strength by using statistical
analysis to help recover the secret information from the side-channel.
To carry out a DPA attack, an attacker must have a number of power consumption
curves (PCC) collected from a device that has repeatedly executed a cryptographic
operation with different inputs and the same key. It is crucial that PCCs contain infor-
mation about the secret key that can be deduced using statistical methods. The algo-
rithmic condition, the so-called fundamental hypothesis, states that for a DPA attack to
be successful the following must be true (quoted from [57]):
Definition 3.5.1 (Fundamental Hypothesis). There exists an intermediate variable,
that appears during the computation of the algorithm, such that knowing a few bits
(in practice less than 32 bits) allows to decide whether two inputs (respectively two
outputs) give or not the same value for this variable.
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In other words, the (only) algorithmic condition is that there must exist an intermedi-
ate variable whose value is dependent upon an easily accessible subset of the secret
key and upon known plaintext or ciphertext data. The key bits involved may then be
reconstructed by partitioning the power curves according to the chosen intermediate
value, and comparing the calculated average curves. The attack is successful if there
is a significant difference between two average curves at one or more points in time.
What makes the attack particularly interesting, and at the same time powerful, is that
most cryptographic algorithms satisfy the fundamental hypothesis.
3.5.2 Attack details
The attack is performed as follows. Let T1,T2, . . . ,Tn be power traces collected from
a cryptographic device that is repeatedly performing a cryptographic operation using
different inputs and the same key. Each trace is an array of k power consumption
measurements and represents the power consumed during each cryptographic opera-
tion. The general assumption is that the power consumption is different depending on
whether zero or one is the calculated value of the specific bit (b) that is being taken into
consideration. The bit b is determined by a selection function, D, which depends on
the cipher. It is crucial that the key bits are manipulated during the operation defined
by the selection function.
The attacks in [78] were performed on the DES encryption algorithm, because of
its widespread use. In each of its 16 rounds, the DES performs eight S-box lookup
operations. Each of the 8 S-boxes takes as input 6 bits and outputs 4 bits of data. The
input 6 bits are generated by XORing 6 bits of the key with 6 bits of the R register (see
Section 2.2 for the description of DES).
The selection function for DES can be defined as follows. If the attacker has knowl-
edge of the plaintexts, the selection function D can be defined as the first bit of the
register R1, which can be calculated as:
R1 = L0⊕F(R0,K1) (3.3)
where
R1 – is the register containing the rightmost 32 bits of the results of the first round
transformation.
L0 – is the register containing the leftmost 32 bits of the results of the initial permuta-
tion of the plaintext - a value known to the attacker.
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R0 – is the register containing the rightmost 32 bits of the results of the initial permu-
tation of the plaintext - a value also known to the attacker.
K1 – is the first round key.
F – is the round function.
The only unknown in Equation 3.3 is the value of round key K1. From the definition of
the round function (F) and the S-boxes, it follows that the first bit of R1 is influenced
by only 6 bits of the first round key K1. The attacker does not know these bits, but can
use brute force and try all of the 26 possibilities.
To generalise, for each guess of the key, Ks, the PCCs are partitioned into two
groups according to the intermediate value of the bit b calculated during the operation
(using the selection function D), as follows. Let T0 and T1 be the two partitions of the
power traces:
T0 = {Ti : b = 0}
T1 = {Ti : b = 1}









where |T0|+ |T1|= n, and Ti[ j] is the j-th power consumption measurement in the i-th
power trace. Next, the attacker computes the differential trace ∆:
∆[ j] = A1[ j]−A0[ j]
∆[ j] is therefore the average over n plaintexts of the effect on the power consumption
measurements at point j, due to the value represented by the selection function D.
If Ks is incorrectly guessed, the bit computed using D will differ from the actual
target bit for about half of the plaintexts. The selection function is, therefore, uncorre-
lated to what is actually computed in the device. In that case, function D is a random
function that is used to divide the set of all power samples into two subsets and there-
fore it should be that:
lim
n→∞
∆[ j] = 0.
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In practice, however, this differential trace might not be completely flat and it might
even show a slight correlation to the trace for the correct key guess [78].
If, on the other hand, the guess Ks was correct, the computed value of the selection
function should be equal to the value calculated in the target device. Therefore, the
selection function is actually correlated to the value manipulated in the device and the
power consumption and the selection function are also correlated. If the bit b was
manipulated at times j′, then the expected difference in power when two values of b
are manipulated should be:
E[Ti[ j
′]|b = 1]−E[Ti[ j′]|b = 0] = ε > 0. (3.4)
When j is not equal to j′, the power dissipation should be independent of the value of
the bit b, and therefore this difference should be zero, i.e.:
E[Ti[ j]|b = 1]−E[Ti[ j]|b = 0] = 0,∀ j 6= j′. (3.5)
As the number of traces grows, values A1[ j] and A0[ j] converge to E[Ti[ j]|b = 1] and
E[Ti[ j]|b = 0], respectively. Therefore, according to Equations 3.4 and 3.5:
lim
n→∞
∆[ j] = lim
n→∞
(A1[ j]−A0[ j]) =
{
ε, j = j′
0, j 6= j′
(3.6)
Equations 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 show that if enough plaintext samples are used, ∆[ j]
will show a power bias (spike) of ε at time j′, and will converge to zero at all other
times. However, due to small statistical biases in the outputs from the S-boxes, the
Equation 3.6 is not entirely correct, and in practice ∆[ j] will not always converge to
zero, but a larger bias will occur at time j′ [97]. If the key used for the cryptographic
operation was correct, a spike will appear where the selection function is correlated to
the value of the bit being manipulated.
In summary, the attack works as follows. For each guess the attacker constructs a
new partition for the power traces and a new differential trace, ∆[ j]. If the appropriate
selection function was chosen, the differential trace should show biases whenever the
bit defined by the selection function was manipulated. If the selection function was
not chosen correctly, then the resulting ∆[ j] will not show any biases. In this way the
attacker can determine the six bits of the first round key, K1. Repeating this approach
for seven other S-boxes the attacker can learn the entire 48 bits of the first round key.
The remaining 8 bits of the DES key can be discovered by brute force, or by applying
the attack on the successive rounds.
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The attack can also be performed on the last round of DES encryption. This attack
works similar to the case when the first round is attacked, except that in this case the
attacker needs to know the ciphertexts. The selection function can be in this case




⇒ R16 = L15⊕F(L16,K16)
⇒ L15 = R16⊕F(L16,K16) (3.7)
where
R16 – is the register containing the rightmost 32 bits of the results of the last round
transformation of DES and can be obtained by applying the inverse of the final
permutation on the ciphertext. Since the ciphertext is known to the attacker, this
value can be easily obtained.
L16 – is the register containing the leftmost 32 bits of the results of the last round
transformation of DES and can be obtained by applying the inverse of the final
permutation on the ciphertext. Since the ciphertext is known to the attacker, this
value can also be easily obtained.
L15 – is the L register after round 15.
K16 – is the key used in round 16.
F – is the round function.
The D function in Equations 3.3 and 3.7 was chosen because at some point during
DES encryption, the value of the specified bit must be calculated. When this occurs,
there will be a difference in the amount of power dissipated/consumed when this value
is equal to zero compared to the case when this value is equal to one.
3.5.3 Increasing the magnitude of the bias signal
The number of traces (n) that are required to successively perform the DPA attack,
depends on the noise in the power consumption measurements (σ) and on the size of
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Messerges et al. [97] suggested that a way to decrease the number of power con-
sumption measurements is to use multiple-bit DPA attacks, in which the magnitude of
the bias (ε) is increased. The magnitude of the bias depends on the number of bits that
are defined by the selection function D. In devices which show Hamming weight cor-
relation, for the selection function D that outputs d bits: ε = dl, where l is a constant
equal to the instantaneous power difference between two data words with Hamming
weights i and i+1. Experiments have shown [97] that this difference can be considered
approximately equal, for all i.
When performing the multiple-bit DPA attack, three sets are used for partitioning:
T0 = {Ti j : D(., ., .) = 0d}
T1 = {Ti j : D(., ., .) = 1d}
T2 = {Ti j : Ti j 6∈ T0,T1},
while the rest of the attack remains unchanged and the power traces in set T2 are not
used in the analysis.
An example of a 4-bit DPA attack on DES was outlined in [97]. The 4-bit selection
function is based on the 4-bit output from S-box. The power traces are partitioned
according to whether the output from the first S-box in the DES round functions is
0000 or 1111. The expected size of the bias signal is 4ε. The problem with this
approach is that each of the partitions should have about n/24 power traces. In that
way the averages of the partitions should have higher levels of noise. The experiments
in [97] have shown that this can introduce difficulties in recognising the bias of the
correct guess as the incorrect solution might have the same magnitude as the correct
key, in which case a small brute-force search could be used to discover the correct key.
Another way to mount a multiple-bit DPA attack is to partition the power traces
into T0 and T1 by not using the output, but the input to the S-box. In this way one
partition maximises the number of address-bus transitions and the other minimises the
number of address-bus transitions. The rest of the attack is repeated as usual.
As noted in [97], when mounting the d-bit DPA attack, the attacker may need to
use more power traces. This is due to the fact that a large portion of the power traces,
approximately n(1−21−d) power traces placed in the partition T2, are not used in the
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attack. As the averaging decreases noise, this would mean that the attacker would need
to obtain a higher number of power traces in order to reduce noise in partitions T0 and
T1. This implies that an attacker cannot arbitrarily increase the number of output bits
of the selection function, as the requirement for the number of power traces increases
significantly. Messerges et al. [97] have shown that if an attacker running a 1-bit DPA
attack needs n power samples to mount the attack, then for a d-bit DPA attack the
number of power samples needed to maintain the same signal-to-noise ratio is equal to
nd = 2d−1n/d2. It can be seen from this relation that for the 8-bit attack, only twice
as many power samples are needed. The advantage is that the resulting power bias in
d-bit attacks should be magnified d times. Experiments in [97] have confirmed that the
signal levels for multiple-bit DPA attacks are indeed much stronger.
3.5.4 Higher-order DPA attacks
In the DPA attack explained in Section 3.5.2, also known as the first-order DPA attack,
the attacker records the power consumption and computes their particular statistical
property for each individual instant of the computation. This attack does not require
any knowledge about the individual electric consumption of each instruction, nor the
positions in time in which each of these instructions occurred. It only relies on the
fundamental hypothesis given in Definition 3.5.1. This makes the (first-order) DPA
attack particularly impressive, since using simple mathematical tools and techniques
that are independent of the algorithm’s implementation, the values of the secret keys
can be relatively easily revealed.
The variations of this method which use more than one intermediate result in the
statistical analysis are called higher-order DPA attacks. Higher-order DPA attacks are
a generalisation of the (first-order) DPA attack, in which PCCs are analysed using joint
statistics applied to a collection of points in time. The higher-order attacks are more
powerful, but also more complicated as the choice of joint statistic and the points in
time may depend on the specifics of the cipher implementation.
Higher-order DPA attacks were defined in [78] as DPA attacks that use combi-
nations of one or more samples within a single power trace. During a first-order DPA
attack, the attacker calculates the statistical properties of each power trace at each sam-
ple point. In a higher-order DPA attack, the attacker calculates joint statistical proper-
ties of the power consumption traces at multiple sample points within each trace. The
definition of the n-th order DPA attack (quoted from [95]) is given next.
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Definition 3.5.2. An n-th order DPA attack makes use of n different samples in the
power consumption signal that correspond to n different intermediate values calcu-
lated during the execution of the algorithm.
Higher-order DPA attacks depend on the following fundamental hypothesis (quoted
from [15]):
Definition 3.5.3 (Fundamental Hypothesis (order n)). There exists a set of n in-
termediate variables, that appear during the computation of the algorithm, such that
knowing a few key bits (in practice less than 32 bits) allows to decide whether two
inputs (respectively two outputs) give or not the same value for a known function of
these n variables.
Chari et al. [36] have shown that the complexity of performing a higher-order DPA
attack increases with the exponent of the number of points used in the joint statistic.
In practice, higher-order DPA attacks are more difficult to mount than first-order
DPA attacks. For example, the second-order DPA attack requires more complex anal-
ysis, increased memory and processing requirements and increased number of power
consumption patterns [44]. Messerges [95] demonstrated that a second-order DPA
attack can be performed on the software implementation of the cipher which uses ran-
dom masking. Two implementations of a cipher are observed, pseudo-codes for which
are given in Figure 3.5.
W 1(plaintext)
{








B: r mask = random();
m plaintext = plaintext ˆ r mask;






Figure 3.5: Routines vulnerable to first and second-order DPA attacks.
In the routine W1 the operation at line A is vulnerable to the first-order DPA attack.
The routine W2 is resistant to first-order DPA attack, but the joint statistic applied at
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the operations on lines B and C mounts the second-order DPA attack. The DPA bias
statistic for routine W2 is defined as:
∆ = S̄0− S̄1
where S̄b, for b = {0,1} is an average statistic calculated as S̄b = |PB−PC|, over all
plaintext input values in which the i-th bit is set to either 0 or 1, and PB and PC are
instantaneous power consumptions at points B and C, respectively. If ∆ > 0, then the
key bit is equal to one, otherwise it is equal to zero. Further details of the correct-
ness of this approach are given in [95]. The author also points out that in this attack
the knowledge of the cipher implementation is important, since otherwise the attacker
would need to resort to additional statistical analysis to find the critical points.
3.5.5 Variations of the DPA attack
Biham and Shamir [29] studied the power analysis of key scheduling in AES can-
didates. They noted that an important disadvantage of the DPA attack was that the
attacker has to know all the plaintexts (for the attack on the first round) or all the ci-
phertexts (for the attack on the last round). The authors point out that, in reality, the
attacker does not necessarily know the precise values of the inputs or the outputs, as
these could be additionally protected with an unknown protocol. Biham and Shamir in-
troduced a variant of power analysis in which the attacker does not have to know either
the inputs or the outputs of the encryption operations, the precise timing in which they
were carried out, or the details of their software implementations in the smart-cards.
Their technique performs the power analysis of the key scheduling part of the block
cipher, as an important target for power analysis because its power consumption is a
function of the key, and not of the data, and thus could be used to attack smart-cards
in which the plaintext, ciphertext, protocols and implementation details are unknown
to the attacker. It is, however, assumed that the protocol always performs the same
subroutines in the same order, and that they always require the same number of clock
cycles. As a result, the power consumption graphs of different executions of the pro-
tocol can be aligned and compared at the level of single instructions.
The first part of the attack is to discover the portion of the power trace which
corresponds to the key scheduling operation, and is performed in two steps:
Step 1 – The attacker executes the protocol many times on a single smart-card in dif-
ferent contexts (i.e. executing different operations). The attacker then aligns the
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power curves at each clock cycle, and compares them. Next, those clock cycles
in which the graphs show a large variability in power consumption, due to dif-
ferences in the processed data, are eliminated from further consideration. The
remaining clock cycles represent operations that are data-independent.
Step 2 – The attacker repeats Step 1 for several smart-cards, which contain different
cryptographic keys, and finds their common data-independent regions. Regions
which show small variability among different cards and which are likely to be
standard system-wide operations are eliminated.
The attacker performs a filtering process identifying the cycles in which each card
behaves in the same way (regardless of the values being processed), but different cards
behave in different ways (depending on the card’s unique identity). These periods
will include the key scheduling elements of the encryption process, but not the routine
book-keeping operations or the actual data encrypting steps.
The next step is to study the individual steps of the key scheduling algorithm. Soft-
ware implementations of iterated block ciphers usually compute each subkey just be-
fore it is used in the appropriate round (usually due to small RAM size). The computed
subkey is stored in the RAM in chunks of 8 bits. The amount of current consumed de-
pends on the number of 1s among the 8 written bits. Even though the measurements are
likely to contain many errors and provide only partial information about the key, they
can be smoothed by averaging the power consumed by the large number of executions
with a common key. The crucial observation is that even imperfect measurements of
the Hamming weights of a small number of bytes generated during the key scheduling
part of the block cipher can completely reveal the key.
Biham and Shamir performed the analysis of the feasibility of applying this attack
to each of the AES candidates. In particular, the authors note that Rijndael applies
several layers of XORing each key word into the next word, with almost no other
information in between. There is mixing in the key bytes, but the authors claimed that
the derivation of Hamming weights is not expected to be very complicated.
Clavier et al. [39] also proposed an improvement to the general DPA technique,
called Hamming integration variant method. They have noticed that if more than one
output bit of S-boxes are observed, more information can be extracted in comparison
to a DPA attack in which only one output bit is observed. In the case of DES, the
basic idea is that instead of considering one output bit of the S-boxes, all four output
bits are considered. The Hamming integration method assumes that the device’s power
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consumption is proportional to the Hamming weights of the observed data. PCCs are
classified according to the Hamming weights of the S-box outputs (details can be found
in [39]). The signal-to-noise ratio is increased this way, which should have a conse-
quence of enabling a successful attack with a reduced number of PCCs. The authors
also observe that very strong correlation exists between the chip’s power consumption
and the operations being executed. This value is high during data transfers between the
CPU and external RAM, so the operation which is performed after the S-box output
is determined, can be targeted for DPA. They notice that, in this case, the power con-
sumption does not depend only on the value of the bit that is output from the S-box,
but also on the transitions that occur on the data-bus. A high power consumption is
expected when a 1 is written on the bus previously discharged, or similarly when a 0
is written on the bus previously charged. The authors noticed that the status of the bus
must be considered when all four output bits from the S-box are observed simultane-
ously, as the information could be lost otherwise. This means that the previous value
of the bus line must be determined. If the attacker does not know the previous value of
bus line, all possibilities must be examined experimentally.
3.5.6 Countermeasures
The fact that DPA attacks represent a real threat to cryptographic devices has sparked
huge interest in preventing these attacks and protecting cryptographic devices. DPA
was demonstrated as being able to break almost any implementation of both symmetric
and asymmetric ciphers and the majority of the proposed countermeasures were shown
not to be sufficient. Rather than preventing the attack, countermeasures tend to increase
the complexity of performing the attack to the point that it becomes infeasible or too
expensive to perform it.
The complexity of differential power analysis can be increased by introducing soft-
ware (algorithmic) and hardware (physical) countermeasures. Software countermea-
sures tend to be more desirable, since they can be implemented on existing architec-
tures. Hardware countermeasures, although generally more costly to implement, might
be necessary depending on the desired level of security.
DPA is an implementation-oriented attack that exploits the fact that the power con-
sumption pattern is correlated to the value of at least one bit of the secret key. A
general strategy to render DPA more complex to apply, is to balance and randomise
major computations which involve the secret key. This in turn is equivalent to increas-
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ing the amount of noise that is already present in the power traces, and in that way
hiding the DPA bias signal.
3.5.7 Software countermeasures
Although considered inexpensive, software countermeasures can result in significant
memory and execution time overheads [35]. The overhead depends on the type and
arrangement of the fundamental operations used in an algorithm. Some of the proposed
software countermeasures are summarised in the following sections.
3.5.7.1 Desynchronisation
The major strength of the DPA attack comes from the assumption that the sequence
of instructions is fixed, and that in adding power consumptions up, the instructions are
paired nicely. Daemen and Rijmen [46] suggested that inserting dummy instructions
based on some modifying parameter, could make the straightforward attack not work
anymore. However, dummy instructions, as any other instruction, have characteristic
power signatures, which weakens this countermeasure.
3.5.7.2 Software balancing
Software balancing was also proposed by Daemen and Rijmen [46]. This technique
specifies that the program is written in a such way that during the execution both the
data and its complement are processed. In this way the correlation between data and
power consumed is decreased, but overheads could be significant.
3.5.7.3 The ”duplication” method
Goubin and Patarin [57] studied how DPA attacks may be prevented by using the fol-
lowing idea: replace each variable V that occurs during the computation and that de-
pends on the inputs or the outputs, with k variables V1, . . . ,Vk, and an appropriately
chosen function f for which V = f (V1, . . . ,Vk) that satisfies two additional conditions:
1. It is not possible to deduce information about the set of k values of variables Vi,
i = 1 . . .k, from any subset of k− 1 values. In other words, the knowledge of
k−1 variables Vi does not give any information about V itself.
2. Transformations to be performed on variables Vi during the computation can be
implemented without calculating the value of V .
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The cryptographic algorithm is transformed by replacing each intermediate variable V
depending on the inputs (or influencing the outputs) with k variables V1, . . . ,Vk. The
authors have demonstrated this approach in the cases of DES and RSA algorithms.
• For DES, each intermediate variable V is replaced with two variables V1 and V2.
They choose the function f (v1,v2) = v = v1⊕ v2, where⊕ is the XOR operation,
which obviously satisfies conditions 1 and 2.
• In the case of RSA, each intermediate variable V whose values lie in the multi-
plicative group of Z/nZ is replaced with two variables V1 and V2 and the choice
of function f (v1,v2) = v = v1·v2 mod n. It is easy to see that this function also
satisfies the conditions 1 and 2.
The authors claim that it is possible to show that when each variable is split into k
variables, the complexity of the implementation increases in O(k), while the complex-
ity of the attack should increase exponentially in k.
3.5.7.4 Random masking
Messerges [96] proposed a way of protecting vulnerable operations in cryptographic
algorithms by using a strategy that employs random masks. A random boolean and
arithmetic masking was proposed for masking fundamental operations used in im-
plementation of cryptographic algorithms vulnerable to power analysis. The random
masks decorrelate power consumption signals from the secret key and the input and
output data, thereby forcing the DPA to use joint probability distribution.
Each of the masking strategies consists of masking word x with random mask rx
resulting in x′. Two types of masking are distinguished:
• Boolean masking, which uses bitwise XOR and masks x with rx as follows:
x′ = x⊕ rx. This type of masking can be used in DES.
• Arithmetic masking, which uses addition and subtraction modulo 232 (it is as-
sumed that the data is represented with 32-bit words) and masks x with rx as
follows: x′ = (x− rx) mod 232. This type of masking can be used in RSA.
The basic strategy is to mask the key and the input operation prior to algorithm
execution. In that case, since the algorithm is executed on masked data, all the inter-
mediate results are also masked. As the new mask is randomly chosen for each new run
of the algorithm, the statistical correlation of the power consumption measurements is
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not sufficient for a successful attack. The attacker would have to look at joint probabil-
ity distributions of multiple points in the power signal in order to successfully mount
the power analysis attack.
Boolean and arithmetic masking operations are possible only if all the fundamen-
tal operations of the algorithm can work with masked input and produce masked out-
put. Different classes of cryptographic algorithms use different masking depending on
the kind of operations performed in the algorithm. For example, DES requires only
boolean masking; while RSA uses only arithmetic operations and, therefore, needs
only an arithmetic mask. On the other hand, some algorithms require more than one
mask, for instance algorithms which perform both arithmetic and boolean operations,
boolean-to-arithmetic and arithmetic-to-boolean maskings are required.
The boolean-to-arithmetic masking is given in Algorithm 6 (quoted from [96]), in
which x represents the unmasked data, x′ the masked data, and rx a random mask.
The algorithm works by unmasking x using the XOR operation and then arithmetically
masking x using modular subtraction. Since the unmasked x can be vulnerable to
power analysis attack, a random value C is used to randomly select whether x or x̄
is unmasked. Arithmetic-to-boolean masking algorithm is very similar to boolean-to-
arithmetic algorithm (see [96] for further details).
Algorithm 6 Boolean-to-arithmetic masking.
INPUT: (x′,r) such that x = x′⊕ r
OUTPUT: (A,r) such that x = (A− r) mod 2k
1: Randomly select : C = 0 or C =−1
2: B = C⊕ r /* B = r or B = r̄ */
3: A = B⊕ x′ /* A = x or A = x̄ */
4: A = A−B /* A = x− r or A = x̄− r̄ */
5: A = A+C /* A = x− r or A = x̄− r̄−1 */
6: A = A⊕C /* A = x− r */
This technique shows better performance characteristics when compared to secret-
sharing heuristic (reviewed in Section 3.5.7.5), but should be carefully implemented.
Coron and Goubin [41] proved that the approach given in [96] is not sufficient to
prevent DPA. According to [96], the basic strength of the masking algorithm is in the
fact that the attacker never knows whether variable x or x̄ is being calculated; therefore,
the attacker cannot guess the bits of the key. In [41] it is pointed out that this is true if
only one bit is observed (one-bit DPA attack). If two bits are observed, then a DPA-like
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attack can be applied. This attack is based on the fact that if two bits of x are equal
then those two bits are also equal in x̄. Therefore, in the attack, all PCCs are divided
into two groups according to this criteria. If the power consumption when two bits
are equal differs from the case when these bits differ, then the 2-bit DPA attack can be




where µi j, i, j ∈ {0,1}, is the mean value of power consumption when the pair of ob-
served bits is equal to ′i j′.
The authors provide no experimental results for their analysis, but point out that
this is not a higher-order DPA attack, because the latter consider joint probability dis-
tributions of multiple points in the power signal. The higher-order DPA attack, as
shown in [36], requires a number of experiments that is exponential in the number of
points considered. The authors argue that since this attack concentrates only at one
point in the power signal, the required number of experiments should be of the same
order as in the case of a single-bit DPA.
3.5.7.5 Secret-sharing
Chari et al. [36] proposed a general technique to counter statistical attacks in devices
where the power model is reasonable and the source of randomness exists. Their tech-
nique is based on a well known secret-sharing scheme, which randomly splits every
relevant bit into several (k) shares. Each of k shares and furthermore, every collection
of k−1 shares should be statistically independent of the bit required for computation.
In this way only shares of the sensitive data are manipulated and never the data itself.
This share-based technique needs to be applied for a sufficient number of steps into
the computation until the attacker has a very low probability of predicting bits, i.e.,
until sufficient secret key operations have been carried out. Similar splitting has also
to be performed at the end of computation if attacker can access its outputs. This gen-
erally increases the noise and complicates the analysis of data, as the attacker has to
analyse joint distribution functions on multiple points in the power trace. The authors
claim that the number of power traces needed to perform the attacks increases expo-
nentially with the noise. This countermeasure eliminates the threat of the first-order
DPA attack and forces the attacker to mount a second-order DPA attack. However,
the performance penalty of the secret-sharing scheme could make this countermeasure
impractical [104, 103].
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3.5.7.6 Elliptic curve cryptography
The use of elliptic curves in cryptography was first proposed by Koblitz [74] and
Miller [99] in 1985. Since then, elliptic curves (EC) over large finite fields have be-
come a common way to implement public-key protocols. Elliptic curve cryptosystems
(ECC) can use much smaller key sizes, typically around 160 bits, providing the same
security level as 1024 key bits of RSA. In addition, ECCs show better performance
and computation speed than other multiplication groups such as RSA and ElGamal at
the same security level [60]. This makes ECCs very attractive for implementations on
devices with limited memory and computation capabilities, such as smart-cards.
Definition 3.5.4. An elliptic curve over field K is a pair (E,O) where E is a non-
singular curve of genus one over K with a point O ∈ E. The set of points (x,y) ∈K×K
verifying the (non-singular) Weierstraß equation
E/K : y
2 +a1xy+a3y = x
3 +a2x
2 +a4x+a6 (ai ∈K) (3.8)
together with O, form an elliptic curve over K. The point O is called the point of
infinity.
If char K 6= 2 and char K 6= 3, Equation 3.8 can be reduced to the form:
E/K : y
2 = x3 +a2x +b (a,b ∈K).
In the field K = GF(2n) of characteristic 2, Equation 3.8 can be reduced to the form:
E/K : y
2 + xy = x3 +a2x +b (a,b ∈K).
The set of points (x,y) on an elliptic curve, together with point O can be equipped with
an Abelian group structure by the following operation.
Definition 3.5.5 (Addition formula for char K 6= 2,3). Let P = (x1,y1) 6= O be the
point on the elliptic curve. The inverse of P is:
−P = (x1,−y1).
Let Q = (x2,y2) 6= O be a second point on the elliptic curve. The sum P+Q = (x3,y3)
can be calculated as:
x3 = λ2− x1− x2




x2−x1 , i f P 6= Q
3x12+a
2y1
, i f P = Q
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Definition 3.5.6 (Addition formula for char K = 2). Let P = (x1,y1) 6= O be the
point on the elliptic curve. The inverse of P is:
−P = (x1,x1 + y1).
Let Q = (x2,y2) 6= O be a second point on the elliptic curve. The sum P+Q = (x3,y3)
can be calculated as:
x3 = λ2 +λ+ x1 + x2 +a





, i f P 6= Q, (3.10)
and as
x3 = λ2 +λ+a
y3 = x21 +(λ+1)x3




, i f P = Q. (3.11)
One of the main drawbacks of using ECs in cryptography is the fact that adding two
points requires too many field multiplications. Certain special curve types allow for
faster addition, but this choice has to be carefully made as shown in [55].
Koblitz [75] suggested an alternative, which he called anomalous binary curves
(ABC curves) or Koblitz curves. These are the curves of types:
E1 : y
2 + xy = x3 + x2 +1
E2 : y
2 + xy = x3 +1
over GF(2n). Cryptosystems based on these curves offer significant advantage in terms
of reduced processing time. This fact, together with the short key size, has made
Koblitz curve cryptosystems attractive for practical implementations.
Similarly, in order to ease additions, Montgomery [101] considered the family of
the elliptic curves of the form:
E/K : By
2 = x3 +Ax2 + x,
where B(A2−4) 6= 0 and char K 6= 2, and the cardinality of E(K) is divisible by 4.
Hessian-type elliptic curves were also considered because they provide unified for-
mula for adding and doubling. They are defined as the intersection of the two quadrics
in P3, and can be given in the following form:
E/K : x
3 + y3 +1 = 3Dxy,
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where D ∈K, D3 6= 1, and the cardinality of E(K) is divisible by 3.
Projective coordinates. The addition formulae, given in Equations 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11,
require a number of arithmetic operations, namely, additions, squaring, multiplications
and inversions over GF(2n). The representation of points of the elliptic curves can
influence the cost of point adding and doubling [61]. To avoid costly inversions, it is
convenient to use projective coordinates. Among numerous possibilities, the two most
commonly used are homogeneous and Jacobian projective coordinates.
• Homogenous projective coordinates are obtained by setting x = X/Z and y =
Y/Z, whereby the general Weierstraß equation becomes:
E/K : Y
2Z +a1XY Z +a3Y Z




The point of infinity O is represented by (0,θ,0) for some θ ∈K∗, and the affine
point (x,y) is represented by (θx,θy,θ) for some θ ∈K∗, and a projective point
(X ,Y,Z) 6= O corresponds to affine point (X/Z,Y/Z).
• Jacobian projective coordinates are obtained by setting x = X/Z2 and y = Y/Z3,
whereby the general Weierstaß equation becomes:
E/K : Y
2 +a1XY Z +a3Y Z




The point of infinity O is represented by (θ2,θ3,0) for some θ ∈ K∗, and the
affine point (x,y) is represented by (θ2x,θ3y,θ) for some θ∈K∗, and a projective
point (X ,Y,Z) 6= O corresponds to affine point (X/Z2,Y/Z3).
Scalar multiplication. The basic operation performed in ECC algorithms is the ellip-
tic curve scalar multiplication over a large finite field (definitions and details regarding
finite fields can be found in [84]). Elliptic curve scalar multiplication (or just scalar
multiplication) is the operation of adding a point P to itself d times and is denoted as
dP. Scalar multiplication of a point on an EC is analogous to modular exponentiation
in a multiplicative group.
The group structure of the ECs enables the translation of existing discrete loga-
rithm cryptosystems into the context of elliptic curves [40]. The discrete logarithm
problem in group G of order n and generator g, is the problem of finding x given an
element y = gx of G. The basic strength of symmetric encryption algorithms is in the
discrete logarithm problem. Finding d such that Q = dP seems to be much harder in
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the group defined over the elliptic curve when compared to other groups, such as the
multiplicative group over the finite field.
The scalar multiplication used in ECCs is analogous to modular exponentiation in
multiplicative groups. The basic algorithm used for this operation is the double-and-
add algorithm given in Algorithm 7. Computing dP is based on a binary expansion
d = (dl−1, . . . ,d0) where dl−1 is the most significant bit of d, and it is sometimes known
as the binary algorithm.
Algorithm 7 Double-and-add algorithm for scalar multiplication
INPUT: P,d = (dl−1, . . . ,d0)
OUTPUT: Q← dP
1: Q← P
2: for i = l−2 to 0 do
3: Q← 2Q




Various techniques have been suggested to speed-up scalar multiplications. They
tend to reduce the number of point operations. For example, one idea is to precompute
the table of multiplies of the point P, for a known P. The feasibility of this approach
depends on the memory capabilities of the particular system.
Addition-subtraction chains. Choosing a representation of d that has fewer non-zero
elements, reduces the number of EC additions and improves the scalar multiplication.
The conventional binary system is non-redundant and d has only one representation.
Using different number systems which have redundancy in them, the integer d can be
represented in more than one way. One such approach uses signed binary expansion
of d and the fact that the addition and the subtraction have the same cost.






i, ci ∈ {−1,0,1}. (3.12)
The algorithm that uses this representation is called addition-subtraction algorithm
and is given in Algorithm 8.
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Algorithm 8 Addition-subtraction algorithm for scalar multiplication
INPUT: P,d = (dl−1, . . . ,d0)
OUTPUT: Q← dP
1: Q← P
2: for i = l−2 to 0 do
3: Q← 2Q
4: if ci = 1 then
5: Q← Q+P
6: end if




The non-adjacent form (NAF) of d is a signed binary expansion of d where cici+1 = 0
for all i > 1. It can be shown [55] that each positive integer has a unique NAF with the
minimal number of non-zero cis in the representation given by the Equation 3.12.
The problem of computing dP using the fewest number of EC group operations for
a given d, is equivalent to finding a shortest addition-subtraction chain for d [55]. An
addition chain for d is a sequence of positive integers:
a0 = 1→ a1→ a2→ ·· · → ar = d
such that ai = a j +ak for k ≤ j < i and for all i = 1,2, . . . ,r. An addition-subtraction
chain is defined as the extended addition chain, where ai =±a j±ak for some k ≤ j < i,
for all i = 1,2, . . . ,r. The shortest addition-subtraction chain for d gives the scalar mul-
tiplication for the fewest number of EC group operations. Now, dP is calculated by
computing a1P, a2P, . . . , arP = dP.
Resistance to SPA. Naive implementations of elliptic curve cryptosystems are highly
vulnerable to power analysis as Coron first suggested in [40]. If the scalar multipli-
cation is performed using the double-and-add algorithm, then SPA can be applied. In
Algorithm 7, the step Q← Q+P in line 4 is only processed if di = 1. The attacker
can attempt to determine the bits of d by seeing how the program behaves at the i f -
statement. The test is always carried out, but the point addition is performed only
when di = 1. This operation requires a number of time and power consuming opera-
tions, such as GF(2n) multiplications and inversions as shown in Equations 3.9, 3.10
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and 3.11. The attacker could try to spot this jump in the power trace, which would
enable him to discover the bits of the secret scalar d.
The major threat of SPA attack on ECCs comes from the fact that addition and
doubling operations can be distinguished. The power signal can show the difference
between point doubling and point addition in Algorithm 7, and in that way discover
the secret exponent d. The attacker only needs to observe the power consumption of
the device to identify those parts of the power curve that correspond to additions and
duplications, which trivially gives the key d.
Coron [40] suggested a simple solution to protect EC implementations against SPA.
The execution of the EC addition is made independent of the values of d, by removing
branches in the code that depend on the values of the secret scalar, as shown in Algo-
rithm 9. The drawback is that this solution penalises the running time. More efficient
SPA resistant algorithms have been suggested in [61].
Algorithm 9 Double-and-add scalar multiplication resistant to SPA attack.
INPUT: P,d = (dl−1, . . . ,d0)
OUTPUT: Q[0]← dP
1: Q[0]← P





It has been proposed that a model for the EC in which addition and doubling are
given by the same formula would not suffer from the side-channel analysis of the code
dependent nature of the operation. One common idea to make point addition and point
doubling indistinguishable is to unify the common part of the code for both operations
and add dummy code to balance the difference between the two operations [83]. How-
ever, this defence is unsuitable since the point addition and point doubling would still
have separate execution profiles, and would reside in different areas of memory and
execute in different parts of the hardware [83]. Even if the same code was used for
point addition and doubling operations, the test in the scalar multiplication could still
leak some information about the key. Ideally, one would have to execute the same code
at the same address with different results. For standard elliptic curves of the Weierstraß
model one cannot use the same formula for point addition and point doubling, since
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the addition formula has a singularity when the two points are the same. Liardet and
Smart [83] suggested that this can be achieved by using different forms of the curve,
where mathematically the point addition and point doubling use the same formula.
Their approach involves the representation of an elliptic curve as the intersection of
two quadratic surfaces in P3. The price of this technique is that the performance is
affected as the number of multiplications and squarings in the finite field increases.
They also combined their approach with the random windowing method (e.g. [55]) for
point multiplication and point blinding. However, even after using the various opti-
misations such as Jacobi form and the signed windowing method (details in [83]), the
total increase in the computation cost is 70% in comparison with a standard projective
coordinate method. In addition to the cost problems, Walter [133] proved that this
method is vulnerable to certain attacks.
Joye and Quisquater [69] investigated the cubic form of the EC, known as Hessian
form. The symmetry of the Hessian form, provides the same algorithm for point-
addition and point-doubling. This solution provided an improvement over Jacobian
curves of 33%. In a similar way, Brier and Joye in [31] showed how to perform
point doubling and point addition with the same formula with the general Weierstraß
parametrisation.
Oswald and Aigner [110] have proposed randomisation of the binary algorithm
(double-and-add algorithm in which d is represented using binary expansion) in or-
der to resist the power analysis. Most of the proposed countermeasures that use ran-
domisation as a way of resisting the power analysis [40, 61, 98] randomised the input
parameters (point P or the secret scalar exponent d) of the binary algorithm. In the so-
lution proposed in [110] the binary algorithm itself is randomised. This is achieved by
inserting random decisions into addition-subtractions chains, a technique which was
originally used to speed-up the binary algorithm [60].
Gebotys and Gebotys [54] investigated a modification of adding and doubling rou-
tines for security against power attacks, by inserting redundant operations into point-
addition and point-doubling routines so that the order and type of field operations were
identical, thereby making the signatures for doubling and addition not easily distin-
guishable in the power traces. Addition is split into two routines to help this, as the
code for addition is approximately twice as long as the code for doubling.
Okeya and Sakurai [107] took the approach of using a variant of Montgomery’s
point multiplication algorithm [101] for suitable curves over fields with odd charac-
teristic. Montgomery method is similar to Coron’s double-and-add method, as it al-
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ways performs double and add, and holds the two points during the computation. The
choice of point to add depends on the value of the bit of the secret exponent d (see
Algorithm 10). A method is shown to implement a scalar multiplication resistant to
power analysis using a combination of the Montgomery method, secure against SPA,
and Coron’s randomisation technique.
Algorithm 10 Scalar multiplication using the Montgomery method.








Möller [100] noticed that the previously mentioned methods, although efficient,
can be implemented only for specific ECs. Namely, ECs suitable for those in [83]
(curves with Jacobi form) have to have a group order that is divisible by 4; ECs suitable
for those in [69] (curves with Hessian form) have to have a group order that is divisible
by 3; and ECs suitable for those in [107] (curves with Montgomery form) have to have
a group order divisible by 4. Even though one can use an EC of the required form, it is
very likely that people will use the recommended standard. For example, over a large
prime field, NIST suggests using a curve of the large prime order and the order of the
above mentioned ECs is a small number.
Möller [100] suggested a technique that does not impose limitations to specific
chosen curves. In this solution scalar multiplication is done in such a way that point-
addition and point-doubling occur in a fixed pattern. The method used randomised
projective coordinates and the precomputed multiples of the point P, together with the
recoding of the multiplier d in a special signed-digit encoding. A 2w-ary representation







where b′i ∈ {0,1, . . . ,2w−1}. The k′ is chosen to be minimal, i.e. b′k′ 6= 0, and for
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such that bi ∈ {−2w,1, . . . ,2w−1}. The method precomputes points P, 2P, 3P, . . . ,
(2w−1)P, −2wP and uses these points to unify the point-addition and point-doubling
procedures. This method is more time-efficient than the ones described in [69] and [83].
While the method in [107] has performance advantages, its shortcoming is that it re-
quires specific curves. By implementing the method using randomised projective co-
ordinates and storing precomputed points in extended point representation, the infor-
mation leakage is limited. Möller’s technique is a combination of the Coron’s double-
and-add and the windowing method. The downfall is that it requires additional table
look-ups and a table size of 2w. This additional memory space is not always available,
particularly for devices with scarce memory, such as smart-cards.
Improvements of the scalar multiplications using windowing method were pro-
posed by Okeya and Tagaki [108, 109]. Both of these solutions based their improve-
ments on reducing the size of the look-up table by an appropriate choice of the win-
dowing method. The sizes of look-up tables are reduced to 2w−1 [109] and 2w−2 [108].
Another solution based on Montgomery multiplication that is applicable not only to
Montgomery curves but to any other type curve was suggested by Izu and Takagi [67].
This solution improves the addition chain as well as the addition formula. Izy and Tak-
agi also suggested addition formulae that use only the x-coordinates for the Weierstraß
form curve, that are also suitable for parallel execution.
In summary, the countermeasures against SPA on ECCs can be divided into three
main categories: (1) indistinguishable addition formulae that use one formula for both
elliptic addition and doubling [83, 69, 31]; (2) addition chain that always computes
elliptic addition and doubling for each bit [40, 106, 107, 31, 108]; (3) window-based
addition chain with a fixed pattern [106, 107, 100, 109, 108].
Resistance to DPA. Although the algorithms mentioned previously provide more or
less secure implementations of scalar multiplication against SPA attacks, they do not
necessarily provide security against more powerful attacks - DPA attacks. For example,
the double-and-add algorithm (Algorithm 7) which is resistant to SPA, does not defend
scalar multiplication against the DPA. The step Q[0]← Q[di] in line 4 can consume
slightly different amounts of power, depending on whether the bit di is a one or a zero.
Even though it is very hard to find such a small difference using SPA, DPA is a powerful
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technique that exploits secret information by statistical analysis of power consumption.
Coron [40] has demonstrated that this SPA resistant implementation of double-and-
add algorithm is vulnerable to DPA attack. Namely, it was noticed that at step j the
processed point Q depends only on the first bits (dl−1, . . . ,d j) of d. If the selection
function for the DPA attack is chosen to be a specific bit in the memory representation
of point Q, then when Q is processed, power consumption will be correlated to this
specific bit of Q. In order to recover the bits of the secret scalar d, the point being
processed in the card needs to be guessed. If the second most significant bit of d, dl−2
was a zero, then point 4P would be computed and the power consumption correlated
to any specific bit of the point 4P. Otherwise, if dl−2 = 1, 4P is never computed
and there would be no correlation between power consumption and the bits of point
4P. This could be used to recover dl−2. By recursively applying the same logic to
successive bits of d all of them can be discovered.
This attack can be extended to any scalar multiplication algorithm. In the case
of the addition-subtraction algorithm, the point dP is calculated by computing the se-
quence of points:
a0P = P→ a1P→ a2P→ ·· · → arP = dP
such that ai =±a j±ak, for some k ≤ j < i, for all i = 1,2, . . . ,r. The attack consists of
guessing the ai’s, starting from a0 = 1 to ar = d. At step i≥ 1, the set Ai of all possible
ai =±a j±ak, k ≤ j < i, is guessed. Now, for each a′i ∈ Ai, power consumption is




Coron [40] proposed the following countermeasures to prevent DPA attacks:
• Randomisation of the private exponent d.
Let #ε be the number of points on the curve.
Select a random number k.
Compute d′ = d + k#ε.
Compute the point Q = d ′P.
Since #εP = 0, then Q = dP. Now, in every calculation a different d ′ is used to
calculate Q = d′P.
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• Blinding the point P. Point P is blinded by adding a random variable R, for
which S, such that S = dR, is known. Values Q′ = d(P+R) and Q = Q′−S are
calculated. The value of R and S is updated for each calculation using formulae:
R = (−1)b2R
S = (−1)b2S
where b is a random value. Values R and S can be stored outside the card, and
refreshed for each calculation, in this case, each time a different Q′ is calculated.
• Random projective coordinates. This approach consists of randomising projec-
tive coordinates of point P:
(X ,Y,Z) = (λX ,λY,λZ)
for some random λ 6= 0, and calculating Q = dP. Projective coordinates (X ,Y,Z)








Okeya and Sakurai [107] criticised Coron’s [40] first countermeasure against DPA
as not secure, since it fails to break the dependencies between the executing procedure
and the secret key. They also criticised the second countermeasure and claimed that
it does not manage to randomise the expression of computed objects. As for the third
countermeasure, they claim that careless implementations of this countermeasure are
vulnerable to the attack, but the countermeasure is otherwise safe.
Hasan [61] proposed a countermeasure to resist DPA attack on ECCs based on
Koblitz curves. The underlying principle is that d is randomly changed each time it is
used in the cryptosystem, so that the averaging out technique, used in DPA, does not
converge to an identifiable differential signal and the DPA attacks are expected to fail.
The major idea was to change d to a pseudo-random number (at a reasonable cost)
and still provide the correct result. The suggested masking techniques are summarised
in [61].
Joye and Tymen [70] proposed to protect ECCs from DPA by transforming the
curve through various random morphisms to provide a non-deterministic execution of
the algorithm. In this solution the ECC execution of some operations in the group of
a curve E, is transposed to a curve φ(E), where φ is a random isomorphism. The rich
algebraic structure of the elliptic curves enables a number of possible choices for such
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isomorphism. Another way to achieve the security against DPA is to randomise the
base point by using the isomorphism of the finite field. A specific method for ABC
curves is also suggested.
Ciet et al. [38] suggest a method that is valid for ECs over fields of any charac-
teristic. This countermeasure combines the point-blinding and randomised scalar mul-
tiplication mentioned earlier, into a unique algorithm, in a way which benefits from
the computational speed-up of the method. This method is viewed as two-dimensional
generalisation of Coron’s [40] method.
Ha and Moon [60] suggested randomising the NAF algorithm to resist DPA and
employ a simple SPA-immune system. The NAF representation of the secret expo-
nent in the form of the addition-subtraction chain can reduce the number of operations
that need to be performed compared to ordinary binary representation. As the result
of randomisation, the signed scalar representation is not in the NAF form anymore.
Resistance against SPA comes from the fact that the attacker cannot distinguish addi-
tion from subtraction. The authors also suggest a countermeasure against SPA. Their
SPA-immune addition-subtraction scalar algorithm makes the power consumption in-
dependent of the secret key. The authors notice the importance of building a good SPA
countermeasure, as any SPA weakness completely destroys the DPA countermeasure.
It is generally thought that the ECCs are easy to protect against DPA, using ran-
domisation over an implementation that is already secure against SPA. According to
these countermeasures, an inexpensive and secure way to protect the scalar multipli-
cation against DPA is achieved either by using (1) random projective coordinates, (2)
random elliptic curve isomorphism, or (3) random field isomorphism. Goubin [56]
has shown that for many ECCs such a protection against DPA is not sufficient. It is
shown that for a large class of ECCs the power analysis still works even if one of the
three mentioned techniques (together with SPA countermeasure) is implemented. This
attack is based on the chosen message. The author points out that this result means that
the randomisation of the secret scalar should be performed more extensively and this
problem should be taken seriously. Also this attack shows the importance of blinding
the message before it enters the scalar multiplication, as it would prevent the attacker
from choosing the message for this attack.
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3.5.8 Hardware countermeasures
In general software countermeasures are easy and inexpensive to implement, but are
not applicable for each cipher and are still susceptible to higher-order DPA attacks or
signal processing analysis. Hardware countermeasures, in a manner similar to software
countermeasures, focus on destroying the correlation between the power measurements
and the values of the secret key. Another target of hardware countermeasures is the
alignment of operations in power consumption curves, an important property used by
DPA. Some of the hardware countermeasures proposed in the literature are summarised
next.
3.5.8.1 Power randomisation
Interleaving random computations into the execution of the cryptographic operations
has been often suggested as a defence against DPA. Daemen and Rijmen [46] proposed
power randomisation generated by a hardware module that is built into the chip and
adds noise to power consumption. Power randomisation reduces signal-to-noise ratio
of the attack and as such makes the attack more difficult. The authors notice that a way
to prevent (or at least seriously complicate) the attack is to minimise the correlation
between the data and the power consumption. If the cipher is implemented in software,
then this can be achieved by modifying the ALU hardware so that all instructions that
operate on sensitive data are balanced.
3.5.8.2 Random process interrupts
Some of the first countermeasures against DPA used random process interrupts (RPIs).
If the encryption operation is interrupted at random times with random operations, then
the times at which critical operations (those that manipulate the secret key) are carried
out, will vary from encryption to encryption. Instead of executing all the operations
sequentially, the CPU interleaves the execution with dummy instructions so that cor-
responding executions do not match because of the time shifts. Power traces collected
from the devices protected using this countermeasure will not be aligned with respect
to operations that the device is performing. This is one of the basic strengths of the
straight-forward DPA attack. As a result, spikes which would normally appear thin
and tall in the differential trace, now appear shorter and are smeared across the trace.
This method increases the amount of noise and should therefore result in the greater
number of power traces necessary to mount some version of the DPA attack.
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Figure 3.6: The integration operation of the SW-DPA technique [39].
Clavier et al. [39] showed that the approach of introducing dummy computations
and randomising the noise is not effective enough. One of the important properties
of DPA attacks is that operations are lined-up. In the presence of RPIs the peaks are
smeared across the differential trace, which has a desynchronisation effect and can be
considered as adding noise. The authors showed that RPIs do not make the DPA attack
infeasible, but instead they just considerably increase the number of PCCs necessary
for a successful attack. As the spike’s amplitude is distributed over a certain number
of consecutive cycles, the technique called sliding window DPA (SW-DPA) was used
in order to restore it (Figure 3.6). The method has two steps: (1) the classical (Kocher-
style) differential curve is obtained, (2) PCCs are integrated by adding points from k
consecutive cycles from the differential trace obtained in the first step. The authors
also show that the number of experiments required increases with a factor of k, i.e.,
for the spike to be identified the number of power readings must be equal to N ′ = kN,
where N is the number of power readings necessary to perform the attack without the
RPI countermeasure.
3.5.8.3 Detached power supplies
Shamir [124] proposed decorrelating the external power supplied to the smart-card
chip from the internal power consumed by the chip, using so-called detached power
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supplies. This method uses so-called “air-gap” to decorrelate the power supplied to the
card from the power consumed by the card. The design uses two capacitor as the power
isolation elements. During half of the time the first capacitors is regularly charged by
the external power supply and the second capacitor is irregularly discharged by supply-
ing power to the smart-card chip. During the other half of the time, the roles of the two
capacitors are switched. With this method the smart-card chip is always powered by
at least one capacitor but the external power supply is never directly connected to the
internal chip. Messerges [94] pointed out that this is an easy to implement and simple
technique, it has been observed that the signal can be still leaked through other means.
3.5.8.4 Non-deterministic execution
Removing the correlation between features in the DPA profile and the algorithm source
code makes retrieving useful information from the power traces significantly harder. A
commonly proposed solution for achieving this, is to introduce a level of random-
ness and non-determinism in the execution of the cryptographic algorithm. May et
al. [91] proposed a new processor design to counteract side-channel attacks, called
non-deterministic instruction stream computer (NDISC). Their design introduced sim-
ple additions to a processor with either single or multiple execution units, which allow
randomised execution of instructions on an instruction-by-instruction basis. Like a
super-scalar processor, a set of independent instructions is selected and executed at
random. On the other hand, unlike a super-scalar processor, those instructions are not
executed in parallel, but out-of-order on an instruction-by-instruction basis. In this
way, correlation between different runs of the same program is removed, thereby mak-
ing the DPA attack more difficult. This technique, called instruction descheduling,
creates a level of non-determinism. There is a block of logic that determines conflicts
between instructions, resulting in a set of instructions that is executable. The instruc-
tion is considered executable if it does not depend on any result that is not yet available
and does not overwrite any data that has yet to be used by other instructions yet to be
executed or currently executing. Two techniques for increasing non-determinism were
introduced:
1. Multi-source reduction operation, which is applied on operations that are both
associative and commutative and executed on the set of data. Typical examples
are multiplication and XOR, used in DES and RSA.
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2. Ignore-depend technique, which introduces two extra instructions: IGNORE and
DEPEND. Nesting a set of instructions between IGNORE R and DEPEND R, tells the
instruction descheduler to ignore the dependences of the register R.
3. Standard compiler techniques to increase concurrency by minimising depen-
dences are also employed to increase non-determinism. The result is that the
correlations between different runs of the same program are removed, thereby
making the DPA attack harder.
May et al. [92] combined this approach with random register renaming. Regis-
ter renaming is a common technique used to improve the performance of processors.
The strength of random register renaming comes from the fact that it changes over
time. They observed that a large fraction of the power trace is produced by overwriting
register values. Each time a register value is overwritten, the power consumption is
related to the number of bits that were flipped. They randomly rename the registers
in such a way, that every time a register is overwritten, a non-predetermined value is
overwritten. This technique can be applied to any type of processor. Renaming works
by defining a set of virtual register identifiers and physical register identifiers. The
virtual set is used in the instruction set of processors and the physical set is used in
the execution time. At any time, each virtual identifier uniquely corresponds to one
physical identifier. This binding is unique at any time, but changes over time. When
a virtual register is overwritten, a physical register is assigned to the virtual register.
In standard processors this improves the performance since this physical register can
be used immediately for storing new values, whereas the old register can still hold
values that are used by instructions that are still in execution, and thus enable out-of-
order parallel execution. Random register renaming expands the ideas presented in the
NDISC processor and allows non-deterministic altering of the register-to-register or
memory-to-register transfers. In this way, the registers are randomly renamed, and as a
result, the program execution is also randomised. The advantage is that program code
need not to be modified and neither speed nor power consumption are compromised.
Irwin et al. [66] proposed the addition of a specialised processor pipeline stage to
the NDISC, called the mutation unit, that is placed just before the execution unit in
the processor pipeline. A mutation unit implements the ideas related to adding ran-
dom calculations to the algorithm that is currently in execution. The purpose of this
specialised pipeline stage is to alter the instruction stream in a way that the meaning
of the program is maintained but the instructions used to implement it change each
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time it is run. This is achieved by using the knowledge of register liveness, obtained at
compile-time. The register liveness information allows the processor to alter register
usage and mapping patterns at run-time, by describing which registers contain useful
values and when they can be safely overwritten. The liveness status of each physical
register is stored in the so-called liveness table in the mutation unit, and is determined
by the compiler or the programmer. The table content is kept valid by two extra in-
structions: LIVE and DEAD, which set and clear, respectively, bits in the liveness table.
The task of keeping the liveness table valid is achieved by inserting extra instructions
into the instruction stream, and is the responsibility of the compiler or the program-
mer. The compiler uses the combination of the liveness information and the resulting
register alternations to decide which registers are alive and which ones are dead. The
instances of LIVE and DEAD instructions are then inserted into the instruction stream
to maintain the correctness of liveness table deduced by the compiler analysis. Us-
ing the liveness table, the mutation unit can either delete, insert, or alter instructions
from the instruction stream. These operations are implemented using the concept of
random instruction generation and random register remapping. Using the liveness ta-
ble the generation of random instruction is facilitated, as at any time it is possible to
generate instructions that target dead registers and sources either dead or live registers.
The authors claim that using this technique the meaning of the application remains
unchanged, but the power consumption and the running time are variable. Their ex-
periments have confirmed that this technique increases the level of non-determinism
and manages to foil the straight-forward attack when performed for a relatively low
number (10000) of available power profiles.
3.6 Electromagnetic emission analysis
3.6.1 Introduction
The idea that a processor can leak information by different means was first suggested
by Anderson [17]. That the information can be deduced from timing and power con-
sumption was first demonstrated by Kocher et al. [76, 77]. Quisquater and Samyde [113]
demonstrated that the electromagnetic emission can be another means of secret infor-
mation leakage through a side-channel.
Electric current flowing through a conductor induces electromagnetic emanations,
and is a source of side-channel information. As the power consumption in a device
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varies while the data is being processed, so does the electromagnetic field and one can
expect to extract secret information from a relevant analysis.
Quisquater and Samyde [113] introduced electromagnetic analysis (EMA) as a
more general type of analysis than timing and power analysis. They noticed that the
timing attack [76] is limited to mono-dimensional data processing. The differential
power analysis [77] used a two-dimensional matrix to visualise the correlation of pa-
rameters featured in the attack. Electromagnetic analysis can be treated in a similar
manner to the previous cases, but it also holds three-dimensional information linked to
the volume [113] (locality information).
3.6.2 Attack details
In the experimental setup for the attack Quisquater and Samyde [113] placed a simple
flat coil close to the chip. The coil is sensitive to the electromagnetic field which
changes induce the current at the bounds. This current resembles the field radiated by
the chip. They have found that all the treatments for DPA are possible with EMA since
this analysis includes at least the same information and the electromagnetic radiation
is directly connected to the current consumption.
There are two types of EM analysis:
• Simple electromagnetic analysis (SEMA), in which information is extracted from
a single EM sample. Just as in SPA, if a computation makes use of conditional
branches based on secret information, then this can be observed as relative shifts
in the distances between major computational structures. If this shift is enough
to identify that the branch is taken, then this would be enough to identify the
value of the secret information.
• Differential electromagnetic analysis (DEMA), analogous to DPA, where the
secret information is deduced from a number of power traces using statistical
analysis of the data.
EMA attacks became very interesting in cases when this attack was more powerful
than power analysis. Research presented in [53, 115] has shown that there are such
situations. Gandolfi et al. [53] noticed that in some cases power curves appear to con-
vey no information, as the power does not vary or does vary but in a way that seems to
be uncorrelated to the secret data. The power consumption of the device was observed
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at the global level and in that case no information can be obtained. However, local-
ity information can be revealed by eavesdropping local electromagnetic emanations.
Gandolfi et al. conducted practical experiments on various devices and algorithms and
concluded that electromagnetic measurements, although noisy, yield better differential
trace than power signals. Signal-to-noise ratio for DEMA was higher than in the case
of DPA, and it was easier to identify the correct guess as there were no false alerts due
to erroneous peaks. The locality of EMA is pointed out as its advantage. The probes
used in the experimental setup can be positioned in the neighbourhood of a region that
radiates while the device is executing. Different areas radiate with different intensities
and different code dependencies. The most active areas appear to be located near the
CPU, data-buses and power supplies. The experimental results have shown that the
CPU stands out by radiating the most informative signal. This confirms that the lo-
cality of the EMA attack is its major strength over power analysis attack as it allows
pinpointing the problematic areas of the smart-cards that leak secret information. On
the other hand, the authors also point out that definite advantage of power analysis over
electromagnetic analysis is the simplicity of electric measurements.
Agrawal et al. [12, 13] and Rao and Rohatgi [115] also studied leakage of com-
promising information via electromagnetic emissions. They have shown that these
emanations consist of multiple signals, each leaking somewhat different information
about the underlying computation. They noticed, that in addition to the direct emana-
tions, EM signals consist of several different signals which are unintentional. These are
often the result of the increased miniaturisation and the complexity of modern CMOS
devices which results in electrical and electromagnetic coupling between components
in close proximity. An example of unintentional EM emanations are amplitude modu-
lated EM signals (present even in the power traces), and angle modulated EM signals.
Exploring unintentional emanations can be much more effective than doing the same
with the direct emanations, and in some cases can enable the attacks to be carried out.
Various experiments were conducted [12, 13, 115] to illustrate different types of
EM emanations and the information that can be deduced from them. The quantitative
comparison of these types of emanations and power consumption information leak-
age has also been conducted. SEMA and DEMA attacks were performed on straight-
forward implementations of DES, RSA and COMP128 on smart-cards and various
other cryptographic devices. Experimental results showed that in some cases EM
side-channel attacks are more powerful than other side-channel attacks. The inves-
tigation showed that although the electromagnetic side-channel resembles the power
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side-channel, there are situations where the electromagnetic side-channel can carry
much more useful information than the power side-channel. Furthermore, not only
can EM emanations be used to attack cryptographic devices where the power side-
channel is unavailable, but they can be used to break power analysis countermeasures.
The authors claim that this is due to the existence of a class of so-called bad instruc-
tions which leak much more information to the electromagnetic side-channel than to
the power side-channel. These instructions have to be identified for each smart-card
separately. If the bad instruction for a particular smart-card is identified, major coun-
termeasures, suggested in [57, 36, 78], can be defeated. The type of EM analysis
necessary for this might depend on the countermeasure and the knowledge of the card
details and algorithm implementation.
3.6.3 Countermeasures
Quisquater and Samyde [113] propose that adding noise would be an elegant way for
disturbing EMA. If each instruction has a specific electromagnetic signature, then the
attacker could build a dictionary for each instruction used in the processor, and that
way reverse the part of the code. They propose and discuss several possible counter-
measures for preventing EMA, and point out that if the countermeasures are purely
hard then the circuit and the countermeasure have to be overlapped. Some of the coun-
termeasures they proposed are listed next.
• Reduction of the EM field. Designers can try to block or reduce the electro-
magnetic field, and that way block the information leakage or reduce it to non-
measurable form, by using layers of non-ferro-magnetic metals. In this way, at
least one of the two components of the radiation is reduced, which could cause
a loss of information.
• Block the EM radiation. A simple way to block the EM radiation is to put the
device in a Faraday cage. This is realisable but does not guarantee the security as
the attacker could still find a way to introduce a reason to leak the information.
• Design of very low consumption processors. This is an important direction in
micro-electronics research. If the current consumed by the processor is de-
creased so is the electromagnetic radiation.
• Asynchronous processors. The clock in synchronous architectures allows for sig-
nals to be resynchronised and reamplified. Therefore, synchronous architectures
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maximise the electromagnetic field. The presence of the clock signals also facil-
itates the process of distinguishing the fundamental signal from the harmonics.
As asynchronous architectures do not have a clock, the electromagnetic signal is
significantly reduced.
• Dual-rail logic. It has been suggested that by using dual-rail logic the electric
transitions, which are clearly visible in the electromagnetic traces, will be bal-
anced out. In the dual-rail design each wire is replaced with two wires, and the
two significant states are opposite to each other.
• New architecture designs. The strength of EMA lies in its locality property.
Therefore, in order to counteract the attack, it would be useful to block this prin-
ciple. The authors suggest that a reasonable way to achieve this is to build a
new architectural design in which the locality cannot be exploited. They note
that distributed parallel architectures, in which significant instructions are dis-
tributed, could block the locality property and help prevent the attack.
3.7 Fault analysis
3.7.1 Introduction
In 1996, Boneh, De Millo and Lipton [30] announced that faults during computa-
tion can have severe consequences to the strength of cryptographic systems. They
have shown that for many digital signatures and identification schemes faulty outputs,
caused by hardware malfunctioning, completely expose the secret key stored in the
device. Since then, different implementations of RSA, DES, variety of identification
schemes, ECCs and even unknown ciphers have been successfully attacked. These at-
tacks exploit computational errors that occur during cryptographic operations. These
errors are usually introduced from outside of the device and tend to flip a register bit
in the device, thereby affecting its security.
Boneh, De Millo and Lipton have shown that the secret signing key used in im-
plementations of RSA based on Chinese Reminder Theorem (CRT) can be completely
exposed using a single erroneous RSA signature. They have also presented an attack on
the RSA implementation without CRT which exposed the key from about 1000 erro-
neous signatures. Their results also contain effective attacks on identification schemes
that expose the secret key from as little as 10 faulty signatures. These results are how-
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ever theoretical and the estimates for the number of necessary faulty signatures are
based on standard security parameters [30]. Practical results of similar investigations
are given in [18, 17, 80, 126].
Most of the previously known attacks on RSA cryptosystems were based on fac-
toring the modulus. The inability of the attacker to factor the modulus is the strength
of the RSA algorithm. The fault analysis attacks, similarly to the timing and power
analysis attacks, avoid this difficult task. They use the fact that from time to time, due
to malfunctioning hardware, an error can occur in the computation. The malfunction-
ing of the hardware could be introduced in different ways, such as power glitches or
temperature changes. For example, the device might transmit a ciphertext or plaintext
according to a value of a single register bit. If that bit was flipped (due to for example
a power surge) the device would send the plaintext instead of the ciphertext. In this ex-
ample, the power surge changed the mode of operation, having nothing to do with the
underlying strength of the cryptographic algorithm. These results have demonstrated
that faults can increase cipher’s vulnerability, and that the engineers of cryptographic
devices have to take care that the device behaves correctly in the presence of faults, as
specified by the FIPS 140-2 standard [11].
3.7.2 Attack details
Boneh, De Millo and Lipton [30] presented fault attacks on several cryptographic
schemes. The following sections give details of the attacks on RSA with and with-
out Chinese Reminder Theorem (CRT), DES and other cryptographic systems.
3.7.2.1 An attack on RSA with CRT
Let N = pq be the product of two large prime numbers each n/2 bits long. Signing
a message M ∈ Z/N using RSA, involves computing S = Md mod N, where d is the
secret exponent. The expensive part of this computation is the modular exponentia-
tion. This operation can be speeded-up by using the CRT. Namely, the modular ex-
ponentiation can be split into two operations by calculating: S1 = Md mod p−1 mod p
and S2 = Md mod q−1 mod q. The final S is calculated as a combination of S1 and S2:
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The values of a, b, d mod p−1 and d mod q−1 can be precomputed to additionally
speed-up the computation. The speed-up of using CRT comes from the fact that doing
two modular exponentiations using the modulo of the size n/2 is quicker than doing
one modular exponentiation with the modulo size n. Namely, since the square-and-
multiply algorithm for calculating the modulo Md mod N requires O(n3) operations,
the speed-up of using two modular exponentiations with modules half the size, is of
factor n3/(2n
3
8 ) = 4.
If exactly one of the computed values S1, S2 was faulty, then the attacker who has
two signatures of the same message, one correct and the other faulty, can factor N, as
described next. Let Ŝ be a faulty signature. In order to calculate Ŝ the attacker has
to calculate Ŝ1 and Ŝ2 first. If only one of Ŝ1, Ŝ2 is faulty, it can be assumed without
loss of generality that Ŝ1 is faulty. i.e., S1 6= Ŝ1 mod p. Therefore, Ŝ 6= Ŝ mod p but
Ŝ = Ŝ mod q, or in other words:
gcd(S− Ŝ,N) = q.
As an improvement to this method, Lenstra [82] noticed that one faulty signature
and the message M contained enough information to factor N. Consider the value
M− Ŝe, where e is the public exponent used to verify the signature. Since:
M − Ŝe mod p = M − Ŝe1 mod p
6= 0 mod p
M − Ŝe mod q = M − Ŝe2 mod q
= 0 mod q,
in order to factor N the attacker only needs to calculate:
gcd(M− Ŝe,N) = q.
This attack works under a very general fault model, i.e., it makes no difference
what type of error or how many errors occurred in the computation of S1. The only
important point is that the fault occurs during the modulo computation of only one of
the primes [30].
3.7.2.2 An attack on RSA without CRT
Although the usage of the CRT in RSA can improve performance, not all implementa-
tions of RSA use the CRT. This section gives a description of the fault analysis attack
78 Chapter 3. Side-channel Analysis
presented in [30], which exploits register faults that occur during the modular expo-
nentiation. Although this attack is not as practical as the attack on RSA with CRT, it
nevertheless illustrates the vulnerability of non-CRT implementations [30].
Let N be a RSA composite of length n and d a secret exponent. Further, suppose
that the observed implementation of RSA uses the right-to-left repeated square-and-
multiply algorithm for modular exponentiation given in Algorithm 11. This algorithm
requires at least two registers to store intermediate values of variables z and S. The
variable z is used to store the values M, M2, M2
2
, . . . , M2
n−1
needed to calculate
Md mod N. If a register fault flips a bit of register z, then a factor used in this product
and, thus, the produced signature will be faulty. This enables an attacker with an access
to the number of erroneous signatures to deduce the value of d. It is important that the
fault occurs at a random iteration during the modular exponentiation, and that it flips
only one bit of register z.
Algorithm 11 Repeated left-to-right square-and-multiply algorithm for modular expo-
nentiation, which models register faults.
INPUT: M,N,d = (dn−1, . . . ,d1,d0)2
OUTPUT: S = Md mod N
1: z←M
2: S← 1
3: for j = 0 to n−1 do
4: /* register fault: z← z±2w */
5: if d j = 1 then
6: S← S · z mod N
7: end if
8: z← z2 mod N
9: end for
The attacker obtains signatures for a number of messages M1, M2, . . . , Ml , until
sufficiently many erroneous signature Ŝi are collected. The pairs 〈Mi, Ŝi〉 are then used
to deduce the secret signing key d. Starting with the most significant bits, the at-
tack recovers blocks of bits from the binary representation of d. As an illustration of
this technique suppose that during signing of the message M the fault occurred when
j = n−2. This error affects two intermediate values of register z. Thus, the sequence
of values stored in register z is:
M, M2, . . . , M2
n−3
, M̃, M̃2
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where M̃ = M2
n−3±2w, i.e., the fault that occurred in the register z is caused by the
bit flip at position w. If 〈M, Ŝ〉 is the erroneous signature obtained after this operation,










or just using the binary notation, in a simple form:
Ŝ = Mdn−3...d0M̃dn−1dn−2 mod N.
Next, the following equivalences modulo N can be derived [104]:
(M2
n−2
)dn−1dn−2 Ŝ ≡ (M2n−2)dn−1dn−2Mdn−3...d0M̃dn−1dn−2 (mod N)
≡ Mdn−1dn−2dn−3...d0M̃dn−1dn−2 (mod N)
(Me2
n−2
)dn−1dn−2 Ŝe ≡ Med(M̃dn−1dn−2 (mod N)
≡ M(M̃e)dn−1dn−2 (mod N)
≡ M(M2n−2±2w)e·(dn−1dn−2) (mod N).
Therefore, with the knowledge of 〈M, Ŝ〉 and that M̃ = M2n−2±2w for some w, an
attacker can exhaust the values of w, dn−1 and dn−2 until this condition holds, and in
that way discover two bits of d. Since 〈M, Ŝ〉 is erroneous, Ŝe 6≡M mod N and therefore
dn−1dn−2 6= 00. Thus, there are three values for the pair of bits dn−1dn−2 that need to
be considered. This leads to the conclusion that it takes at most 3n trials to recover the
correct values of dn−1dn−2 and w [104].
In practice however, the attacker does always know the value of j∗, at which the
register fault might have occurred. With some trials and errors this value would have to
be determined as explained in [104]. The interesting part is that identifying the value
of j = j∗ also reveals the value of bits dn−1 . . .d j. Knowledge of these bits reduces the
effort required to identify j∗ for other erroneous signatures since there are now fewer
unknown bits of d.
3.7.2.3 An attack on DES
It is obvious that the techniques previously described cannot be directly applied to
ciphers that do not utilise modular exponentiation. For instance, typical operations of
symmetric ciphers use bit-oriented transformations such as AND, XOR and rotations.
Biham and Shamir [28] introduced a technique that easily breaks the implementation of
DES when it is subject to the same random register faults that Boneh et al. considered.
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Their method is a combination of differential cryptanalysis [27] and fault analysis, that
was simply termed as differential fault analysis.
It was assumed that the DES encryption algorithm is implemented on a smart-
card with random transient faults (the type of faults considered so far) in its registers
occurring at each bit with some small probability, and that during each encryption
only a small number of faults (typically one) appears. Further, it is assumed that the
malfunctions are realised as single bit inversions in the registers which store 32-bit
values of Li−1 and Ri−1. These faults can cause erroneous output as they influence the
intermediate values during the DES computation. Since Ri = Li−1⊕F(Ri−1,Ki), the
only consequence of a single bit error in Li−1 is the identical single bit error in Ri. Due
to this one-to-one correspondence, the model can be simplified to consider only the
errors in register Ri−1, in which a single bit of this register is flipped. In the attack,
the attacker obtains two encryptions of the same (possibly unknown) plaintexts from
the smart-card. One encryption is performed in errorless conditions and computes the
ciphertext C, and the other one is performed while the smart-card was malfunctioning,
computing the ciphertext Ĉ. It was assumed that the fault occurred only once during
the encryption, in round i = i∗. The first step was to identify this round. The ciphertext
Ĉ was corrupted by a single bit error in register Ri∗−1. From C = FP(R16L16) follows
that R16L16 = FP−1(C) and from Ĉ = FP(R̂16L̂16) follows that R̂16L̂16 = FP−1(Ĉ),
where FP denotes the final permutation in DES. Further, since L16 = R15, the attacker
also knows R15 and R̂15. If the fault occurred in round i∗ = 16, then R15⊕ R̂15 reveals
the exact bit at which the fault occurred. In addition, L15 = L̂15. Now the calculation:
R16⊕ R̂16 = (L15⊕F(R15,K16))⊕ (L̂15⊕F(R̂15,K16))
= F(R15,K16)⊕F(R̂15,K16)
reveals the difference in the two outputs of the round functions. Moreover, this gives
the difference in the outputs from the S-boxes, as:
P−1(R16⊕ R̂16) = S(E(R15⊕K16))⊕S(E(R̂15⊕K16)). (3.13)
Since the S-boxes are designed to be non-linear, the influence of K16 in Equation 3.13
is not cancelled out and this calculation can be used to reveal the bits of key K16. The
difference of the inputs to the S-boxes can be calculated as E(R15⊕ R̂15). Differential
fault analysis uses differences of input and outputs from the S-boxes to derive the
information about the 48 bits of the key K16.
As with the fault analysis of RSA without CRT, it cannot be known at which round
the fault has occurred. If the fault occurred at round i∗ = 15 the analysis would be
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similar. Again, P−1(R15⊕ R̂15) could be calculated, which in turn reveals which S-
boxes were affected by the fault in R̂14.
With enough ciphertext pairs 〈C,Ĉ〉 all 48 bits of the key K16 can be revealed. The
remaining 8 bits can be discovered using brute force. Alternatively, the last round
of DES could be peeled back using the knowledge of K16 and the differential fault
analysis could be reapplied to the previous rounds. This technique could be used to
attack the triple DES as well. An interesting fact is that Biham and Shamir managed
to recover the complete 48 bits of key K16 using only 50 to 200 ciphertext pairs [28].
3.7.2.4 Intrusive fault analysis
Biham and Shamir [28] have assumed that during any encryption a fault occurs at only
one bit of register Ri and only during one round i = i∗. One criticism of differential
fault analysis was that this model for faulty behaviour is unrealistic as it does not in-
clude more permanent faults. Biham and Shamir, consequently, presented alternative
attacks which exploit permanent or stuck faults in hardware registers. In these attacks
the attacker was required to physically intrude into the circuitry of the cryptographic
hardware and set the values of certain memory cells. Anderson and Kuhn [17] have
shown that this is possible and that the circuitry of the embedded chip can be ex-
posed. Biham and Shamir have shown how the DES hardware implementations can
be attacked using only the erroneous ciphertext outputs. However, the attack can be
facilitated if the correct 〈plaintext,ciphertext〉 pair can also be obtained (for example,
before any damage is done to the hardware) [28].
3.7.2.5 Attacks on elliptic curve cryptosystems
Joye and Quisquater [68] noted that the CRT attacks (described in Section 3.7.2.1) can
be mounted against several elliptic curve systems. Biehl et al. [26] also described the
fault attacks on elliptic curve cryptosystems. The danger of faults in these systems
comes from the fact that the register faults can transform a cryptographically strong
elliptic curve into a less strong curve in which the discrete logarithm problem can be
solved, and consequently the secret key revealed. Three different types of attack that
can be used to derive the information about the secret key when bit errors are inserted,
were presented.
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3.7.3 Countermeasures
All the attacks presented so far relied on the device outputting the erroneous cipher-
text. An obvious and very simple defence against fault analysis would be to improve
the implementation of the cipher, so that it does not output the erroneous outputs, by
checking the output for correctness. However, this could be costly, depending on the
cryptographic system [30].
In the case of RSA, the correctness of the signature is verified using the public ex-
ponent e. The cost of checking the correctness of the signature depends on the value
of the public exponent e. This value is usually specified to be small (e.g. e = 3) to
exploit this fact. Therefore, the cost of verifying the signature might not be the same
as the cost of generating it. In the case when e is large, Shamir [123] proposed the
correctness check for RSA with CRT that is less costly than the full signature verifi-
cation. Namely, he suggested choosing a random, 32-bit long value r and calculating
values: Spr = Md mod pr and Sqr = Md mod qr. If Spr mod r = Sqr mod r, then the
exponentiations were carried out correctly and the signature can be reconstructed from
the linear combination of Sp = Spr mod p and Sq = Sqr mod q.
In the case of DES, checking for correctness could be achieved by calculating the
same output twice and comparing the results. However, this solution would reduce the
efficiency of the implementation by a factor of two. Moreover, this countermeasure
does not work in every fault model [104]. For the random transient fault model, there
are 32 ·16 = 512 bit positions where the fault can occur. Therefore, the probability that
the same fault occurred in each of the two encryptions is equal to 1512 , which means
that the number of encryptions an attacker must perform in order to obtain the required
number of faulty signatures increases by a factor of 512. On the other hand, in the
intrusive fault model this countermeasure would fail completely, as the error occurs
in the same manner for both encryptions. A more sensible solution seems to use the
decryption to verify the correctness of the ciphertext in this case [104].
Bellare and Rogaway [23] proposed the use of randomisation technique for pre-
venting fault attacks. In schemes that support randomisation, RSA is applied on
F(M,r), where F is some formating function and r is a random string. This technique
is equivalent to padding the message M with random bits r before encryption. This
should defeat all fault analysis attacks, apart from those that exploit intrusive faults,
as it ensures that the signer never signs the same message twice. In this way, given
an erroneous signature, the attacker does not know the full plaintext message F(M,r).
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However, for DES and other ciphers with small key sizes this might not be feasible
since some number of input bits would have to be used for storing the random bits. For
RSA, however, this technique has been implemented with small overheads [23].
3.8 Summary
Side-channel analysis, in particular power analysis, have been extremely effective in
attacking implementations on simple hardware platforms. Chari et al. [36] noticed that
a general countermeasure against DPA would be to modify the code to ensure that the
attacker cannot predict any relevant bit in any part of the computation, without making
several other run-specific assumptions. However, they also noticed that is unclear how
one can perform serious computations if this requirement is to be satisfied, since no bits
that depend directly on the data and the key can be manipulated in any cycle. In RSA-
like ciphers, for example, this could be done and the actual value could be blinded, but
such a structure is unlikely to be present in block ciphers [36]. These authors propose
a generic technique to create provably resistant implementations. They assume that
the device has reasonable power properties and a source of randomness exists. Their
method consists of creating a model for the physical characteristics of the device and
then designing implementations provably secure in that model. These implementations
resist generic attacks with an a priori bound on the number of experiments. In such
a setting, the lower bound on the number of experiments to mount a statistical attack
can be proved. Other attempts have been made in order to formalise the approach of
protecting cipher implementations against side-channel attacks. Coron et al. [42] gave
a definition of leakage immunity and presents several leakage detection tests. However,
research in this direction is still in its initial stages and substantial effort is required to
find more effective and general countermeasures against side-channel attacks [36].
Daemen and Rijnmen [46] suggested that the cryptographic systems can be pro-
tected by combination of two approaches. The first approach consists of preventing, or
rather complicating the exploration of correlations in the power traces by using tech-
niques such as desynchronisations, software balancing or power randomisation. The
second approach is to minimise the correlation between the data and the power con-
sumption, by manipulating both the data and its complement in major operations. The
suggestion is that if the cipher is implemented in software, then the hardware can be
modified so that all instructions that operate on cipher key and input are balanced. Sim-
ilarly, the hardware implementation would have to be balanced also. When considering
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the possibilities for balancing the authors found that arithmetic operations are problem-
atic to balance. The balancing in the case of other instructions involves manipulation
of both the data and its complement and modification of the hardware implementation
of circuits so that the outputs also contain the data and their complement.
Chari et al. [37] introduced an interesting class of side-channel attacks termed as
template attacks. Template attacks have been characterised as the strongest form of
side-channel attacks, from the information theoretic point of view [37], because they
can extract sensitive information from a far fewer number of power samples than other
known side-channel attacks. They claim that these attacks can break countermeasures
whose security is based on the assumption that the attacker cannot obtain more than
one or a limited number of side-channel samples. These attacks require the attacker
to have access to identical experimental device that can be programmed to his willing.
The template attacks derive their power from the ability to closely model the noise in
the device. This is in contrast to other attack approaches which focus on removing
the noise by averaging. The precise models of signal and the noise are referred to as
templates of computation. Although the possession of identical devices that is used
to model the noise is an advantage, if the attacker is not able to control the possible
source of randomness in the device, the attack would be less dangerous [37].
On the other hand, due to the wide-ranging impact of these attacks, in areas such
as credit cards, mobile phone SIMs and pay-TV, several proposed commercial imple-
mentations are described as ad-hoc [36] and most of them can be broken using a higher
number of experiments or by using smarter statistical methods. As seen in this chapter
no generic solutions protect against these attacks. In general this seems to be a difficult
problem to solve, and until a generic solution is found this remains an active area of
research.
This chapter has presented several ways in which an attacker can use side-channel
information to attack well known and well studied ciphers and their implementations.
Although some of the techniques are described in the example of well known ciphers,
such as RSA and DES, these attacks could be readily applied to other ciphers also.
Out of all side-channel attacks considered in this chapter, power and electromagnetic
analysis seem to be the most powerful ones. Most software countermeasures, such as
blinding and randomisation, have been effective against attacks such as timing analy-
sis, simple power analysis or fault analysis. However, in the case of attacks that exploit
the statistical properties of a large number of side-channel information samples, soft-
ware techniques have been shown to be less effective. Securing ciphers against the
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statistical attacks might require the combination of both hardware and software coun-
termeasures.
The next chapter presents the overview of asynchronous architecture design. The
overview of the design of the micronet-based architecture, which is used as an inspira-
tion for the network-based architecture presented in this thesis, is also given. The next
chapter also presents the related work towards securing asynchronous architectures




Asynchronous design is not new, it was used in the early days of computers when the
machines were built using discrete components. With the discovery of integrated cir-
cuits the synchronous design approach attained popularity and became the dominant
style. The major difference between the two design styles is in the way the timing
is managed: in the synchronous case the clock system provides global time reference
whereas asynchronous systems operate without the reference to a global clock signal.
In the last two decades there has been a revival of interest in asynchronous circuits [33].
This is partially due to serious design and implementation problems that the high per-
formance synchronous systems are facing [93].
4.2 Asynchronous control
Changes on a wire that occur on non-clock signals in synchronous architectures do
not influence their functionality. On the other hand, the change on a wire in an asyn-
chronous system, that occurs whenever a transition from one logic level to another
takes place, is termed an event. The interface between control circuits and the datapath
in asynchronous circuits is said to be an event-driven one.
Due to absence of centralised control, communication and control sequencing in
asynchronous designs are implemented explicitly. Communication is usually imple-
mented through the use of handshaking protocols [122]. These protocols perform lo-
cal synchronisations, and therefore the control and the control circuits are distributed
throughout the system. The correct operation of such a system does not dependent
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on meeting strict timing requirements, but is based on controlling the order in which
events occur. Due to data-dependent nature of delays, this order in which events occur
is usually non-deterministic [105].
The granularity of instruction parallelism in synchronous systems is usually limited
to the cycle level, which simplifies the implementation of control. The manner of op-
eration of synchronous architectures is deterministic, and enables the control and dat-
apath operations to run in parallel. The performance of asynchronous circuits largely
depends on the organisation of control [105]. In order to exploit local timing variations,
asynchronous designs must exhibit fine-grain parallelism. Also it must be ensured that
the handshaking and other control signals themselves do not represent considerable
performance overheads. These issues influence the design of both circuits and the ar-
chitecture, and trade-offs are often necessary between parallelism, circuit complexity
and the resulting speed of circuits [105].
4.3 Asynchronous circuits
In the past two decades there has been much work in synthesis and analysis of asyn-
chronous circuits, since this class of circuits promises a number of advantages over
synchronous circuits. Some of the most often cited advantages are increased modu-
larity, better tolerance to variations in power supply voltages and temperatures, low
power consumption, higher performance, and no problems with clock skew [65].
Variable delays in asynchronous circuits can introduce so-called hazards. These
occur when an intermediate value on the input is presented on the output of logic gates.
Potential hazards limit the number of asynchronous circuits that operate correctly with-
out any assumptions about wire and gate delays. According to the assumptions made
about wire and gate delays, asynchronous circuits can be classified as follows:
Delay-insensitive (DI) circuits: A circuit whose operation is independent of the de-
lays in both gates and wires, except that the delays are finite and positive, is said
to be delay-insensitive (DI). The class of true delay-insensitive circuits that can
be implemented in CMOS is very restricted [88].
Speed-independent (SI) circuits: If wire delays in the circuits are assumed to be in-
significant or zero, and the correct operation of the circuit does not depend on the
delays in any circuit elements, then the circuit is said to be speed-independent
(SI). Although it seems unrealistic, this assumption is realistic when applied lo-
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cally, to so-called equipotential regions, inside which delays are negligible. An
example of a scheme that adopts this approach are self-timed circuits which were
introduced by Seitz in [122].
Quasi delay-insensitive (QDI) circuits: This class of circuits is similar to the first two.
They are often characterised as delay-insensitive circuits with isochronic forks,
which is in practice very close to speed independence [87]. The wires of a set of
interconnecting wires are set to form an isochronic fork if the difference between
signal propagation delays in those wires is negligible compared to the delays of
the gates connected to them [88]. Circuits created using the DI design style aug-
mented with the isochronic fork assumption are said to be quasi delay-insensitive
(QDI).
The isochronic fork was introduced by Burns and Martin [34, 87] and is con-
sidered to be an essential and the “weakest possible” compromise to true delay
insensitivity [88] if such circuits are to be realised in CMOS [112].
Bounded delay: If the circuit operates correctly only when the delays are below some
predefined limit, then the circuit is said to be bounded delay circuit.
4.4 Communication in asynchronous circuits
Due to the absence of global synchronisation, communication in asynchronous systems
is achieved through handshaking mechanisms [122]. Data is passed between modules
using a group of wires collectively known as a channel. In channels, data usually flows
in one direction (i.e. channels are unidirectional) between two modules (1) the sender,
that delivers the data into the channel; (2) the receiver, that accepts the data from the
channel. If the cause of the transfer is taken into account, the following definition of
the two parties participating in the transfer can be made [22]: (1) the initiator is the
device that initiates the transfer; (2) the target is the device towards which the transfer
is initiated. Communication provided by a handshaking scheme is decentralised and
the only two parties taking part in it are the sender and the receiver. The sender is
responsible for the start of the transaction and the receiver responds when it is ready to
receive.
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4.4.1 Handshaking protocols
Local synchronisations in asynchronous systems are achieved through handshaking
protocols. A handshake involves two modules: the initiator and the target; which ex-
change so-called request and acknowledge signals. The target module (the receiver)
responds to a received request by sending an acknowledge signal. The initiator mod-
ule (the sender) starts the communication by sending a request and then waits for the
corresponding acknowledge signal to arrive (Figure 4.1). A request signal is used
to indicate the wish to communicate, while an acknowledge signal indicates that the
communication has been completed. This combination of a request and an acknowl-
edgement signal is called a handshake. Consequently, the communication medium
between the two modules is called a handshake channel [112].
Figure 4.1: Communication using handshake protocols.
If the positive and the negative edge transitions of a signal are treated equally during
a handshake, the handshake is called two-phase or transition signalling. Figure 4.2(a)
illustrates a two-phase handshake. In the two-phase handshake, the sender initiates
the communication by generating a raising or falling request event that is sent to the
receiver. The receiver acknowledges the receipt of the data by generating a rising or
falling acknowledge event. If, on the other hand, only the positive edge transitions of a
signal are used in the handshake, the handshake is called four-phase or level signalling.
Figure 4.2(b) illustrates a four-phase handshake. The two protocols differ in the num-
ber of signal transitions used to complete the communication. In the two-phase proto-
col, a single event is used to generate a request inducing a single acknowledge event.
As a consequence, no meaning is assigned to the levels on the request and acknowl-
edge wires. In the four-phase signalling protocol both request and acknowledge wires
are returned-to-zero (RTZ) at the end of each communication. In that case, the levels
on the request and acknowledge wires indicate a particular phase of the handshake,
and both request and the acknowledge signals must be reset before new data can be
transmitted.
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(a) Two-phase handshake.
(b) Four-phase handshake.
Figure 4.2: Handshake protocols.
The events that take place in the two protocols can be summarised as follows. In
the-two phase handshake, two events take place (Figure 4.2(a)) : (1) the sender requests
to transfer the data; and (2) the data transfer is completed. In the four-phase handshake,
there are accordingly four events (Figure 4.2(b)) : (1) the sender sends a request to start
the transaction; (2) the receiver acknowledges; (3) the sender stops sending the data;
(4) the receiver completes the handshake.
The design of the interface circuits between modules involved in the communica-
tion is influenced by the choice of the handshaking protocol. It is generally accepted
that the four-phase protocol results in smaller implementations of the interface circuits,
whereas the fewer number of transactions in the two-phase approach can show power
and performance advantages (e.g. [105]). However, the second half of the four-phase
handshake protocol (phases 3 and 4) can be done in parallel with the computation,
which means that, overall, the four-phase protocol can achieve higher performance
and lower costs than the two-phase protocol in CMOS designs [50].
4.4.2 Encoding schemes
Handshake protocols are responsible for both control related tasks and data communi-
cation. Since the simultaneous arrival of data and request signals cannot be guaranteed
under a delay-insensitive model, a technique is required to detect the presence of data.
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Detecting the arrival of the signal is only possible if it produces an event on a wire.
This means that in the case of data, only those bits whose values have changed could
be detected. For this reason a number of encoding schemes has been invented:
Single-rail encoding: In the single-rail encoding scheme [112] one wire is used for
each bit of data. It is assumed that the data is available prior to the control
signal from the sender, or equivalently, it is assumed that the delay of the request
is longer than the delay of the data-bus. This encoding scheme is also known
as bundled-data. This approach assumes that a safety margin is introduced by
delaying the request event, which ensures that the request arrives after the new
data values have been established at the receiver’s interface, thus conveying the
readiness of data.
Dual-rail encoding: In the dual-rail encoding scheme two wires are used to encode
each bit of data, whereby n bits of data are represented using 2n wires. The
transfer of each bit of data involves the activity of only one of the two wires
(as illustrated in Figure 4.3), which allows the presence or absence of data to
be established. The data is considered to be available by detecting a level (for
four-phase signalling) or an event (for two-phase signalling) on one of the two
rails for every bit of data. Therefore, a separate signalling wire to convey the
readiness of data is not required.
Data D0 D1
Clear 0 0
Logic 0 0 1
Logic 1 1 0
Illegal 1 1
Figure 4.3: Dual-rail encoding scheme.
One-hot encoding: In the one-hot encoding scheme 2n wires are used to represent n
bits of information. Each line represents one n-bit code, thus one line transmits
n-bits of information and the data validity, i.e., timing information.
N-of-M encoding: Examples of N-of-M encodings when N = 1 are dual-rail and one-
hot encodings. Systems coded using N-of-M encoding where M > N, operate
correctly regardless of delays in wires and gates, and are therefore considered
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delay-insensitive (e.g. [22]). Codes in which N > 1 are more complex, and use
more than one wire in a group to indicate one of a number of possible codes.
These codes can offer better utilisation of the available wires. For example,
2-of-7 encoding can transmit 4 bits of data over 7 wires in a delay-insensitive
manner. However, these codes result in larger arithmetic circuits and higher cost
of conversion between the coded form and a single-rail form, when compared to
1-of-M codes.
4.5 Advantages of asynchronous design
Synchronous control has been a norm in processor design for a number of years. The
improvements in integrated circuit technology have set forth new constraints on the
design of synchronous processors. Serious design and implementation problems that
the high performance synchronous systems are facing, were partially the reason for the
renewal of interest in asynchronous circuits. The main advantages of asynchronous cir-
cuits that have motivated researchers to investigate the asynchronous processor design
are summarised next.
4.5.1 No clock skew
The global clock signal is used in synchronous systems to regulate their operation, with
all system state changes occurring at the change of the clock signal level. Scaling down
of physical sizes of both transistors and interconnections, has an affect on physical
delays on the wires in a chip, causing some components of the system to see the global
clock signal change before others do. This difference in arrival times of the clock
signal at different parts of the circuit is known as the clock skew [62]. In order to
ensure correct operation, the clock period must be increased, which in turn imposes a
limit on the maximum clock frequency. This problem can be made less severe through
careful engineering of the clock distribution network, but solutions can be expensive
in terms of area and power consumption (e.g. [22]). On the other hand, the absence of
the clock in asynchronous designs completely avoids the problem of clock skew.
4.5.2 Low power consumption
Power consumption is an important factor when designing computing systems. In sim-
ple hardware systems, such as embedded systems, the power consumption is important
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as the power supply of these systems is usually limited. In larger, high-performance
systems, the power consumption can effect the cost of packaging due to both problems
of power supply and the cost of cooling. Asynchronous designs have the ability to
reduce power consumption by avoiding the following two problems of synchronous
design: (1) all parts of the synchronous design are clocked, regardless on whether they
perform useful functions or not; (2) a significant amount of power is required just for
driving the clock line.
One of the proposed solutions to reduce the superfluous circuit activity in syn-
chronous systems is clock-gating, a technique which isolates inactive circuits from
the clock. Similarly, signal-gating can be used for non-clock signals. Although these
techniques can improve power consumption, the main drawback is complicated circuit
design and timing analysis [59]. Power consumption can also be reduced by lowering
the power supply voltage, but it might be difficult to make transistors operate at low
supply.
The event-driven nature of asynchronous circuits naturally avoids any unnecessary
circuit activity. The absence of the global clock signal in asynchronous circuits causes
power consumption to be more evenly distributed over time, resulting in voltage vari-
ances that are smaller when compared to the synchronous case. Namely, transistors
fire only when they contribute to the computation, in contrast to synchronous case,
where most transistors fire simultaneously at all rising and falling clock edges. Also,
an asynchronous system activates only those parts of the circuit which are required and
so does not dissipate power in the rest of the circuit that is not being used. These facts
lead to the conclusion that asynchronous circuits should generally have lower power
consumption than synchronous circuits.
4.5.3 Average-case instead of worst-case performance
Components in the asynchronous design do not have to wait until after they complete
a transaction, but rather, if requested they can proceed to the next operation. This
characteristic of asynchrony is often cited as one of its main advantages over the syn-
chronous designs. The speed of asynchronous circuits thus depends on the average
speed of the components, whereas synchronous designs are optimised for the worst-
case conditions [33]. In synchronous systems, the clock period, and therefore its max-
imum frequency, is limited by the operation that takes the longest time to complete.
This is determined by the slowest component, its slowest operation, its worst-case
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data inputs, and worst-case operating conditions (such as supply voltage, temperature
and transistor speed). The worst-case combination is, however, typically met very in-
frequently [22]. Asynchronous circuit, by not being restricted to run in fixed clock
periods, can potentially realise better than worst-case performance whenever all the
worst-case conditions do not coincide. Asynchronous circuits are optimised for the
average-case and the worst-case operations just take longer [33]. The fact that there
is no fixed clock period during which the operation must complete, enables the delays
to be as long as necessary. Although, this may in some cases be slower than the syn-
chronous clock period, considering that the asynchronous circuits operate at the speed
determined by the current operation and therefore are effectively limited by its average
(or typical) delay, they are potentially faster.
4.5.4 Improved electromagnetic compatibility
Clock-orchestrated operation of the synchronous designs has for a consequence that the
radiated energy emissions of the circuits are concentrated at the harmonic frequencies
of the clock. If the circuit includes analog or RF circuits this could cause a problem as
the high frequency harmonics can be confused for a proper signal. Attempts to solve
this problem suggest varying the clock period in order to spread the radiated energy
across the spectrum. However, these solutions can have a negative effect on the per-
formance as the clock period can only be prolonged in order to maintain the correct
operation of the circuit (e.g. [22]). The asynchronous circuits, on the other hand, pro-
duce broadband distributed interference spread across the entire spectrum [52]. Due to
the absence of a clock, asynchronous circuits may have better noise and electromag-
netic compatibility properties than synchronous systems [132].
4.5.5 Modularity of design
In synchronous designs the improved performance can often be achieved only by in-
creasing the global clock frequency, which usually requires most of the design to be
reimplemented. On the other hand, the performance of asynchronous designs can be
improved by modifying only the most active parts of the circuit, while obeying the
communication protocol on the interface of the redesigned block. A designer of an
asynchronous system has an advantage of being able to simply replace one block by
another with different characteristics and evaluate performance changes.
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4.5.6 Simplified layout and improved robustness
The independence of circuit correctness from the delays on the wires in the asyn-
chronous circuits, causes the chip layout to be simplified. Delay-insensitive circuits
are also tolerant to implementation parameters such as fabrication process and tran-
sistor scaling (e.g. [116]). Asynchronous circuits are also more tolerant to physical
environment variations, such as temperature, power supply and fabrication specifica-
tion. In synchronous systems, these parameters have to be taken into account, since the
system must work under worst-case operating conditions. Asynchronous circuits, on
the other hand, in general do not have critical timing requirements to match, and may
therefore exhibit different timing variations and run as fast as their operating conditions
allow. Furthermore, their functionality and correctness will be preserved regardless of
the operating conditions.
4.6 Disadvantages of asynchronous design
Despite the aforementioned advantages, the asynchronous designs also have a number
of disadvantages when compared to synchronous. These disadvantages serve as a mo-
tivation for further research, but may also account for the unwillingness of industry to
adopt such techniques.
4.6.1 Design complexity
The operation of synchronous circuits is fully orchestrated by the clock: every process-
ing stage must complete its activity in less than the duration of the clock period. This
characterises a simple and so far largely successful scheme. Not having any global
timing restrictions poses a problem in the design of asynchronous circuits. It has in-
troduced numerous styles to describe asynchronous circuits, from speed-independent
to delay-insensitive [33]. In order to ensure the correct behaviour, these designs have
to deal with the sequentiality of signals and avoid hazards and races, caused by non-
determinism. These problems present the designers with difficult tasks of specifying
the behaviour of the circuit and the values of signals at every moment in time.
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4.6.2 Completion detection problems
The lack of timing references in asynchronous circuits makes the completion detection
complicated, as the task of determining when the completion signal should be gener-
ated is difficult. This should not be too early nor too late as the successor stage might
read the incorrect data, or it can reduce the performance. This is usually manifested
with asynchronous design requiring extra hardware to allow each block to perform lo-
cal synchronisations to pass the data to other blocks. This added complexity results in
larger circuits and more difficult design process.
4.6.3 Testing difficulties
Although a considerable amount of work is put into specification and design of asyn-
chronous circuits, testing them has received relatively little attention [64]. Testing
asynchronous circuits has traditionally been considered difficult, particularly if com-
pared to synchronous circuits [131]. A number of aspects of asynchronous circuits
have made them harder to test than synchronous circuits: the existence of a large num-
ber of state-holding elements, considerably complicates testing; it is not possible to
“freeze” and “single step” from a particular state of the circuit, which is commonly
done when testing synchronous circuits; there is a large overhead of logic around the
asynchronous circuit; and finally, detecting hazards and races is a difficult problem that
needs to be solved in the first place [64].
Although these difficulties are largely challenging, there are examples where test-
ing can be implemented as a part of control, with some probability of success. Namely,
self-checking circuits have an interesting characteristic, seen only in self-timed circuits,
that makes them fully testable [64]. During the handshake a request from the sender
initiates the process and the receiver must eventually acknowledge back the sender,
when ready to receive. If this process is never completed, it is likely that there is a
fault in the circuit, and the circuit halts.
Although the methods for testing synchronous circuits are not directly applicable
(partly due to the absence of the global clock signal in the asynchronous circuits), some
techniques (e.g. partial scan [73]) have been adopted for use in asynchronous circuits.
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4.6.4 Lack of tools
Years into the design of synchronous systems has yielded a large body of tools for
design, simulation, synthesis, routing and verification. Considering that the revival of
interests for asynchronous architectures appeared relatively recently, a good amount of
tools has appeared for asynchronous design, from high-level languages for hardware
description to verification and synthesis [114]. However, these tools are still immature,
when compared to the rich infrastructure available for synchronous designs.
4.6.5 Performance measurement difficulties
The task of measuring the performance of synchronous systems consists of simply
measuring the length of the critical path and then counting the number of clock cycles.
In asynchronous design, this task is not as trivial as the length of time in which a
task needs to completewe depends on both the delays and the input data. This implies
that the performance measurements are inclined to be variable, and the performance
measure is actually an average measure.
Some of the alternative methods for measuring the performance of asynchronous
circuits are reviewed in [118]. One of them is MIPS/Watt metric, which measures how
fast the processor runs, in terms of power consumption, and shows that the performance
and the power consumption can be correlated.
It has been experimentally shown in [89], that the higher speed at higher voltage,
and therefore higher power consumption, can be traded for lower voltage with lower
power consumption, but also lower performance.
4.7 Pipelines
Pipelining is an implementation technique in which instruction execution is divided
into a number of distinct stages. It is by far the most popular technique for improving
performance in CPUs, which enables a new task to start before an old one has been
completed. Instructions at different stages of execution are allowed to progress con-
currently, thus allowing the execution of a number of instructions to be overlapped.
Figure 4.4 illustrates a sample organisation of a four-stage pipeline. The throughput
of a pipeline is determined by the frequency of results coming out of the pipeline.
In the synchronous case, the time needed to move data one stage down the pipeline
(the machine cycle) is determined by the slowest pipeline stage. If there are no data
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dependencies, the throughput is equal to one instruction per machine cycle. In the
asynchronous case, the movement of data between pipeline stages is controlled by the
handshaking protocols. The data can move forward only when the succeeding stage is
empty and ready. Therefore, the asynchronous pipelines may have variable throughput
and have the ability to exploit the actual delays, where synchronous architectures are
optimised for the worst-case.
Figure 4.4: Four-stage pipeline.
In a pipeline organisation, as the one given in Figure 4.4, the basic mechanism
for naming operands and communicating results is provided through the register bank.
Data and control dependencies in the datapath enforce sequentiality in the instruction
execution order. Therefore, the pipelined architecture must ensure that the correct
order of instructions is preserved. In a non-pipelined architecture, at the beginning
of execution of an instruction, all the values in the register file are up-to-date. In a
pipelined architecture, however, data values are read and written at different stages,
and therefore the immediate correctness of values in physical registers is no longer
guaranteed.
Register-based communication can be adapted for use in asynchronous environ-
ments with the addition of a register locking mechanism [111], which provides the
synchronisation required at the register file. The register locking mechanism allows
for reads to a particular register to be stalled until all the pending writes have been
completed. A simple way to implement this mechanism it to use a single additional bit
for each physical register. Typically, during the decode, the destination register of the
instruction is locked by setting the lock bit, and during the write-back, the register is
unlocked by unsetting the lock bit. Any attempts to read the register while the lock bit
is set are stalled. Locks for an already locked register can be treated in several ways.
For example, they can be stalled until the register is unlocked, which is a solution
that provides correct execution even in the case of out-of-order write-backs [116]. A
lock FIFO [111] organises multiple lock bits and allows a single register to be locked
multiple times and also generates write-select signals during the write-back stage.
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4.8 Exploiting instruction level parallelism
Exploiting instruction level parallelism (ILP) in synchronous architectures suffers from
control overheads. In addition, the centralised control forces complex designs to op-
erate below their technological best by always assuming worst-case behaviour. On
the other hand, the benefit of centralised approach, in which operations complete in
fixed delays, is that it leads to deterministic behaviour of the architecture, where the
state of the system can be predicted at any time. In contrast, in asynchronous sys-
tems operations take only as long as it is necessary and even the execution times of
identical instructions may show variations. This characteristic of asynchronous sys-
tems can have unfavourable effects on instruction generation and scheduling. On the
other hand, exploiting concurrent behaviour is more efficient under distributed control,
whereas enforcing synchronisations and sequentiality of operations in asynchronous
environment increases the control complexity [116].
Pipelined architectures typically exploit parallelism that is available between stages
of the pipeline. However, this does not make the full use of the available ILP, that
can be exploited to the fullest by allowing more instructions to execute concurrently.
Available instruction level parallelism can be utilised in one of the following two ways:
1. Introducing deeper pipelines that make better use of resources over time, known
as temporal parallelism. Architectures that exploit temporal parallelism are
called super-pipelined architectures.
2. Allowing the operations to be performed in parallel by duplicating resources,
known as spatial parallelism. Architectures that fetch and execute multiple
instructions in parallel are called super-scalar or Very Long Instruction Word
(VLIW) architectures.
The following section gives details of the asynchronous architecture that exploits both




A feature common to all of the asynchronous designs is their view of the datap-
ath [116]. In most of the asynchronous designs the datapath is, like in synchronous
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designs, seen as a single linear pipeline. An alternative, as shown in [116], is to im-
plement the datapath as a so-called micronet. Micronet is a network of asynchronous
communicating pipelines, that can be seen as the generalisation of the Sutherland’s mi-
cropipelines [129]. It allows a higher degree of fine-grain concurrency to be exploited,
both between and within instructions, a feature that is considered to be very expensive
to achieve in the equivalent synchronous design [116].
4.9.2 Synchronous, asynchronous and micronet pipeline
The delay of the slowest stage of the synchronous pipeline defines its clock period.
The imbalance between delays of different pipeline stages results in the existence of
idle periods which lead to poor utilisation of the physical resources (e.g. [116]). Fig-
ure 4.5(a) illustrates a four-stage synchronous pipeline datapath that exploits temporal
parallelism. The shadows in the figure represent the activity of the stage and the white
spaces the idle times.
The performance of the asynchronous pipeline is determined by the average speed
of its components. Figure 4.5(b) shows an asynchronous linear pipeline, which like
the synchronous one, exploits only temporal parallelism, but in a more efficient man-
ner. The instructions spend in each stage of the pipeline only as long as necessary. If
the current stage is completed and the next stage is free, the instruction can proceed
to the next stage. Micropipelines are representatives of asynchronous linear pipelines.
In these pipelines, only different pipeline stages can operate concurrently. The aver-
age throughput of an asynchronous pipeline is bounded by the stage with the slowest
isolated average throuput. Idle times can be reduced by introducing buffers between
stage, but can also cause increase in pipeline latency and reduce performance when
compared to synchronous case. In [116] it is suggested that exploiting spatial paral-
lelism might be a way to reduce the number of buffers required to maintain isolated
average performance.
Figure 4.5(c) shows an asynchronous datapath which exploits both temporal and
spatial parallelism. The figure shows an asynchronous non-linear pipeline, the so-
called micronet, in which stages from different instructions can overlap. The datapath
is no longer modelled as a true pipeline, but rather as a network of communicating
stages. In micropipelines, although each stage may consist of a number of different
resources, generally only one (or a subset) of them can be active at any time for a given
instruction. In case of the micronet, successive instructions which utilise different
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(a) Synchronous pipeline.




resources within a stage are able to execute concurrently. In the example illustrated
in Figure 4.5(c), the instruction execution (IE) stage has two concurrent resources and
two instructions take place concurrently. Instructions can share resources in any of
the stages, which enables further resource utilisation [118]. For example, while an
instruction is stalled waiting for an operand on one bus, another instruction could use
the other bus to fetch its operand. The amount of spatial parallelism which can be
achieved in practice depends on the relative delays of the functional units within the
datapath [116].
4.9.3 Micronet as an asynchronous network of micro-operations
A micronet-based processor exhibits fine-grain concurrency both at spatial and tempo-
ral level [21]. In a synchronous design the centralised control forces each instruction
to go through all the stages of the pipeline regardless of the need to do so, with the
time spent in each stage being determined by the clock period. The execution cost
is therefore determined by worst-case delay of the slowest stage. The similar is true
for micropipeline-based datapath [51], except that the cost is this case determined by
the actual delay of the slowest stage. In the micronet, on the other hand, considering
that the control is decentralised and distributed amongst the communicating functional
units which operate concurrently, the ILP can be achieved implicitly without extra
cost [116]. The micronet datapath is modelled as a network of functional units, in
which each instruction visits the appropriate functional units, and for as long as is nec-
essary to execute a particular part of the instruction. Different program instructions
may execute concurrently within the same stage. There are several instructions active
at a same time, and they compete for functional unit resources, and may even overtake
each other. In order to maximise the utilisation of datapath resources, the micronet
architecture is designed to enforce only minimal constraints on their use [105]. This
is achieved by breaking each individual instruction into a number of micro-operations,
each scheduled independently. This allows micro-operations from different instruc-
tions to exists in the same logical pipeline stage. An instruction uses only those micro-
operations that are required for its execution. This enables other instructions to use the
resources within the same stage that are not used. The micronet architecture exposes
resources such as register read ports and operand-buses and allows different instruc-
tions to use them concurrently. For example, an instruction that has only one operand,
and therefore requires only one read-bus, will leave the other read-bus available. The
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second read-bus can be used concurrently by another instruction that also has only one
operand. Similarly, if an instruction does not need any of the resources within a stage,
it will skip it.
In asynchronous pipelines the number of active instructions at any time is bounded
with the number of pipeline stages, while in the micronet architecture the number of
active instructions is bounded with the number of functional units [118]. Furthermore,
the time an instruction spends in a micronet stage is variable. The fast instructions can
overtake the slower ones and, effectively, instructions compete for resources. In prac-
tice, all instructions do not necessarily have identical execution times and therefore
their results may be ready out of program order. In-order write-back is not enforced
as it can degrade the performance by stalling the functional units and increasing the
instruction evaluation times. In the micronet architecture the strict ordering of instruc-
tion completions can be relaxed and that way ILP further exploited. This has an effect
of increased utilisation of functional units. Therefore, the micronet datapath offers a
finer-level of concurrency than the level offered by micropipelines [21].
4.9.4 Micronet implementations
Micronet asynchronous processor (MAP) architecture was developed at the University
of Edinburgh [21, 19, 116]. Rebello [116] studied the conversion of a synchronous
processor architecture into an efficient micronet-based architecture. This process was
described in a series of refinement steps, each introducing additional scope for exploit-
ing fine-grain parallelism and decentralised control.
The development of scheduling algorithms targeted at micronet processors was
studied in [20], where an additional scheme for exploiting information obtained at
compile-time was also suggested. This theme of exploiting a close interaction between
compiler and architecture was continued in the work of Mullins [105], who explored
super-scalar asynchronous architectural designs. Further investigation of scheduling
algorithms and problems of optimisations for ILP in micronet-based processor were
studied by Sotelo-Salazar [118], who introduced a scheme for scheduling instructions
within basic blocks, that minimises stalls cause by data-dependencies and resource
contention. The issue of efficient scheduling of instructions with uncertain latencies in
the micronet-based asynchronous architecture was also addressed in [118].
Data-forwarding is a technique commonly used in pipelined architectures to min-
imise the cost of functional unit stalls (due to data-dependencies) by redirecting data
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that is being written to the registers, to the waiting functional unit(s). In synchronous
ILP designs, the cost of maintaining the correct operation increases the complexity of
control which in turn affects the clock period and thus the performance [116]. Mi-
cronet datapath design can utilise the existing handshaking mechanisms, together with
register locking mechanisms, in order to achieve the same effect but with trivial hard-
ware overheads. Exploiting concurrency in a micronet architecture is aided by the
distributed nature of the control strategy and by the fact that the movement of data is
controlled locally [116]. In the micronet architecture, data-forwarding is implemented
by tagging each result with the destination register identifier. During the write-back
stage the tag may be matched to operands currently being fetched. This allows the
operand fetch stage to obtain the data from the write-back bus before the result is
available from the register file. In such an event a second handshake is sent to register
file to cancel the pending read request.
A block diagram of an example RISC architecture developed using a micronet
model is given in Figure 4.6. A small token ring provides arbitrated access to a single
write-back bus. Write-after-write (WAW) hazards are avoided by ensuring that an
instruction’s destination register is unlocked before write-back can take place. This
way the instruction issue stalls are avoided, and only the write-back stage can be stalled
while the destination register is locked. The go-write signal shown in the figure is
generated at the register file and indicated when it is safe to write-back a particular
result [105].
Figure 4.6: Micronet [105].
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4.9.5 Summary
The previous sections presented an overview of the basic concepts regarding asyn-
chronous architectures: asynchronous control, asynchronous circuits, and some of
the advantages and disadvantages of asynchronous control. In the next section, side-
channel analysis of devices implemented using asynchronous paradigm are reviewed.
4.10 Side-channel analysis of asynchronous architec-
tures
Apart from the various design problems that the global clock introduces in synchronous
designs, the clock is also seen as a source of information that makes the modern cryp-
tographic devices vulnerable to side-channel analysis. Recently, asynchronous circuits
have been suggested as a promising platform for security sensitive applications due to
a number of their advantages.
4.10.1 Motivation for using asynchronous architectures for cryp-
tographic devices
Most smart-cards use CMOS technology which consumes power only when the logic
state of the chip changes; at other times only quiescent current is drawn. Synchronous
architectures are clock-driven; all activity in the chip is driven by an internal or exter-
nal clock edge and nearly all activity ceases before the next clock edge is due. This
results in periodic power consumption curves and the existence of large peaks that
correspond to clock signals, which facilitate the power analysis attacks. In contrast,
operations in asynchronous architectures are initiated in a data-driven fashion making
gate-switching more distributed. Circuits employ handshaking protocols which work
as local synchronisation signals. This allows the circuits to operate independently, as
the activity in each individual subcircuit only depends on their local handshake sig-
nals. The global timing reference in the power consumption signals that is used in
power analysis are no longer present and the analysis is more difficult [136].
The absence of the clock in the asynchronous architectures reduces high cycle-to-
cycle power variations and clock-driven electromagnetic emissions, which are sources
of side-channel information. As the subcircuits are independent, the contribution of
each subcircuit to the overall power consumption does not have consistent relative
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timings [136]. The power consumption curves (PCCs) of asynchronous circuits appear
smoother and represent agregation of many small peaks appearing at arbitrary times
according to their handshake signals.
Timing variations of asynchronous circuits make correlating power traces more
difficult and signal averaging problematic [49]. This further complicates the statistical
analysis of the power traces obtained from asynchronous architectures. Handshakes
dominate the behaviour of every part of the circuit, but also the behaviour of one stage
might be affected by the behaviour of the previous stage and a number of other stages.
This results in power curve overlaps and shifts which raise a problem during the sta-
tistical analysis. Also, the cycle time for the same instruction can vary in different
periods. Therefore, different power consumption curves might not necessarily have
the same periodicity. Correlating power traces and signal averaging is made difficult
due to these issues. On the other hand, the different execution times for the same in-
structions can introduce fine-grain timing noise, which can be a potential source of
information for the attacker [102, 136].
4.10.2 Side-channel analysis of dual-rail asynchronous architec-
tures
Recent investigations into the information leakage in asynchronous architectures [102,
136, 103, 49] have shown that asynchronous logic with dual-rail encoding improves
resistance to side-channel attacks.
Moore et al. [102] suggested that 1− o f − n encoded speed-independent circuits
could provide a good framework for smart-card devices that are resistant to side-
channel analysis and fault injection. They notice that one of the ways to protect smart-
cards is to eliminate the data-dependent power consumption. The idea to achieve this
is to use 1− o f − n encoding scheme in which each bit of data is represented with n
wires and at any point only one of them is high. Since the power consumption is di-
rectly proportional to the circuit’s switching activity, a simple binary encoding of data
(unlike 1−o f −n), where one wire is used for each bit of data, results in power con-
sumption proportional to the number of state changes. 1−o f −n encoding consumes
constant power to transmit data since only one wire transitions for every symbol en-
coded. However, it turned out that this is not enough to guarantee the data-independent
power consumption. A number of issues, ranging from the layout problems, logic
complexity variation and the data-dependent control had to be resolved during the de-
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sign [102]. Other ideas towards protecting smart-cards against side-channel analysis
include diffusing data-dependent timing, which is already present in asynchronous ar-
chitectures due to data-dependent execution. 1−o f −n encoding scheme also allows
the protection against fault injection as it allows for the alarm signal to be generated
and propagated as the internal part of the data.
Dual-rail (1− o f − 2) encoding is often used to construct speed-independent cir-
cuits. The two wires in this scheme are traditionally used to encode three states: clear,
logic-0 and logic-1. In this design the fourth state is used to explicitly encode the error
state, or the alarm, as shown in Figure 4.7. This enables dual-rail circuits to deadlock
when faults are injected. In order to ensure the data-independent power consumption
the return-to-zero (RTZ) signalling was required.
D0 D1 Meaning
0 0 Clear
0 1 Logic 0
1 0 Logic 1
1 1 Alarm
Figure 4.7: Dual-rail encoding with alarm signal definition.
In the experiments, reported in [49], the design of secure dual-rail XAP asyn-
chronous processor was compared with a synchronous XAP, bundled data XAP, 1-of-4
XAP and 1-of-2 (dual-rail) XAP. Power analysis of secure dual-rail processor revealed
that small imbalances in the design of dual-rail gates allowed some data-dependent
power leakage to be observed. Although the amount of leakage in the secure dual-rail
XAP was significantly lower, when compared to synchronous XAP, this reduction in
power leakage was not enough to protect against DPA. Authors noticed that although,
in theory, secure dual-rail XAP should be breechless thanks to its dual-rail encoding
and RTZ signalling, the manufactured chip showed small weaknesses to DPA. This
turned out to be due to implementation tools that were used, which tent to optimise
the space, and also the bit encoded into two wires might have one wire longer than the
other. This creates the imbalance and produces the power leakage.
Experiments involving electromagnetic analysis (EMA) included similar tests as
the power analysis. The collected electromagnetic signals had exploitable magnitudes
which allowed for successful DEMA attack to be carried out on the collected reference
curves. Again, the imbalance introduced by the design tools has been identified as the
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reason for data-dependent EM leakage. The important property of EMA, its locality,
has also been demonstrated. The ability of EMA to isolate fine circuit areas has an
implication that the balanced design is of great importance. Furthermore, in clocked
designs the clock usually adds noise to the EM signal and in asynchronous design
this is no longer true and this inconvenience of EM analysis is no longer faced. As a
defence against EMA, the authors suggest the use of the top level metal grid which can
help mask the underlying activity. The authors also suggest that non-determinism may
be used to make data correlation more difficult.
The analysis of the resistance of the secure dual-rail XAP to fault injection is also
performed. The suggested design strategy towards the resistance to fault injections
was in ensuring that all the attempts to introduce faulty behaviour should result in
a deadlock. However, the experimental investigation revealed weaknesses to optical
analysis [126] of secure dual-rail XAP processor, which were again the result of some
design concessions. Details of these faulty behaviours and the proposed countermea-
sures are given in [49].
Fournier et al. [49] also notice the importance of the design-time security evaluation
and validation. They suggest that the systematic simulation during the design time
can reveal data-dependent leakages. Also, the range of physical phenomena that can
trigger the faulty behaviour can be simulated. They notice that these simulations can
be performed in a way similar to traditional fault analysis simulations.
Yu et al. [136] investigated the security of self-timed ARM-compatible processor,
that was designed specifically to explore the benefits of asynchronous design for secu-
rity sensitive applications. Their secure asynchronous design consists of the following
features, which were introduced to improve security: (1) dual-rail encoding, used to
reduce data-dependent power consumption; (2) “null” insertion between consecutive
data bits, used to ensure that the power consumption of the new data does not depend
on the previous data value; (3) return-to-zero dual-rail encoding extended to storage
elements for on-chip registers and state-holding storage; (4) design of functional units
with data-independent response times. Yu et al. have compared their dual-rail secure
design with the single-rail asynchronous design. The findings were that the dual-rail
design has shown better resistance to power and timing analysis than its single-rail
equivalent. The power analysis experiments have shown that the signal-to-noise ratio
of the data-dependent operations was smaller in the secure dual-rail processor than in
the single-rail processor. The analysis has also identified the instructions that were still
vulnerable to power analysis attacks.
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Experiments reported in [136] also included the timing analysis. The authors no-
ticed that a system that takes different time when processing different data values can
potentially leak timing information. This information could be compromising and the
attacker who could extract the timing variation could also extract the data value. The
larger the variation, the easier would be to extract the information. The timing varia-
tions in single-rail processor were much larger than in the secure dual-rail processor.
Furthermore, processing the same instruction with the same data does not always con-
sume the same amount of time. In synchronous cases this is usually the result of
noise, whereas in asynchronous case this is the effect of handshaking protocols. Each
handshake is influenced by the neighboring stages and therefore processing the same
instruction with the same data can consume slightly different times. This suggests that
the self-timed behaviour of asynchronous circuits contributes to making attacks more
difficult. Using the secure dual-rail design, the timing variation for some instruction
was almost eliminated where for some other instructions it was still present.
Sokolov et al. [127] presented a way to improve the security of (synchronous) dual-
rail circuits. The dual-rail protocols implemented in most designs allow switching
from all-zero (“00”) to a code-word, i.e., “01” or “10” (see Figure 4.7), and back to
all-zero. The “00” state is used to indicate the absence of data and is usually called
a spacer. The authors suggest introducing an additional spacer, all-one (“11”) spacer,
in the dual-rail protocol and in that way guarantee that all gates switch in each clock
cycle regardless of the transmitted data values. The dual-rail protocol now alternates
between the two spacers. Reported experimental results show that the data-dependent
switching activity is eliminated, but the price of this effect is in increased switching
activity and area.
The asynchronous processors show interesting security and tamper-resistance prop-
erties. Although the investigations into their security have shown some weaknesses,
the leakage of information through power consumption was significantly reduced. The
combination of techniques might have to be used when securing these processors
against side-channel attacks and fault injection. Another problem with asynchronous
design is that secure designs have a cost of doubled or tripled area penalty [49]. This
can be balanced against large memory size savings that are possible due to reduced
need for software countermeasures in asynchronous design. The authors of [49] con-
cluded that pure balancing on its own is insufficient and suggested that introducing




This chapter has presented background concepts of the second of the two major back-
grount areas: asynchronous processor design. This information is intended to set the
context for the overlap of two design themes: secure-cryptosystem design and asyn-
chronous design. This chapter has also covered basic concepts and design ideas of the
micronet-based asynchronous architecture that shares some of the design ideas with
the network-based asynchronous architecture introduced in the next chapter. Finally,
this chapter reviewed the research done in evaluating the asynchronous designs for
side-channel analysis.
The next chapter gives a detailed description of the design of the network-based
asynchronous architecture that aims at achieving improved resistance to side-channel
analysis and in particular differential power analysis.
Chapter 5
Design of the Network-based
Asynchronous Architecture
5.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 reviewed side-channel attacks and countermeasures for preventing these at-
tacks that were proposed in the literature. Section 3.5.8 reviewed hardware counter-
measures for preventing side-channel attacks. Some of these solutions [91, 92, 66]
demonstrated a hardware paradigm for randomising the execution, which assists in
making the side-channel attacks more difficult to apply. These solutions exploit the
available instruction level parallelism in order to randomise the execution, achieve
non-deterministic execution, and hide compromising information in the power traces.
A completely different approach for counteracting side-channel attacks, reviewed
in Section 4.10, uses balanced asynchronous logic [136, 103, 49] to balance the power
consumption of the device and decorrelate the data being processed from the power
consumption. Research in this direction has confirmed that the use of balanced asyn-
chronous circuits is beneficial for protecting cryptographic devices, but perfectly bal-
anced systems, in which the power consumption and the data are completely decorre-
lated, are difficult to design. The authors of [49] concluded that pure balancing on its
own is insufficient and suggested that introducing non-determinism in the execution
might be a way to remove vulnerabilities introduced through balanced design.
Due to the absence of centralised control the execution in asynchronous architec-
tures is naturally non-deterministic [116]. In the previous chapter the micronet asyn-
chronous architecture was reviewed. In this architecture the control is distributed in
order to exploit both temporal and spatial parallelism. The micronet model features
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single instruction issue and out-of-order write-back, and is capable of issuing instruc-
tions one at a time, rapidly, allowing different instruction execution stages to execute
concurrently.
This chapter concentrates on the design and implementation of the network-based
asynchronous architecture in which execution is non-deterministic. Different runs
of the same code have different order of instruction execution, execute in different
amounts of time and have different power signatures. This type of behaviour leads
to decorrelation of power consumption measurements and, therefore, the increase in
complexity and the cost of applying side-channel analysis. The non-deterministic ex-
ecution is achieved by: (1) exploiting available instruction level parallelism, (2) al-
lowing concurrent execution of both independent and dependent instructions, and by
(3) performing data-forwarding using randomised routing of register values through
the network. The non-deterministic execution renders the architecture more robust to
side-channel analysis, and in particular differential power analysis, as one of its most
powerful forms. The focus here is on the design of an architecture in which a number
of control issues resulting from data and structural dependencies have to be addressed
efficiently at run-time.
5.2 Design goals
Due to the absence of a global clock and centralised control, execution in asynchronous
architectures is inherently non-deterministic. This thesis investigates ways in which
non-deterministic execution, often cited as a possible way to render the side-channel
analysis more difficult to apply, can be further exploited. A major contribution of this
thesis is the introduction of a novel architectural idea in which the functional units in
the processor datapath are themselves connected as a network, rather than as a linear
pipeline. The aim is to decorrelate the power consumption measurements by exploiting
the inherent non-determinism of instructions executing in parallel over the network of
functional units in which data-forwarding is realised through randomised routing. This
investigation focuses on exploring architectural principles which could be beneficial
for efficiently and effectively decorrelating power consumption measurements, and
not on the low-level implementation of the architecture.
The network-based asynchronous architecture is a network of functional units. One
of the most popular ways to increase the performance of processors is to organise func-
tional units into a linear pipeline. A new approach which sees the processor datapath as
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a micronet, i.e., network of communicating stages, was first introduced in [21]. One of
the fundamental differences between the network-based architecture and the micronet
architecture is in the topology of the network. In the network-based architecture the
network has the topology of a family of graphs known as graphs on alphabets. The
interesting question, investigated here, is how the control can be distributed over the
network, in order to make the execution both concurrent and randomised, and thus
non-deterministic.
In the network-based architecture the distributed control strategy and the fact that
data movement is controlled locally aid in exploiting concurrency. Central to the per-
formance of the architecture is the ability to issue instructions rapidly and keep the
functional units busy. The instructions are issued in order, at a fast rate. The time an
instruction spends in different functional units may vary, and depends on a number of
static and dynamic factors [118]. Furthermore, computations may overtake each other
leading to out-of-order completion and non-deterministic execution.
In order to improve performance and to achieve concurrent execution, techniques
of instruction compounding and data-forwarding are implemented. These are impor-
tant features for exploiting instruction level parallelism and achieving high perfor-
mance. A novel implementation of instruction compounding technique is presented,
in which data-dependencies between instructions are recognised during the instruction
issue stage. This information is then used to initiate data-forwarding operations, which
route operand values from one functional unit to another, thus avoiding the register file.
This leads to efficient execution that is achieved by distributing both state and control
and minimising the need for high-level synchronisations.
The number and functionality of functional units can be changed without influenc-
ing the overall behaviour of the architecture. The network itself does not depend on
the types of functional units that form it, but the execution of a particular code can be
influenced by the distribution of the functional units among different types. The over-
all behaviour of the network and the architecture depends on the code that is executed,
the distribution of different instructions within the code, the ordering of instructions in
the instruction stream, and the distribution of different units within the network. For a
particular code the distribution of units could be adjusted to match its specific security
and performance requirements.
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5.3 Overview of the network-based architecture
In most architectural implementations the exploitation of instruction level parallelism
(ILP) is limited by data-dependencies and structural hazards. Asynchronous designs
that aim at exploiting ILP face a number of control issues that result from data and
structural dependencies. These issues need to be addressed efficiently so that the ex-
ecution does not suffer from control overheads. Even when instruction scheduling
techniques for avoiding such dependencies are considered, a good statically generated
instruction schedule is not always possible, and techniques are required to resolve them
at run-time (e.g. [116]). A commonly used solution for reducing stalls caused by data-
dependencies is data-forwarding. Data-forwarding is traditionally done by redirecting
the data being written to the register bank to the unit that requires that data.
In the design of the network-based asynchronous architecture techniques for ex-
ploiting fine-grain ILP and efficiently resolving control issues that result from data-
dependencies and structural hazards are explored. The execution paths of instructions
without data-dependencies are independent and these instructions are allowed to exe-
cute concurrently, at their own pace. There is no communication or synchronisation
imposed between different execution stages of these instructions. Communication of
execution stages of different instructions in some cases requires a level of synchro-
nisation which is undesirable in asynchronous design. When there are dependencies
between instructions (not only between consecutive instructions), these are recognised
at run-time during the instruction issue stage, and are used to initialise data-forwarding
operations. In this implementation data-forwarding involves communication between
units in the network through which the data is routed in a randomised fashion from the
producer unit to the consumer unit. In traditional implementations data-forwarding re-
quires synchronisation between the consumer’s operand fetch stage and the producer’s
write-back stage. This synchronisation inevitably slows down the faster stage (the
fetch stage) when two dependent instructions are fetched and issued one after another.
Data-forwarding, as implemented here, does not require these stages to be synchro-
nised. Furthermore, the consumer does not issue the operand fetch for the register that
is obtained through data-forwarding and the producer’s write-back stage is completely
decoupled from the data-forwarding operations as the latter is realised through the net-
work. Although the dependencies between instructions do mean that the consumer
might need to wait for the result to be ready and forwarded, this is still faster than writ-
ing the result to the register bank and reading it during the operand fetch stage. In this
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case, the operand fetch stage is replaced by waiting for the data to be forwarded. Dur-
ing this period the network routes the data to the consumer unit. The routing module
of the unit operates concurrently with the unit’s operand fetch-and-lock module. Data-
forwarding implemented in this way reduces the register bank traffic, as the number
of fetch requests is reduced with the number of forwarding operations. This in turn
reduces register bank response times and improves performance. Figure 5.1 compares
the execution times of running AES on architectural configurations with and without
data-forwarding as the number of functional units is increased. This confirms that data-
forwarding in the network-based asynchronous architecture improves the performance.
The results presented in Chapter 6 confirm that it also improves security against differ-
ential power analysis, which is the primary goal of this investigation.
Figure 5.1: Execution times of the architectural configurations with (NET) and without
(NO NET) data-forwarding.
Although the performance gains of data-forwarding are evident (Figure 5.1), these
are not the primary focus of this design. The focus is on the variation of execution times
that this approach introduces. Namely, the network routes the data using a randomised
routing protocol, which is specific for the implemented network topology. The routing
consists of two parts: in the first part the data is routed to a randomly chosen unit;
whereas in the second part the data follows the shortest path to its destination. The
number of nodes a packet visits on its path from the source to the destination varies
between routes, which introduces variations in the execution times. Different units
may now receive different amounts of traffic that also influences the time required to
route the packet through the network. Although one might argue that this is a serious
118 Chapter 5. Design of the Network-based Asynchronous Architecture
shortcoming and that the units can become overwhelmed with routing, in practice this
is not a real threat because the randomised part ensures that units get balanced amounts
of traffic. However, some routes could be more likely than others due to the fact that
some units could be utilised more than others. For example, the arithmetic unit may be
utilised more than the memory unit, as the former would need to route other network
traffic while also receiving a higher amount of its own traffic. However, this can be
avoided by having the appropriate number of each unit type in order to balance the
computations. In summary, data-forwarding leads to the fulfillment of the first design
goal, non-deterministic execution, what makes the implementation of data-forwarding
one of the key features of this architectural design.
The fact that data-forwarding is realised through randomised routing is not the only
differentiating characteristic of this design. In this implementation data-forwarding is
not requested either by the consumer or the producer unit, as seen in some other im-
plementations (e.g. [105]). Instead, it is initiated by the issue unit, which does so even
before the consumer instruction is issued (further details are given in Section 5.5.2).
This enables the producer to start off with data-forwarding and reduce possible stalls
in the consumer’s operand fetch stage. Further details on the data-forwarding process
are given in Section 5.6.
Non-determinism in the execution is further increased by out-of-order instruction
completion. Although instructions are issued in-order, there are many instructions in
flight at the same time and their progress during the execution is independent. Non-
deterministic execution introduces different execution times even for the same instruc-
tion with the same input data. The order in which different micro-operations are per-
formed changes from one run to another. Different runs of the same program code
execute in different amounts of time and the order of particular micro-operations per-
formed changes from a run to a run. This means that the order in which values are read
from or written to the register file also changes from run to run. In practice, all instruc-
tions do not have identical execution times and, thus, the results of instructions may be
available out of program order. In-order write-back to the register bank is not enforced
as this would be a performance overhead, and it would introduce functional units stalls
and reduction in performance. Supporting out-of-order execution is beneficial both
from the points of view of the non-deterministic execution and the performance, as
it allows instructions to proceed at their own pace and complete when the results are
ready.
5.4. Architectural components 119
All these natural side-effects of randomised routing help toward decorrelating the
power traces. It is especially important that the reference time points (on which many
side-channel attacks rely on) are removed and that the signal is smeared across the
power trace. Using randomised routing the standard execution routine is disrupted, it
changes with time, and is unpredictable. This is the primary goal of this research: to
investigate how and to what extent these architectural ideas contribute to decorrelating
the power consumption traces of cryptographic algorithms running on the architecture.
5.4 Architectural components
Figure 5.2 shows a block diagram of the network-based architecture with four func-
tional units. The architecture is composed of a Fetch and Branch Unit (FBU), the Issue
Unit (IU), a number of Functional Units (FU) each with a Communication Unit (CU),
the Register Bank (RB), the Register Bank Arbiter (RBA) and the Memory Arbiter
(MA). The architecture can be configured to have different numbers (≥ 1) and distri-
bution of functional units from the following four types: arithmetic, logic, multiplier
and memory units.
Figure 5.2: A block diagram of the network-based asynchronous architecture with four
functional units.
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The term “network-based” is derived from the property of the architecture that CUs
form a network. CUs carry out most of the communication within the architecture, in-
cluding communication with other CUs, the dedicated FU, the IU, the RB, the RBA and
the MA. Each CU is paired with a FU which evaluates the instruction and writes back
the result to the RB. The RBA and the MA are responsible for resolving structural haz-
ards caused by data and memory dependencies. The goal behind such an organisation
is to decentralise the control and achieve higher levels of non-deterministic execution
through concurrent execution and randomised routing of register values in the network.
This section gives a brief introduction to the composite parts of the architecture
depicted in Figure 5.2, with more details in the following sections. The major building
blocks of the architecture are as follows:
Instruction Memory (IM) and Data Memory (DM): which store the program instruc-
tions and data, respectively.
Fetch and Branch Unit (FBU): which fetches the instructions from the instruction
memory (IM) and places them into the instruction buffer (IB). The FBU also
executes the control transfer instructions. Detailed description of the operation
of this unit is given in Sections 5.5.1 and 5.5.5.2.
Issue Unit (IU): which issues instructions to the functional units of the appropri-
ate type in an in-order basis. The issue of an instruction initiates a series of
micro-operations in the respective CUs that deal with the given instruction. The
task of identifying data-dependencies and initialising data-forwarding micro-
operations, is also performed by the IU. Further details of these processes are
given in Section 5.5.2.
Communication Units (CU): which represent the communication part of the func-
tional units and form a network. The task of CUs is to perform fetch-and-lock
operations and data-forwarding in the network. In this way the control, that is
in other architectures (e.g. micronet architecture [116]) performed by a semi-
centralised control unit, is now distributed between CUs. Detailed description of
the CUs and their functionality is given in Section 5.5.4.
Functional Units (FU): which evaluate the instructions and perform the write-back
operations. They are effectively isolated from the network and communicate
only with the CU and the RB. Further details on the FUs and the instruction set
are given in Section 5.5.5.
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Register Bank (RB): which consists of 32 registers, two operand read ports (regRead
in Figure 5.2), one operand lock port (regLock) and one operand write port
(regWrite). Read and write accesses can be performed in parallel if they refer
to different register locations. The RB communicates with CUs, the part of the
FBU that evaluates the branch instructions (PC++ module in Figure 5.2), FUs,
and the RBA. The communication with different functional blocks is controlled
through a number of arbiters that sit on its read, lock and write ports, and sched-
ule requests to and from the RB, one at the time, in the order of their arrival.
Further details on the functionality of the RB is given in Section 5.5.4.
Register Bank Arbiter (RBA): which is responsible for resolving structural hazards
which arise from data-dependencies. In an architectural organisation in which
control and sequencing of operations are distributed and decentralised, some
arbitration is necessary to ensure that the data-dependencies are preserved and
that operand fetch-and-lock operations are scheduled in the correct order. The
RBA is an active part of the register locking mechanism and communicates with
each of CUs granting read and lock requests to the RB. Full explanation of the
operation of this unit is given in Section 5.5.4.1.
Memory arbiter (MA): which is responsible for memory disambiguation. It is im-
plemented as a reorder buffer and ensures that memory instructions access the
data memory (DM) in order of their issue. The MA can be implemented in a
way similar to RBA, due to the similarity of dependencies when referencing the
RB and the DM. However, given that, in practice, there is a need for no more
than one or two memory units, the implementation cost can be avoided at a small
performance penalty. Further details are given in Section 5.5.5.3.
Network: is formed between CUs. The network topology can be configured to be a
binary hypercube or a binary de Bruijn graph. Further details are available in
Section 5.6.1.
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5.5 Instruction execution




• Evaluation and write-back
5.5.1 Instruction fetch
Implementation of certain instructions, and in particular control transfer instructions,
can cause the issue stage to be starved of instructions. This could have a damaging
effect on exploitation of the concurrency and the efficient utilisation of functional units.
For this reason, all the Program Counter (PC) related instructions are executed in the
FBU. The FBU is responsible for fetching instructions from the IM and processing
control transfer instructions, during which the PC register is updated directly.
The FBU continuously fetches instructions and places them in the instruction buffer
(IB) until either the buffer is full, or the fetch stalls waiting for a control transfer to
be resolved. If the value of the PC is valid, and there is space in the IB, the next
instruction is fetched (Figure 5.3). If this instruction is a PC-related instruction (i.e.
control transfer instruction), the FBU will execute it, update the value of the PC and
fetch the next instruction. If, on the other hand, the fetched instruction is not a PC-
related instruction, it is added to the IB, the value of the PC is incremented and the
process is repeated. (Note that PC-related instructions are not added to the IB.)
Since the implementation of the FBU does not support branch prediction, some
stalls might be possible though they are minimised in this implementation. Uncondi-
tional branches are executed by the FBU directly updating the PC. Conditional branches
are also executed by the FBU but may cause stalls in the instruction fetch stage, and
consequently in the issue stage. It is assumed that the fetch and decode mechanisms
are in place and operating so that the IB is always full, except possibly when a branch
instruction occurs. This ensures that the issue unit is not starved of instructions.
The task of the fetch-and-branch unit is, therefore, to fetch and decode instructions,
and then either execute the control transfer instruction or place the instruction into the
instruction buffer. The hardware required for execution of control transfer instructions
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Figure 5.3: Fetch-and-branch unit and the instruction fetch stage.
would need to be similar to that of an arithmetic unit due to the nature of the performed
operations. The fetch-and-branch unit is organised so that it is capable of decoding the
instruction and consecutively executing the control transfer instruction or placing the
instruction in the instruction buffer, depending on its type. The fetch and decode stages
for the consecutive instruction are stalled until the control transfer instruction is exe-
cuted. This organisation assumes that the fetch, decode and PC-update operations are
faster then the operations performed in the instruction issue stage, and therefore, the
instruction issue stage is not starved of instructions. The functionality of the instruc-
tion issue unit is given in Section 5.5.2. The description of the tasks involved in the
issue stage leads to the conclusion that the assumption about the fetch unit is realistic,
and that the process of fetching, decoding and calculating the next PC value is faster
than the instruction issue stage. This process might be slower when there is a control
transfer instruction to be executed in the fetch stage, but it is still faster than waiting
for the PC-related instructions to be executed in the functional units. Furthermore, as
the organisation of the architecture evolved, it became apparent that having the FBU
executing the PC-related instructions is beneficial and keeps the IU busy, but is also the
simplest design, as the PC value is now updated directly by the FBU which speeds-up
the fetch and consequently the instruction issue stage.
5.5.2 Instruction issue
The IU has the task of sequencing the instruction issue operations and initialising data-
forwarding operations. In order to increase temporal ILP the issue has to be fast and
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attention is paid so that the instructions can be issued in the quickest possible way.
The instructions are issued in an in-order fashion to the appropriate FUs. The IU
also initialises data-forwarding operations, through which operand values are obtained.
The respective CU performs the rest of the required communication to complete the
operand fetch-and-lock stage. The control is next transfered to the FU that evaluates the
instruction and writes the result back to the RB. The task of the control unit, responsible
for sequencing of operations in the micronet architecture [116], is here distributed
between the IU, CUs and the RBA. Mutual operation and communication of these units
ensures that the operation sequencing is done in a correct manner and in accordance
with data-dependencies.
The instruction decode stage is distributed between the FBU and the IU. Each of
these units decodes only the portion of the instruction that is needed for the execution in
that particular unit. Thus, the FBU decodes the mnemonic part to recognise the control
transfer instructions, while the IU decodes the operands. The process of issuing the
instruction involves the following four steps (Figure 5.4):
Step 1 – The instruction is assigned to a FU of the appropriate type.
Step 2 – The dependencies between the current instruction and a number of previously-
issued instructions are identified .
Step 3 – Forwarding requests (if any) to the producer units are generated and queued
for dispatch.
Step 4 – The issue handshake with the CU of the target FU is initialised.
After the instruction is fetched, the next step is to check if there is a unit of the
appropriate type that is free and ready to accept the next instruction (Step 1). The
IU keeps a ready bit for each of the functional units in the architecture. The ready
bit is set if the respective CU has completed the operand fetch-and-lock stage, and is
therefore free and ready to accept the next instruction. This step simply associates an
instruction with a functional unit. If the functional units are duplicated, then instruc-
tions are assigned in around-robin fashion, subject to the availability of functional units
at the given time.
After the instruction is assigned a unit, the next step consists of identifying data-
dependencies between the current instruction and a number of previously issued in-
structions (Step 2). For each of the issued instructions, the information about the desti-
nation register and the unit that the instruction was issued to are kept in the dependency
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Figure 5.4: Instruction issue.
table. Entries in the dependency table are tuples of the form: 〈regID, unitID〉, where
regID denotes the resulting register identifier, and unitID the identifier of the unit the
instruction was issued to. In other words, for each register regID in the dependency
table, the unitID points at the unit which has the most recently generated its value and
can forward it. For each of the current instruction’s operands, the existence of such a
unit in the dependency table is first checked. If a producer unit is found, the operand’s
compounding bit is set. The next step is to generate the forwarding signal to the pro-
ducer unit (Step 3). If the producer unit is not found in the table, the compounding bit
is left unset and the data will be obtained from the register bank.
Before the issue proceeds to Step 4, in which the instruction is issued to a unit, it
is first ensured that already generated data-forwarding requests to the destination unit
are issued. This precaution is necessary, as the current instruction could overwrite the
previous register value, stored in the unit, for which a data-forwarding operation is
generated. Finally, when the instruction is issued the information about its resulting
register and the unit is added to or updated in the dependency table, while ensuring
that there can only be one entry per register in the dependency table.
The small amount of information maintained in the dependency table allows the is-
sue unit to initiate data-forwarding operations. In [105] the explicit dependency infor-
mation was used to forward the data and the compounded instructions encapsulated the
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information about the use of results of instructions within the compound. This infor-
mation was used in order to enable the producer of a result to initiate data-forwarding
operations. In some other implementations (reviewed in [105]) it is the consumer of
the result which requests the data from the producer. In the implementation of the
network-based architecture, the issue unit initialises data-forwarding operations in the
producer units, while the producer units together with the rest of the network realise
actual operations.
The data-forwarding initialisation signals are queued and issued one at a time to
their destinations. Each of these signals contains a tuple 〈regID, unitID〉, which rep-
resent identifiers of the register and the consumer unit that the register value should be
forwarded to. The IU does not wait for the handshake to complete before it starts the
next data-forwarding initialisation handshake (except when the same unit is in ques-
tion). Data-forwarding signals are initiated and left to complete at their own speed.
The IU issues instructions one at a time in an in-order manner. The entire process of
instruction issue and signalling of the completion of the operand fetch-and-lock stage
in the corresponding CU, is done as one handshake1: (1) the IU request high means
that the instruction is issued, i.e., the data is available at the instruction bus; (2) the
CU acknowledges that the instruction is received; (3) the IU lowers the request and
the data is no longer available; (4) the CU lowers the acknowledge to signal that the
operand fetch-and-lock stage has been completed and the CU is free to accept the next
instruction. A high request edge during the issue handshake resets the ready bit for
that unit and the low acknowledge edge sets it. In this way, the different edges of
the handshake are exploited to signal different events, thus avoiding the need for an
additional line to signal the ready state of the CU.
Although the instructions are issued to the respective CUs one at a time, the IU
does not wait for the handshake on one issue port to complete before it starts an issue
handshake with another CU. Furthermore, although each issue handshake is initiated
one at the time and in-order, their completion and, therefore, the completion of the
operand fetch-and-lock stage in the CUs is out-of-order. An example of issue and
completion orders are shown in Figure 5.5, and were obtained from a simulation of
AES algorithm on the architectural configuration with six functional units. (The AU,
LU, MULT and MU in Figure 5.5 stand for arithmetic, logic, multiplier and memory
unit, respectively.)
1The communication protocol in the implementation uses four-phase handshaking bundled data pro-
tocol.
5.5. Instruction execution 127
Figure 5.5: Instruction issue and completion order of the fetch-and-lock stage.
The issue stage is not concerned with the availability of operand values before it
issues an instruction. Once the instruction is issued, the progress of the operand fetch
depends on the availability of the operand values from the register file or through data-
forwarding. This allows the issue stage to issue instructions at a fast rate, enabling the
functional units to process more instructions concurrently, as the stalls during the issue
stage that are due to unavailability of results are completely removed. The only stalls
in the issue stage can result from resource contention (all the units of the right type are
busy). This problem can be alleviated by carefully balancing the number of units in
the particular architectural configuration. This not only improves the performance but,
as shown in Chapter 6, also improves the security.
5.5.3 Instruction compounding
This section demonstrates how the explicit dependency information generated at run-
time may aid in exploiting fine-grain instruction level parallelism. The ability to ap-
pend the dependency information to the instruction prior to issue and to use that infor-
mation in later stages of instruction execution, can help to further exploit asynchrony
and solve some of the problems normally caused by data-dependencies.
In contrast to VLIW architectures, in which grouping independent instructions is
beneficial, the aim here is to exploit the explicit dependencies between instructions.
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This involves identifying groups of dependent instructions at run-time, during the issue
stage, and forwarding register values directly between them, thereby bypassing the reg-
ister file. The small amount of information maintained locally in the issue unit, allows
a novel implementation of data-forwarding that is specifically aimed at asynchronous
design with highly distributed control. The obtained information naturally flows from
older to younger instructions and has no limitations regarding control transfer instruc-
tions, seen in some other implementations of the same concept (e.g. [105]).
5.5.3.1 Related work
The technique of instruction compounding generally consists of identifying groups of
dependent instructions in order to forward register values between them. Different im-
plementations of this concept vary in the way in which the dependency information
is obtained, compounded instructions are issued, or forwarding requests are gener-
ated and handled. Depending on whether the dependency information is generated
at compile-time or at run-time, two general approaches, static and dynamic, can be
recognised.
In the static approach implemented in [105], the instruction compounds are formed
at compile-time and then scheduled atomically. Data is forwarded only between con-
secutive instructions within a compound, while the communication between com-
pounds is performed through the register file. Instruction compounds consist of a
number of instructions, each being dependent on the previous one. Compounding is
restricted to basic blocks to simplify the execution, as compounding instructions from
different blocks in this implementation can introduce control hazards. The compiler
restriction when forming instruction compounds is that the resulting compound depen-
dency graph is an acyclic graph, as otherwise, it would not be possible to schedule the
compounds as atomic units (i.e. it would result in deadlocks). Membership of a par-
ticular compound is indicated by a single additional bit appended to each instruction
at compile-time. If the particular compounding bit is set, then the next instruction is a
member of the same compound and requires the result of the preceding one. The con-
sequence of this is that each member of the compound must be scheduled in-order and
consecutively, thereby enabling the consumer of a result to be identified. The explicit
dependency information appended to the producer of the result allows the producer to
make a request to forward its data to the consumer.
The dynamic approach for instruction compounding in [105] is achieved by main-
taining a so-called forwarding table within the processor, which records pending results
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and a list of potential consumers. The table is used to construct compounds dynami-
cally and free from the restrictions imposed on the compiler. Each instruction accesses
the table twice: once to indicate that it has generated a result and again, prior to the
generation of a forwarding request, to obtain the location of a consumer. At this point,
the entry is reset to indicate that the result is no longer available via the forwarding
mechanism. A consumer instruction records its destination in the same table entry and
sets its compounding bit. The forwarding request is then generated by the producer
after reading the location of its recorded consumer from the forwarding table. As in
the static case, dynamic compounding is restricted to only recording a single consumer
for each result.
5.5.3.2 Dynamic compounding in the network-based asynchronous architecture
The instruction compounding as implemented in the network-based asynchronous ar-
chitecture allows a novel approach for data-forwarding. The compounding is per-
formed at run-time recognising not only the dependencies between consecutive in-
structions of the basic block, but also between the instruction that is currently in the
issue stage and a (relatively small) number of previously-issued instructions. This
number depends on the size of the dependency table that is maintained in the IU. This
table records pending or already calculated results and the units that have generated
them. Each instruction compound consists of a consumer instruction and one or two
producer instructions (the number of source operands is at most two). The dependency
table holds pairs, 〈regID, unitID〉, which identify the register and the unit that has
produced the register value.
The dependency table is accessed by each instruction once for each operand in
order to locate the potential producer for that operand and to initiate the forwarding
operation. Finally, the dependency table is accessed once more to add the information
about the resulting register and the unit that the instruction is being issued to. This
information is used to construct compounds dynamically, free from the limitation of
only forming the compounds between instructions that belong to the same basic block,
and free from the limitation that each result can have only one consumer.
The dependency table is updated each time an instruction is issued by adding the
information about the resulting register and the unit that the instruction is issued to.
The dependency table holds at most one entry per register, pointing to the unit that has
the most recently generated its value. When the instruction is issued, an older entry
for the same register is updated, if such an entry exists, or otherwise, the information
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about the resulting register and the destination unit are added to the table, removing
the oldest entry from the table.
Forming instruction compounds is equivalent to identifying units which can for-
ward register values between them. In [105] the compounded instructions are issued
as atomic units. The execution of instruction within a compound is mutually exclu-
sive, while instructions from different compounds can execute concurrently. In the
implementation of the network-based architecture, the instructions are issued on an
instruction-by-instruction basis, enabling instructions from the same compound to ex-
ecute concurrently subject to availability of results.
Figure 5.6: An example of instruction compounding.
Figure 5.6 illustrates instruction compounding. Instructions 3 and 2 are com-
pounded, where instruction 2 is the producer for register 3 and the instruction 3 is
the consumer. Instruction 5 is compounded with instruction 3, which produces its first
operand (register 21), and instruction 4 which produces its second operand (register
20). Here, instruction 5 is a consumer and instructions 3 and 4 are the producers.
The dependency table holds at most one entry per register corresponding to the
instruction which has most recently produced its value. If the information about the
operand exists in the table, then its value will not be obtained from the RB but through
data-forwarding. This is signalled to the CU, which initiates the operand fetch opera-
tions, by setting a specific bit in the instruction, the compounding bit, associated with
each of the operands. (Compounding bits are denoted with rsf and rtf in Figure 5.6.)
If this bit is set, then the operand should not be read from the RB, but its value is for-
warded to the unit. The unit, therefore, does not initiate the operand fetch operation but
waits for the corresponding producer unit to forward its result. These bits are the only
additional information attached to the instruction during instruction compounding.
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When the instruction’s operand is located in the dependency table, a forwarding re-
quest to the producer unit is sent. This signal contains a tuple 〈regID, unitID〉, which
denotes the result register and the unit this result should be forwarded to. These two
pieces of information are used to identify the register value in the locally maintained
forwarding table in the producer unit, and to generate the path from the producer to the
consumer unit. The forwarding table in each unit contains results that were recently
calculated in that unit.
In summary, the key features of instruction compounding implemented in this ar-
chitectural design, are as follows:
• The dependencies between instructions are identified at run-time, during the in-
struction issue stage.
• The dependencies are recognised between the current instruction and a (small)
number of previously issued instructions. Depending on the size of the depen-
dency table, possibilities for forming compounds can vary, as the information
about the producers varies. Namely, the bigger the table, the more possibilities
for compounding.
• Information obtained from the dependency table is appended to the consumer
instruction in the form of two compounding bits (one for each source operand).
Each of the two compounding bits specifies whether the corresponding operand
values should be obtained from the register file or through data-forwarding.
• Explicit dependency information obtained at run-time, allows the issue unit to
initiate data-forwarding operations in producer units.
• Instructions of a compound are not issued as atomic unit, but one at a time,
allowing for a degree of concurrent execution of these instructions.
• Instructions within a compound are not restricted to basic blocks.
• Each result can have more than one consumer.
The proposed compounding mechanism is dynamic and hardware-based. It works
by recognising the dependencies between the instruction currently in the issue stage
and a number of previously issued instructions (not only consecutive instructions).
However, modern optimising compilers try to separate dependent instructions. The
dynamic compounding technique implemented here recognises dependent instructions
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that fit into a window of the size of the dependency table. Therefore, the impact of
optimising compilers could have a negative effect on the implemented dynamic com-
pounding mechanism if the size of the dependency table and the way in which the
compiler separates the instructions is such that the dependent instructions exceed the
size of this window. For a small dependency table an optimising compiler could make
the dynamic compounding technique less effective. However, the proposed architec-
tural design is not a general purpose one and is targeted for specific applications for
which the compilation process and the size of the dependency table could be adjusted
so that this issue is not problematic.
5.5.4 Operand fetch-and-lock
Instruction level parallelism in the network-based asynchronous architecture is ex-
ploited by allowing instructions both with and without data-dependencies to execute in
parallel. The mutual exclusion of instructions with data-dependencies is not imposed,
although the progress of the consumer is subject to the availability of operands. In this
way fine-grain ILP is exploited and the control is further distributed.
As noted earlier, an operand value can be obtained in two ways: through data-
forwarding or from the register file. Data-coherence of the register file is based on
the register locking scheme [111], which has been a common solution in many asyn-
chronous implementations. The locking scheme guarantees correct operation during
the asynchronous access to the register file. The mechanism consists of a device that
contains an individual lock bit for each register, which indicates that a register is yet
to be written by a pending instruction. If the lock bit is set, it implies that the register
cannot be read from or written to by any subsequent instruction. If the lock bit is unset,
then the content of the register can be read by any instruction until it is locked again.
In the micronet architecture [116] the instructions are issued in-order and one at a
time, and the operand fetch-and-lock stages are performed by a specialised control unit
during the issue stage. Since it cannot be known for how long the register will contain
valid data, the issue unit cannot issue instructions that depend on a locked register, i.e.,
if there is a read-after-write (RAW) or write-after-write (WAW) dependency. There-
fore, the issue unit is stalled until the register value of the operand is available, i.e., the
register is unlocked. In such a setting the above scheme is enough for maintaining the
data-coherence of the register file.
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In network-based architecture responsibility for fetching the operand values and
locking the result register is transfered to communication units. This allows for faster
issue rate but additional care has to be taken to avoid structural hazards. Although
instructions are issued in-order, the rest of the communication towards the comple-
tion of the instruction execution progresses at different speeds and effectively out-of-
order, thereby complicating the structural hazard avoidance mechanisms. Therefore,
the order in which fetch-and-lock operations are processed in the RB has to be ar-
bitrated. A specialised arbitration unit, the Register Bank Arbiter (RBA) was imple-
mented, which schedules fetch-and-lock operations according to data-dependencies,
thus avoiding structural hazards and preserving data-coherence of the register file.
Figure 5.7: The operand fetch-and-lock stage.
Figure 5.7 shows the organisation of communication between the CU, RB, RBA
and other CUs during the operand fetch-and-lock stage. As the data can be obtained in
two ways, major building blocks of a communication unit are the forwarding module
and the fetch-and-lock module. These two modules are implemented to operate inde-
pendently and communicate only when the forwarding module receives the operand
value. The forwarding module is responsible for performing data-forwarding opera-
tions and also maintains the forwarding table, which contains the results of a number of
previously executed instructions, that can be forwarded on request. If the compound-
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ing bit for the operand for the instruction is set, then the operand value is not obtained
from the register bank, but through forwarding. The forwarding module performs rout-
ing of data as a part of the network. It has a number of “in” and “out” connections to
other CUs, depending on the topology of the network, which correspond to the vertices
of the network graph. Data is forwarded through the network, from the producer to the
consumer unit.
The fetch-and-lock module is responsible for locking the resulting operand and
fetching the operand values that are not obtained through data-forwarding. If the com-
pounding bit for an operand is set, then the module does not initiate the operand fetch
operation. As the fetch operations for the operands that are being forwarded are not
performed, the problem of issuing fetch-and-lock operations in accordance with data-
dependencies is this way removed (this namely concerns RAW hazards). This is true
under the condition that for the set of instructions that are concurrent in execution all
the data-dependencies are captured in the issue stage, which is subject to the size of
the dependency table. The maximum number of instructions that could be concur-
rent in execution, and for which RAW hazards can occur, is equal to the number of
CUs. It seems that if the size of the dependency table is at least the number of CUs,
then the RAW hazards would be removed. However, the control transfer instructions
are not considered during the issue stage. Namely, they are evaluated in the fetch-
and-branch unit, and thus do not take part in instruction compounding. Therefore,
data-dependencies between control transfer instructions and those evaluated in the rest
of the architecture are not captured during the issue stage. RAW hazards due to these
instructions remain, and the mechanism for preventing them still needs to be imple-
mented. An obvious solution for removing these hazards would be to move the execu-
tion of control transfer instructions with source operands out of the FBU. However, in
the current instruction set (covered in Section 5.5.5.1) the number of such instructions
is small and the improvement of such an approach would be negligible, if compared to
one in which control transfer instructions are not executed in the FBU at all. In addi-
tion, the size of the dependency table dictates the size of forwarding tables maintained
in each of the CUs. As the size of the forwarding table cannot be too large, if the
number of CUs is high the approach for removing the RAW hazards (by making the
size of the dependency table at least equal to the number of CUs) cannot be followed.
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5.5.4.1 Register bank arbitration for fetch-and-lock operations
Although the instructions are issued in-order, the operand fetch-and-lock operations in
the RB could be performed out-of-order. The idea is that the order is imposed only
when data-coherence is in danger.
When the instruction is received by the CU the compounding bit for each of its
operands are first checked. If the compounding bit for an operand is set, then the
operand value is forwarded and the CU does not initiate the operand fetch operation.
Otherwise, the CU needs to obtain this operand value from the RB. The RBA arbitrates
in this process. This arbitration is realised through granting the CU with permissions
to perform fetch-and-lock operations. Therefore, before the CU can issue a fetch or a
lock request to the RB, permission has to be obtained from the RBA.
Write-after-write (WAW) data-hazards are prevented by ensuring that the lock re-
quests for the same register are issued in program order. This is achieved by granting
instructions with exclusive permissions to lock a particular register in the order of their
issue, while locks for other registers can proceed out-of-order. For each register in the
RB, the RBA stores the lock reserve status (lockStatus). This status is binary and
can be set to RESERVED or NOT RESERVED. The status is set to RESERVED, if there is
an instruction that has reserved the right to lock the register, but has not locked it yet.
Otherwise, the status is set to NOT RESERVED. The NOT RESERVED status means that the
previous instruction has locked the register and no other instruction has reserved the
right to lock it next. There is no direct correspondence between the lock status of the
register in the RB, and the lockStatus of the register in the RBA. For a particular
register, only one lock request can be issued, and only one instruction can lock the
register. If the register is locked, and since an already locked register cannot be locked
again, the next lock can be reserved but it will be stalled in the RB until the previous
instruction unlocks the register. The lockStatus is set (RESERVED) when the lock is
reserved in the RBA, and reset (NOT RESERVED) after the instruction locks the register
in the RB.
This process of locking a register is shown in Figure 5.8. Algorithms 13, 15, 16,
17 and 19 describe the procedures performed in the CU, the RBA and the RB during
this operation. The summary of this process follows next:
Step 1 – Obtain the exclusive right to lock the register. After the instruction is re-
ceived, the CU initiates the reserveLock handshake with the RBA (see Al-
gorithm 16). When a request is received, if the register’s lockStatus is set to
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Figure 5.8: The three-step register lock procedure.
NOT RESERVED, then the lock is reserved, i.e., its lockStatus is set to RESERVED.
Even if the lockStatus of a register is NOT RESERVED, it does not mean that the
register is unlocked, but rather, that there is no other instruction that has reserved
the right to lock it in the future, and that the previous instruction has already
locked it. The reservation of the lock for a register is signalled with the high
acknowledge reserveLock signal. If, on the other hand, register’s lockStatus
is RESERVED, then the request is indexed and queued, as shown in Algorithm 16
and Figure 5.9.
Step 2 – Send the lock request to the RB. After the lock is reserved, the CU initiates
the regLock handshake with the RB, which requests the register to be locked, as
shown in Algorithm 13.
Step 3 – Lock the register and update its status. If the register is unlocked, the RB
locks the register and sends the update signal (see Algorithm 19) to the RBA
which resets its lockStatus (see Algorithm 15). An awaiting lock request for
the same register can now be reserved. If the register is locked, the lock request
is stalled until it is unlocked.
Figure 5.9: Register bank arbiter: reserveLock and grantRead queues.
If the register is locked by the previous instruction, the next lock request to the
same register can be issued. This request will not be able to lock the register until
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it becomes unlocked, but no other lock request could overtake it. It is clear that this
locking mechanism speeds up the register locking procedure. This is another example
of how fine-grain instruction level parallelism can be exploited. At any time, only one
instruction can lock a register and one more instruction can have the lock request to
the RB initialised although not completed. Once locked the register remains locked
until the result is written to it. The write-back of the result will cause the register to
be unlocked, awaiting reads to be performed and the pending lock-request to lock the
register.
Read-after-write (RAW) data-hazards are prevented by ensuring that the operand
fetch request to the RB is issued after the instruction that writes that register has locked
it. If the size of dependency table is large enough to gather all the RAW dependencies
and perform data-forwarding between instructions with these dependencies, then RAW
dependencies can occur only when executing the control transfer instructions which are
not included in data-forwarding.
Figure 5.10: The three-step register read procedure.
The three steps when fetching operands are illustrated in Figure 5.10, given in
Algorithms 12, 14 and 18, and also be summarised as follows:
Step 1 – Obtain the grant to read (fetch) the register value. If the compounding bit
for the operand is not set, the CU will initiate the grantRead handshake with
the RBA (see Algorithm 12). This read request is granted if the status of the
register is NOT RESERVED. Otherwise, the grantRead request is tagged with the
most recent entry index for the same register in the reserveLock queue, if one
exists, or with zero otherwise, and queued in the grantRead queue as shown in
Figure 5.9 and Algorithm 14. The request tagged with a zero is granted after
the update signal resets the status of the register, i.e., sets it to NOT RESERVED
(see Algorithm 15). Each time a lock request is reserved all reads with the same
138 Chapter 5. Design of the Network-based Asynchronous Architecture
index have their indices updated to 0 and will be granted next (after the register
is locked and its lockStatus set to NOT RESERVED).
Step 2 – Send the read request to the RB. After the RBA grants the fetch operation, the
CU initiates the regRead request with the RB (see Algorithm 12).
Step 3 – Send the read response to the CU. The register value is read from the RB only
if it is valid, i.e., the register is written and unlocked. If the register is locked,
then the read requests will wait for this status to change (see Algorithm 18).
Although care is taken when issuing read and lock requests so that WAW and RAW
hazards are prevented, the order in which they are processed in the RB is still not guar-
anteed. The hazardous write-after-read (WAR) situation occurs when the subsequent
lock request manages to lock the register before the reads are performed. As the regis-
ter cannot be read unless it is unlocked, the incorrect register value is eventually read.
The order in which read and lock requests are processed in the RB depends on the num-
ber of these requests and the speed with which the RB can serve them. The RB records
the number of register reads performed for each register. Similarly, the IU records the
number of register reads that ought be performed before the register is locked (with
respect to data-forwarding). This information is attached to the instruction on issue
and sent as a part of the lock request to the RB. A simple comparison then prevents
WAR hazards. This solution is satisfactory, albeit ad-hoc, given that the validity of
architectural principles is being explored in this study.
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Algorithm 12 Communication unit: operand fetch procedure.
1: /*for each of the operands */
2: for operand = current inst.rs, current inst.rt do
3: /*if the operand value is not obtained through data-forwarding */
4: if operand.compounding bit == false then
5: /*send grantRead request to RBA */
6: grantRead[operand].data.regID = operand.regID;
7: grantRead[operand].req = high;
8: else
9: /*send regRead request to RB */
10: regRead[operand].data.regID = operand.regID;
11: regRead[operand].req = high;
12: end if
13: /*if the read is granted */
14: if grantRead[operand].ack == high then
15: /*send regRead request to RB */
16: regRead[operand].data.regID = operand.regID;
17: regRead[operand].req = high;
18: grantRead[operand].req = low;
19: end if
20: /*complete the regRead handshake */
21: if regRead[operand].ack == high then
22: regRead[operand].req = low;
23: end if
24: /*read response received */
25: if readResponse[operand].req == high then
26: operand.value = readResponse[operand].data.regValue;
27: readResponse[operand].ack = high;
28: end if
29: /*complete the readResponse handshake */
30: if readResponse[operand].req == low then
31: readResponse[operand].ack = low;
32: end if
33: end for
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Algorithm 13 Communication unit: operand lock procedure.
1: /*send reserveLock to RBA */
2: reserveLock.data.regID = current inst.rd.regID;
3: reserveLock.req = high;
4: /*if the lock is reserved */
5: if reserveLock.ack == high then
6: /*send regLock to RB */
7: regLock.data.regID = current inst.rd.regID;
8: regLock.req = high; grantRead.req = low;
9: end if
10: /*destination register is locked */
11: if regLock.ack == high then
12: current inst.rd.locked = true;
13: regLock.req = low;
14: end if
Algorithm 14 Register bank arbiter: grantRead procedure.
1: /*for each of the units */
2: for all unitID do
3: /*if grantRead request is received */
4: if grantRead[unitID].req == high then
5: if lockStatus[grantRead[unitID].data.regID] == NOT RESERVED then
6: grantRead[unitID].ack = high;






13: /*complete the grantRead handshake */
14: if grantRead[unitID].req == low then
15: grantRead[unitID].ack = low;
16: end if
17: end for
5.5. Instruction execution 141
Algorithm 15 Register bank arbiter: update procedure.
1: /*received an update request from the RB */
2: if update.req == high then
3: lockStatus[update.data.regID] = NOT RESERVED;
4: for all gR = grandReadQueue.getNext() do
5: if gR.tag == 0 & gR.regID == update.data.regID then




10: /*find the first lock request in the reserveLock queue */
11: if rL = reserveLockQueue.find(update.data.regID) != NULL then
12: lockStatus[update.data.regID] = RESERVED;
13: reserveLock[rL.unitID].ack = high;
14: reserveLockQueue.delete(rL);
15: for all gR = grantReadQueue.getNext() do
16: if gR.tag == rL.index then





22: /*complete the update handshake */
23: if update.req == low then
24: update.ack = low;
25: end if
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Algorithm 16 Register bank arbiter: reserveLock procedure.
1: /*for each of the units */
2: for all unitID do
3: /*if reserveLock request is received */
4: if reserveLock[unitID].req == high then
5: if lockStatus[reserveLock[unitID].data.regID] == NOT RESERVED then
6: lockStatus[reserveLock.data.regID] = RESERVED;





12: /*complete the reserveLock handshake */
13: if reserveLock[unitID].req == low then
14: reserveLock[unitID].ack = low;
15: end if
16: end for
Algorithm 17 Register bank: write procedure.
1: /*if regWrite is received */
2: if regWrite.req == high then
3: /*write the value and unlock the register */
4: registers[regWrite.data.regID] = regWrite.data.regValue;
5: locked[regWrite.data.regID] = false;
6: regWrite.ack = high;
7: end if
8: /*complete the regWrite handshake */
9: if regWrite.req == low then
10: regWrite.ack = low;
11: end if
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Algorithm 18 Register bank: read procedure.
1: /*for each of the read ports */
2: for all read port do
3: /*if regRead is received and the register is not locked */
4: if regRead[read port].req == high &
locked[regRead[read port].data.regID] == false then
5: /*send the read response and increment number of reads for the register */
6: readResponse.data.regID == regRead[read port].data.regID;
7: readResponse[read port].data.regValue = registers[regID];
8: reads[regRead[read port].data.regID]++;
9: readResponse[read port].req = high;
10: regRead[read port].ack = high;
11: end if
12: /*complete the regRead handshake */
13: if regRead[read port].req == low then
14: regRead[read port].ack = low;
15: end if
16: /*complete the readResponse handshake */
17: if readResponse[read port].ack == high then
18: regRead[read port].req = low;
19: end if
20: end for
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Algorithm 19 Register bank: lock procedure.
1: /*if regLock is received */
2: if regLock.req == high then
3: /*if the register in not locked and all the reads are performed */
4: if locked[regLock.data.regID] == false &
reads[regLock.data.regID] == regLock.data.reads then
5: /*lock the register and send the update to RBA*/
6: locked[regLock.data.regID] = true;
7: update.data.regID = regLoc.data.regID;
8: update.data.req = high;
9: regLock.ack = high;
10: end if
11: end if
12: /*complete the regLock handshake */
13: if regLock.req == low then
14: regLock.ack = low;
15: end if
5.5.5 Evaluation and write-back
Upon the completion of the operand fetch-and-lock stage, the CU transfers the control
of instruction execution over to the FU (when the FU is free and ready). The CU can
now complete the issue handshake with the IU and label itself as free and ready for the
next instruction. Note that operand fetch-and-lock in the CU and the evaluation stage
in the FU can belong to different instructions, although CU and FU are considered an
atomic functional unit. This means that the maximal throughput of the architecture is
twice the number of functional units.
The instruction evaluation stage (performed in the FU) consists of the following
tasks:
• Evaluate the instruction;
• Write the result to the RB;
• Write the result to the forwarding table in the CU.
Functional units are effectively isolated from the network and communicate only
with the CU and the RB. The communication with the CU consists of obtaining the
instruction and operands, and sending the result back to the CU. In a similar manner to
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the communication between the CU and the IU, the complete communication between
the FU and the CU is performed in a single handshake. The low acknowledge signal
means that the FU has evaluated the instruction and is now free and ready for the next
instruction. The write-back handshake with the RB is initiated in parallel with the
handshake that writes the result into the forwarding table in the CU (Figure 5.11).
Figure 5.11: Instruction evaluation and write-back.
The FUs are divided into four types:
1. Arithmetic Units (AU)
2. Logic Units (LU)
3. Multipliers (MULT)
4. Memory Units (MU)
The number of each of these four types can vary and can be adjusted to match the
specific needs of a particular code that is run on the architecture. Applications in which
arithmetic operations are dominant can achieve better performance if the architecture is
configured with a number of arithmetic units. In the case of cryptographic applications,
arithmetic and logic operations are predominant and, therefore, multiple arithmetic and
logic units would lead to improvement in both performance and security, as instructions
execute in parallel, contributing towards the non-deterministic order of their execution.
5.5.5.1 Instruction set
The instruction set implemented in the architecture is a subset of the MIPS instruction
set, and is divided into five groups, which are summarised below (a complete list of all
the instructions is given in Appendix B).
Group 1: Arithmetic instructions with zero, one or two source operands that are exe-
cuted in arithmetic units (AUs) and include additions and subtractions.
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Group 2: Logic instructions with one or two source operands that are executed in
logic units (LUs) and include bitwise operations, bit shifting, and logic opera-
tions such as ORs, ANDs and XORs.
Group 3: Multiplier instructions with one or two source operands that are executed
in multiplier units (MULTs) and include multiplication, division and modulo
operation.
Group 4: Memory instructions with one or two source operands that are executed in
memory units (MUs) and include load from and store to the memory operations.
Group 5: Branch and jump instructions with zero, one or two source operands that
are executed in a specialised module in the FBU and include jump instructions,
conditional and unconditional branches, call and return instructions.
5.5.5.2 Control transfer operations
In order to ensure fast instruction issue rate and prevent the issue stage from being
starved of instructions, control transfer instructions are implemented in the specialised
module in the FBU. This module is capable of executing jump, call, return, and both
conditional and unconditional branches, and directly updates the value of the PC regis-
ter (pcReg), and the link register (linkReg) that is used for storing the PC value in the
call instructions. The operands values (for the control transfer instructions with source
operands) are obtained from the RB through the RBA arbitration. The resulting pcReg
and the linkReg values are both maintained locally in the unit and in the RB.
The jump instruction updates the pcReg with the address specified by its operand,
and the FBU then resumes the instruction fetch from the new PC. A call instruction
causes the pcReg to be updated in the same way as jump instructions, with the differ-
ence that the value of pcReg is saved in the linkReg, before its value is updated. A
return instruction simply restores the pcReg value from the linkReg. Finally, branch
instructions modify the PC depending on the result of the register comparison. Once
the result of the comparison is committed, the FBU issues the next instruction deter-
mined by the new PC value.
5.5.5.3 Memory operations
Memory operations can restrict the available parallelism as they introduce implicit
data-dependencies through memory locations, i.e., a data dependency exists when two
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memory instructions refer to the same location. Therefore, if the store is ahead of a load
in the program order, the load cannot access the memory ahead of a store when they
both refer to the same memory address. Similarly, a store cannot access the memory
before a load when they refer to the same memory address, if the load is ahead in the
program order. Again, two stores cannot access the memory out of program order, if
they are referring to the same memory address.
The process of determining if two instructions access the same memory location is
called memory disambiguation. Memory disambiguation can be implemented either at
run-time, the dynamic memory disambiguation; or at compile-time, the static memory
disambiguation. The requirement for memory disambiguation is seen in architectures
in which instructions are either issued or executed out of program order, i.e., instruc-
tions can overtake while executing.
Dynamic memory disambiguation schemes keep track of the memory instructions
in the order in which they are decoded. When a memory instruction is to be issued,
its address must be compared to the addresses of all previously-decoded memory op-
erations, to check whether the address has been referenced. If such an entry exists,
the order of execution of the corresponding instructions has to be preserved. The dis-
advantage of this approach is that the hardware can become slow and complex as the
number of entries grows (e.g. [118]). Static memory disambiguation on the other hand,
has the flexibility of affording more aggressive algorithms to disambiguate the mem-
ory references, but the problem with this approach is that it is not always possible to
statically disambiguate memory references [118].
Maintaining data-coherence for memory access in the network-based asynchronous
architecture with multiple memory units is similar to maintaining register file data-
coherence. An obvious way to avoid memory disambiguation is to consider only one
memory unit. Since the instructions are issued in-order, this would ensure that loads
and stores access memory in program order. Multiple memory units, executing in an
independent manner make the situation of loads overtaking the stores and vice-versa
possible. Such situations are hazardous when loads and stores refer to the same mem-
ory location. If a store overtakes a load, it means that there is a true dependency
(RAW), whereas if a load overtakes a store, it represents an anti-dependency (WAR).
If two stores refer to the same memory address, it means that there is an output de-
pendency (WAW). Figure 5.12 provides an example of potential dependencies and the
memory data-hazards that can occur if the instructions with these dependencies are not
executed in program order.
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Figure 5.12: An example of memory data-hazards.
Preserving the data-coherence of the memory file in the presence of multiple mem-
ory units requires additional arbitration. The mechanism implemented for this purpose
is called the Memory Arbiter (MA). With the MA in place the memory instruction dat-
apath has an additional stage during which the memory operation is granted. One idea
to implement this additional stage would be similar to that of the RBA. This implemen-
tation would allow memory instructions to access memory out-of-order except when
the same memory location is to be accessed. Data-dependencies between instructions
that access the register file can be detected by simply comparing register identifiers.
For instructions that access memory this kind of comparison can be made only after
each instruction has calculated its memory address.
The frequency at which the same memory location is accessed should in practice
be small as such communication usually takes place through the register file [105].
Therefore, the simplest and the most economic way to implement the memory arbiter
was to enforce in-order memory access. This allows memory instructions to execute in
parallel with other instructions, but access memory in the order of their issue. The rest
of their execution, e.g., write-back stage in the case of loads, can progress out-of-order.
The MA is implemented as a reorder buffer providing in-order of issue memory
access. Each memory instruction is tagged with the small counter which loops around
when it reaches the number of memory units. The MA keeps its own record of the
instruction tag that has accessed the memory last and it will allow only the next incre-
ment to proceed. The process of granting a memory operation, shown in Figure 5.13,
can be summarised as the following three steps:
Step 1 – Obtain permission to execute the memory operation. The CU initiates a mem-
ory access handshake with the MA.
Step 2 – MA grants the operation. If the memory tag of the instruction in question is
equal to the instruction tag of the next memory instruction that is to be granted,
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then the memory access is granted. Otherwise, the request will wait for its turn.
Step 3 – Transfer of control to the FU. After the memory operation is granted, the
control is transfered to the FU that evaluates the memory address2 and accesses
the memory.
Figure 5.13: Memory access arbitration.
5.6 Data-forwarding
Data-forwarding is a commonly used technique in pipelined architectures for minimis-
ing the cost of functional unit stalls due to data-dependencies. It works by redirecting
the result of an instruction to be written in the register file to the following instruction
in the pipeline. In addition, data-forwarding may be preferable to obtaining operands
from the register file from the power consumption perspective even when performance
is unaffected [105]. Data-forwarding results in a reduction in register file traffic, which
reduces the total number of requests at read ports and thereby leads to a decrease in
their access times. The extent of forwarding may be increased by providing more for-
warding registers in the forwarding tables in each CU, and increasing the size of the
dependency table in the IU, thus allowing a higher number of results to be forwarded.
Data-forwarding is initiated by a request from the issue unit to the producer unit.
This request contains the register identifier, regID, and the consumer unit identifier,
unitID. Each unit maintains a small table, called the forwarding table, that contains
pending and already generated register values that can be forwarded on request. En-
tries in the forwarding table are tuples of the form: 〈regID, regValue, valid〉, which
specify the register, its value and the validity of its value. When the instruction is re-
ceived its destination regID is added to the table while the value and the validity bit are
2The memory unit contains an internal adder for calculating the effective memory addresses.
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left unset. These are set after the result is calculated and received from the FU. When
the unit receives the request for forwarding, it queries the forwarding table to find the
value of the register. Non-valid entries correspond to the results that are pending. If
the value is not valid, then this signal will wait for the value to become valid in order
to forward it. When the result is received from the FU, the forwarding table is updated
with a (valid) value for the result register. During this process care is taken to ensure
that there is only one entry per register in the table. The forwarding signals for the
awaiting forwarding request are next generated. If the same unit is both the producer
and the consumer in a particular compound, then the forwarding signal is not generated
but the operand value is directly updated.
The data-forwarding signal contains the following information:
1. The destination unit identifier, unitID, which is used to recognise that the des-
tination is reached.
2. The register identifier, regID, which determines which of the operand values is
forwarded, as both instruction operands can be obtained through data-forwarding.
3. The register value regValue.
4. The ticket, which specifies the routing path through the network, and is gener-
ated according to network topology (as discussed in the following section).
5.6.1 The network topology
The network in network-based architecture can have any topology. The ones consid-
ered in this work are binary hypercube and binary de Bruijn graph, both belonging to
the group of so-called graphs on alphabets [58, 81], widely used in multi-computer
interconnection networks. Hypercubes are sometimes categorised as a separate class,
hypercube graphs, because of their importance. Such a choice was made because these
topologies contain a large number of vertices while having a small diameter, and sup-
port oblivious routing algorithms. Efficient routing protocols in these graph topologies
have the following desirable properties:
1. It is not necessary to explicitly store the topology of the network in every vertex.
2. The shortest path routing can be performed.
3. Randomised routing algorithms can be efficiently implemented.
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A very common routing strategy is the dimension-order routing in which a packet is
routed along dimension 0 until it reaches its correct position, then along dimension
1, and so on. In the design of efficient routing algorithms, randomisation plays an
important role. A major theoretical breakthrough was the probabilistic permutation
routing on the binary hypercube proposed by Valiant and Brebner [130]. The two
phase algorithm consists of a randomised (Phase 1) and a deterministic routing (Phase
2). In Phase 1, the packet is routed to an independent, randomly selected node in
the network. The role of this phase is to decrease the difference between average
and worst-case performance. In Phase 2, the packet follows the shortest path to its
destination.
5.6.1.1 Hypercubes
Binary hypercubes [58, 81] represent an important class of graphs whose diameter
grows slowly with the number of vertices. The binary hypercube graphs are defined on
the basis of binary alphabets as described next.
Definition 5.6.1. Let n be a positive integer. A binary hypercube, denoted by H(n),
is a graph consisting of 2n vertices labelled with n-bit integers from 0 to 2n− 1. Let
(xn−1,xn−2, . . . ,x0) be the label of vertex x from H(n). Vertex x is adjacent to vertices:
(xn−1,xn−2, . . . ,xi+1, x̄i,xi−1, . . . ,x0),∀ 0≤ i≤ n−1,
where x̄ = 0, if x = 1, and x̄ = 1, if x = 0.
This defines a hypercube with the number of nodes equal to a power of two. For the
purposes of this architectural design it was more convenient to define a hypercube
with any number of nodes. Therefore, Definition 5.6.1 was modified to meet this
requirement.
Definition 5.6.2. Let N be a positive integer. A partial binary hypercube, denoted
by PH(N), is a graph consisting of N vertices, labelled with n-bit integers from 0 to
N− 1, where n is a positive integer such that 2n−1 ≤ N ≤ 2n. Let (xn−1,xn−2, . . . ,x0)
be the label of vertex x from PH(N). Vertex x is adjacent to vertices:
x′ = (xn−1,xn−2, . . . ,xi+1, x̄i,xi−1, . . . ,x0), i f x
′ ≤ N,
and
x′′ = (0,xn−2, . . . ,xi+1, x̄i,xi−1, . . . ,x0), s.t. x
′′ 6= x and x′′ 6= x′, otherwise,
for all 0≤ i≤ n−1.
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The partial hypercube PH(6), shown in Figure 5.14(b), has six vertices labelled
with three-bit integers from 0 = (000)2 to 5 = (101)2. The vertex labelled (100)2, in
H(3) connects to vertices (101)2, (110)2 and (000)2. However, vertex (110)2 is not
in PH(6) as (110)2 > 5, thus (100)2 connects to (010)2, i.e., node (010)2 acts as both
itself and node (110)2. This definition renders H(3) and PH(6) equivalent from the
point of view of connectivity and routing.
(a) H(3) (b) PH(6)
Figure 5.14: Binary hypercube H(3) and partial binary hypercube PH(6).
Most hypercube routing algorithms are oblivious. A deterministic oblivious routing
algorithm is one in which the path taken by a packet through the network is a function
of its origin and destination. A randomised oblivious algorithm is one in which each
packet independently chooses a path according to a probability distribution which is a
function of its origin and destination.
Deterministic source oblivious routing in a hypercube requires only the knowledge
of the source and the destination vertices. Current address and the destination address
are compared and if they match, the destination is reached. Otherwise the message
is sent along its first dimension where a mismatch occurred. This algorithm is called
greedy routing algorithm and it sends packets from source to destination along the
shortest path.
5.6.1.2 De Bruijn graphs
Both directed and undirected De Bruijn graphs [85, 24, 25, 81] have received consid-
erable attention as a graph topology for interconnection networks. They represent an
important family of graphs with small diameter and high number of vertices.
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Definition 5.6.3. Let d ≥ 1 and n ≥ 2 be two integers, and A an alphabet of size d.
A directed de Bruijn graph, denoted by DB(d,n), is a graph consisting of dn vertices
labelled with words of length n from alphabet A, where n represents the diameter and
d represents the degree of the graph. Let (xn−1,xn−2, . . . ,x0) be the label of vertex x
from DB(d,n). Vertex x is adjacent to vertices
(xn−2,xn−3, . . . ,x0,α),∀α ∈ A.
Definition 5.6.4. An undirected de Bruijn graph, denoted by UB(d,n), is a graph
consisting of dn vertices labelled with words of length n from the alphabet A. Let
(xn−1,xn−2, . . . ,x0) be the label of vertex x from UB(d,n). Vertex x is adjacent to
vertices
(α,xn−1,xn−2, . . . ,x1)
and (xn−2,xn−3, . . . ,x0,β), α,β ∈ A.
This definition can be generalised to any number of vertices. The vertices of these
graphs can be numbered with integers modulo N, where N is the number of vertices in
the graph. An edge is drawn from vertex x to vertex y if y≡ dx+α (mod N), where
0≤ α≤ d−1.
Definition 5.6.5. Let N ≥ 2 be an integer. A directed binary de Bruijn graph, denoted
by DB(N), is a graph consisting of N vertices labelled with integers modulo N. Vertex
x from DB(N) is adjacent to vertices:
x′ = 2x + α (mod N), α ∈ {0,1}.
A directed binary de Bruijn graph with 8 vertices is shown in Figure 5.15.
Figure 5.15: Directed binary de Bruijn graph DB(8).
The easiest routing in the network would be one which is source oblivious, i.e.,
at each point of time the next edge to be taken depends only on current vertex and
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the destination vertex, but not on the origin. Another routing technique that can be
applied in de Bruijn graphs is the so-called greedy routing. Greedy routing corre-
sponds to correcting dimensions from left to right, but it does not produce shortest
path routes. Valiant-Brebner’s [130] routing to random destinations can also be applied
on de Bruijn graphs. Aleliunas [16] extended this probabilistic algorithm to dynamic
routing on de Bruijn network.
5.6.2 Data-forwarding and randomised routing
For both the hypercube and the de Bruijn graph topologies the Valiant-Brebner [130]
routing strategy is employed. This type of routing consists of two phases: the ran-
domisation phase (Phase 1) and the deterministic routing phase (Phase 2). In Phase 1,
the packet is sent to an independent, randomly-selected node. In Phase 2, the packet
follows the deterministic path to the destination. In the case of a hypercube this path
is the shortest one and in the case of the de Bruijn graph the path is specified by
the greedy routing strategy. Each data-forwarding signal contains the destination unit
identifier, unitID, the register identifier, regID, the register value, regValue and the
ticket. The routing in both phases of the algorithm is predetermined by the ticket,
which specifies the order in which the dimensions of the hypercube are traversed, or
the destination node address used for greedy routing in the de Bruijn network. The dif-
ference is that the ticket for Phase 1 is randomly generated, while the ticket for Phase 2
is generated according to the destination node. The producer unit generates the ticket
for the routing in the Phase 1. Once the forwarded data reaches the randomly-chosen
node, a new ticket, that specifies the path to the destination (Phase 2 routing) is gener-
ated. There is a slight difference in the generation and interpretation of the ticket, and
the way in which the deterministic phase is performed for the two graph topologies
and will, therefore, be presented separately.
The initial stage of each of the phases of the routing procedure consists of ticket
initialisation. The ticket is initialised to contain information about the path that is taken
in that particular phase.
5.6.2.1 Randomised routing in binary hypercubes
In the case of a hypercube the ticket specifies the sequence in which the dimensions
of the graph are traversed. In Phase 1 the ticket is initialised to represent the path
to the random node. The initialisation procedure for ticket T is as follows [130]:
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for i = 0 to size(T) do
T[i] = (rand() % 2 == 0) ? 0 : i+1;
pack(T);
end for
In Phase 2 the ticket is initialised to represent the shortest path to the destination node.
This initialisation procedure for ticket T is as follows:
for i = 0 to size(T) do
T[i] = ((cur node & (1 << i)) == (dest & (1 << i))) ? 0 : i+1;
pack(T);
end for
The initialisation part of both phases can be divided into two subroutines: (1) gen-
eration of the ticket according to the destination node for that phase (in the Phase 1 this
is a random node and in the Phase 2 the destination node); (2) packing of the ticket:
given the ticket T [0 . . .n−1] with r non-zero elements, non-zero elements are assigned
to T [0], . . . ,T [r−1], and zero elements are assigned to T [r], . . . ,T [n−1]. This facili-
tates the routing completion detection, since once all the non-zero dimensions of the
ticket are traversed the ticket expires, i.e., the destination is reached and the routing
stops. If the destination is reached before the ticket expires, then the routing stops
regardlessly.
5.6.2.2 Randomised routing in de Bruijn graphs
In the case of a de Bruijn graph, the ticket specifies the destination node, as the greedy
routing of correcting the dimensions from left to right is used. Given that the alphabet
used to represent a de Bruijn graph is binary, the Phase 1 ticket T initialisation is as
follows:
for i = 0 to size(T) do
T[i] = rand()%2;
de loop(T, current node);
pack db(T);
end for
The following subroutines in the ticket initialisation can be distinguished: (1) gen-
eration of the ticket according to the target node (randomly selected one in Phase 1,
and the destination node in Phase 2); (2) de-looping; and (3) packing of the ticket.
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Since the greedy (dimension correcting) routing strategy is used here, it is possible
for two consecutive nodes on the route to represent the same node. De-looping is per-
formed in order to remove such redundancy in the path, as shown below:
for i=0 to size(T) do
new node = current node << T[i];
if new node == current node then
T[i] = -1;
end if
current node = new node;
end for
Packing the ticket T is slightly different when compared to hypercube packing: given
the ticket T [0 . . .n−1], the r non-negative elements are assigned to T [0], . . . ,T [r−1],
and the negative elements to T [r], . . . ,T [n−1]. The packing of the ticket facilitates the
routing completion detection, since once all the non-negative elements of the ticket are
traversed the ticket expires, the random destination is reached and the routing stops.
5.6.2.3 Routing process
CUs are responsible for most of the communication in the network. A large portion of
this communication is data-forwarding, i.e., routing of register values in the network.
In accordance with the topology, each CU has a number of inports and outports through
which it communicates with other (neighbouring) CUs, as shown in Figure 5.16. Each
data-forwarding request received on the inports is queued in the forwarding queue. The
information that is received in this process contains: (1) the destination unit identifier
(unitID), (2) the register identifier (regID), (3) the register value (regValue) and (4)
the ticket. The ticket specifies the way in which the dimensions of the graph are
traversed, i.e., the routing path. Besides the path, the ticket contains a counter that
specifies which portion of that path is traversed up to that point. With this information
each node on the path can easily calculate the next node to send the information to.
The producer unit performs the initialisation of the ticket for Phase 1, at the end of
which, the packet is at the randomly-chosen node that performs the initialisation of
the ticket for Phase 2. Upon the arrival of a message at a node, there are two possible
actions that can be taken: (1) if the message is destined for that node itself, then the
routing stops and the node updates the status of the corresponding source operand; (2)
otherwise, the next node to send the message to is calculated, the ticket is updated and
the data is forwarded. The rate at which packets progress on their route depends on the
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load on the outports of nodes along the path, with data being forwarded from one node
to another as soon as the connecting port is available.
Figure 5.16: Data-forwarding communication in a hypercube network configuration.
5.6.3 Data-forwarding and secret-sharing
The approach of data-forwarding and randomised routing was adopted in order to hide
compromising information in the power traces. However, when forwarded, critical
register values actually influence the overall data-dependent power consumption. In
order to remove the direct contribution of data-forwarding to data-dependent power-
consumption, data-forwarding is modified to forward data in the form of data-shares.
The general technique is as follows: for each register value d, k− 1 random values,
r1, r2,. . . , rk−1, are generated and the k shares, d⊕ r1⊕ r2⊕·· ·⊕ rk−1, r1, r2, . . . , rk−1,
are forwarded. This differs from the idea of secret-sharing as given in [36], which
involves splitting every relevant bit into several shares and performing operations on
shares. This approach has been criticised as being impractical due to performance and
architectural overheads [103, 104]. In the network-based architecture, the architectural
overhead is minimal as only the number of packets that are routed is increased, which
contributes towards additional noise.
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5.6.4 On-chip random number generator
The network-based asynchronous architecture is designed for cryptographic devices,
such as smart-cards. It assumes the existence of a on-chip source of randomness used
for randomising data-forwarding routines. In most designs the source of “random”
numbers is provided by a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG). PRNGs use de-
terministic processes that output a series of numbers generated using an initial seed
state. Since the output is purely a function of the seed data, an attacker who can guess
the seed can predict the entire PRNG output. It is crucial, therefore, that the PRNG is
seeded by a true random source. A true random number generator (TRNG) produces
random numbers using an unpredictable source. Most TRNGs measure unpredictable
natural processes, such as thermal noise, atmospheric noise or nuclear decay, and use
them as a seed source.
Systems that do not have a hardware RNG, usually seed their RNGs using periph-
erals, such as mouse and keyboard. The most common techniques involve timing user
processes. However, these methods are often awkward and slow. On the other hand,
systems that implement hardware TRNGs tend to be slow, difficult to implement, re-
quire user involvement and often provide unknown amounts of true entropy [71]. It is
generally believed that “good random-number generators are hard to design because
their security often depends on the particulars of the hardware and software” [121].
An example of a “good random number generator” [71] is the Intel Random Num-
ber Generator, which samples thermal white-noise resulting from random electron and
material behaviour.
For smart-cards user-interface peripherals are not available for obtaining a random
source, so it is often unclear how smart-card RNGs can obtain true random seeds. Ex-
isting PRNG for smart-cards (e.g. Schlumberger’s CryptoFlex card) are considered
poor and not to be trusted for key generation. Some designs use a reasonable amount
of entropy for seeding, which is available through the card interface. However, se-
cure RNGs for smart-cards are either non-existent or the vendors do not publish their
designs.
In the case of the network-based architecture an on-chip source of randomness
(e.g. a PRNG) that is not seeded properly would result in every generated sequence
of (pseudo)random numbers, used in randomised routing, being the same for each run
of the code. This would result in no variation in execution timings, except for those
that are side-effects of asynchronous execution. Therefore, it is critical that the PRNG
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is properly seeded from a truly random source. Most criticism that PRNG’s receive is
connected to the reliability and randomness of secret key generation. There is no need
for on-chip key generation in the case of the network-based processor. The source
of randomness is only required for generating random trials during randomised data-
forwarding. These sequences are not reused, as in cases where keys are generated, so
the security issues of an on-chip PRNG are not as crucial. If the PRNG is implemented
using a TRNG for seeding, this would ensure that cryptographic devices using the
network-based design have randomised execution.
As stated earlier, the aim of this thesis is to evaluate the validity of network-based
architecture for introducing non-determinism in the execution. The point is not to give
a detailed specification of every building block of the architecture. The question of
providing true sources of randomness in smart-cards is outside the scope of this work.
5.7 An example
This section provides a step-by-step description of how compounded instructions are
executed in the network-based architecture. The program fragment is used to illustrate
the issue, operand fetch-and-lock and execution stages, and also the forwarding of
results between instructions. The output shown in Figure 5.17 is extracted from the
simulation of the AES encryption algorithm on the network configuration with four
units and the hypercube topology.
Figure 5.17 shows executed instructions in program order, the units that the in-
structions were issued to, the compounding bits and the producer units for each of the
operands. The sample instruction sequence consists of an addition (addi) executed in
the arithmetic unit (AU); a load operation (lb) executed in the memory unit (MU), and
a left bit shift (sll) executed in the logic unit (LU). Each unit is assigned an unitID.
The network configuration has four units connected as a hypercube H(2), as shown
in Figure 5.18. The fourth unit, the multiplier (MULT), is not shown in Figure 5.17,
as the execution output is restricted only to operations that concern the three given
instructions. Each of the rows represent operations that are taking place concurrently
in the functional units. The height of the row and the duration of time the specified
operations take are not related, but the rows correspond to the virtual time units in the
architectural simulator (see Section 6.2.1) in which the simulated time is discrete.
Prior to the issue of the first instruction the CUs of the AU, LU and MU are all free
and ready to accept the next instruction. Therefore, the IU is able to issue the instruc-
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Figure 5.17: A sample execution of compounded instructions.
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Figure 5.18: Hypercube H(2) organisation of functional units.
tions one after the other, in-order, although there are dependencies between instruc-
tions. The operations connected to execution of each of the instructions are coloured
in order to make execution of each instruction easier to follow.
At the issue of an instruction the forwarding signals to the producers are initiated
and the information about the resulting register and the unit the instruction is issued to
are added to the dependency table. Now, each CU will send the reserveLock requests
to the RBA, which grants it if the lockStatus of the register is NOT RESERVED (abbre-
viated to NR in Figure 5.17). For example, the AU requests for the lock to be reserved
for register 2 (specified in Figure 5.17 with resLock〈r=2〉). Since the lockStatus
of this register in the RBA is NOT RESERVED, the lock is reserved and the status of the
register becomes RESERVED (abbreviated to R in Figure 5.17). In the next event the AU
receives the forward initialisation for register 20. This register value should be for-
warded to unit with unitID = 0, which is the AU. This means (not shown in the figure)
that the value of register 20 is most recently generated in the AU. The operand value is
therefore available from the same unit, so both operand fetch and data-forwarding are
avoided. Next, the register lock request for register 2 is sent to the RB (regLock〈r=2〉).
Once the register is locked in the RB, the CU can transfer control to the FU which eval-
uates the instruction. At the same time, the RB sends the update signal to the RBA
to update the lockStatus for register 2. After the instruction is evaluated, the AU
responds to the forwarding request previously received, to forward the value of the
register 2 to the MU. The routing procedure specified for Phase 1 (see Section 5.6.2.1)
generates the path AU→LU→MU (00→01→11). Since the Phase 1 terminates at the
destination node, the routing is completed and the MU can update its operand. Both
phases of the routing procedure can be seen when routing value of register 20 from MU
to LU. Phase 1 routing (routing to a random node) follows the path MU→MULT→AU
(11→10→00), whereas Phase 2 routing (shortest path to the destination) specifies the
path AU→LU (00→01).
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Figure 5.17 does not show the execution of subsequent instructions. The availabil-
ity of the CU of a particular unit, enables the IU to issue the next instruction of the
same type to that unit. The points at which the CUs become available are noted in the
figure to hint at further operation of the architecture.
5.8 Features
The architecture model described in this chapter offers a number of interesting features.
The network-based asynchronous model is a scalar architecture that features a fast in-
order single issue unit, a network of functional units capable of executing concurrently
and specialised for forwarding results between the units, and an out-of-order write-
back stage. Having a fast single issue unit models a processor capable of issuing more
than one instruction at a time without the additional hardware cost of super-scalar
designs (e.g. [118]). This architectural model aims at exploiting fine-grain instruction
level parallelism of both instructions with and without data-dependencies in order to
achieve non-deterministic execution.
In VLIW and super-scalar architectures a fast issue rate is achieved through the
availability of streams of independent instructions, and by issuing multiple indepen-
dent instructions. The code for VLIW architectures is prior to issue analysed and
scheduled by a compiler, which enables these architectures to issue more than one
instruction at a time. As a consequence, the control unit of a VLIW architecture is
largely simplified. The super-scalar architectures, in contrast, require significant hard-
ware control for dynamic scheduling, when the compiler is unable to provide inde-
pendent instructions. The network-based architecture (similarly to VLIW architec-
tures) does not perform dynamic scheduling, and (similarly to super-scalar architec-
tures) prevents hazard at run-time. Instructions are issued at a rapid rate, regardless of
the data-dependencies, but at the expense of hardware necessary to perform dynamic
instruction compounding during the issue stage. The dependencies between instruc-
tions are recognised and used to forward register values between them, which has a
number of beneficial effects. The data-forwarding facilitates some of the problems
that are introduced by data-dependencies, such as RAW hazards caused by true data-
dependencies. Data-forwarding also reduces the register bank response times which
has a positive effect on the performance. Further, the randomised data-forwarding pro-
tocol introduces interleavings in the execution, which means that the order in which
instructions are executed is non-deterministic and is different for each execution of the
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algorithm. This in turn leads to decorrelation of power consumption profiles. Con-
sidering that the architecture is organised as a network in order to enable randomised
routing of register values, this is the key feature of this design.
The instruction compounds are formed at run-time and consist of a number of in-
structions from the same or different execution blocks. This allows the issue unit to
initiate forwarding operations in the producer units and avoid complicated synchroni-
sation and control mechanisms for data-forwarding seen elsewhere. The instructions
are issued in-order and as soon as there are available units, while the availability of
operands is not an issue. This is largely due to the operand fetch-and-lock stages being
moved to the CUs.
The distributed organisation of control, characterised primarily by the distribution
of the control over the fetch-and-lock stage among the communication units, and with
the novel approach to data-forwarding, enables instructions, both with and without
data-dependencies, to operate in parallel. Although the extent of parallel execution
of instructions with data-dependencies is subject to the availability of results, mutual
exclusion is not enforced. More importantly, the issue stage is not stalled due to these
instructions.
The drawback of the traditional implementation of data-forwarding, despite the fact
that it can reduce an instruction’s execution time, is that it requires that the operand
fetch stage is synchronised with the write-back stage. This synchronisation inevitably
slows down the faster stage, i.e., the fetch stage, when two dependent instructions are
fetched and issued one after the other. If the instructions are not scheduled one after
the other, or there is more then one instruction waiting for the result of the first instruc-
tion, then the write-back stage of the first instruction could be held up unnecessarily.
In the network-based asynchronous architecture data-forwarding, operand fetch stage
and the write-back are not synchronised, as explained in Section 5.5.4. In fact, the
consumer will not issue the operand-fetch for the register that is obtained through data-
forwarding and the write-back stage is completely uncorrelated to the data-forwarding,
as the latter is realised through communication of units. Although, the dependencies
between consecutive instructions do mean that the consumer would wait for the re-
sult to be ready and forwarded, this is still faster than writing to the register bank and
reading the result from it.
Out-of-order write-back schemes avoid the need to reorder write-back events when
results are ready to be committed. Reordering these events to maintain in-order write-
back introduces synchronisations, which reduce the benefits of asynchronous (average-
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case) execution. In addition, synchronisations are not desired in the architecture that
aims at exploiting non-deterministic execution. In particular, out-of-order write-back is
beneficial from the point of power analysis as write-back operations are often targeted
in the attacks. The use of both out-of-order execution and out-of-order write-back
helps to desynchronise the fragile points in the power traces.
In the network-based asynchronous architecture the fast issue rate, concurrent ex-
ecution of instructions and randomised data-forwarding are fundamental for achieving
non-deterministic execution. Direct synchronisation of different operations along the
datapath is not required, as the communication is purely data-driven. In comparison to
the MAP architecture [116] which also perceives the processor as a network of func-
tional units, the control in this architectural design is further distributed. Instructions
are issued at the faster rate and data-forwarding is implemented without synchronisa-
tion overheads. These novelties in the design introduce performance improvements
and further exploit non-deterministic execution, that is beneficial for preventing side-
channel attacks.
Power consumption is an important factor when designing computing systems. In
simple hardware systems, such as smart-cards, the power consumption is important be-
cause the power supply of these systems is usually limited. Current synchronous archi-
tectures extensively use clock-gating (a technique which isolates inactive circuits from
the clock) to save power. Although this technique can improve power consumption,
some of its main drawbacks are complicated circuit design and timing analysis [59].
Furthermore, from the security point of view, clock-gating could compromise the secu-
rity of the device. Namely, electromagnetic analysis is able of pinpointing the regions
of the device that are inactive and use that information in the analysis. Thus, on the
one hand clock-gating is useful technique, yet on the other hand it could compromise
the security of the device.
Asynchronous designs have the ability to reduce power consumption simply by
not having a clock and therefore avoiding the clock-related problems of synchronous
design. The event-driven nature of asynchronous circuits naturally avoids any unnec-
essary circuit activity. An asynchronous system activates only those parts of the circuit
which are required and so does not dissipate power in the rest of the circuit that is not
being used. Similarly to synchronous designs with clock-gating, this characteristic of
asynchronous designs could be a potentially exploited by electromagnetic analysis.
In the design of the network-based architecture the functional units that are not exe-
cuting the instructions could be used in data-forwarding and thus do not appear as inac-
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tive. Due to randomised routing, it is not possible to predetermine which any given unit
will be used by data-forwarding. In addition, due to the nature of execution, the issue
of instructions to functional units changes from one run to the other, as they complete
in different times and became available for new instructions in a non-deterministic or-
der. This is a useful characteristic when considering the electromagnetic analysis and
its ability to extract the locality information.
5.9 Summary
This chapter presented a novel architectural solution for preventing power analysis.
The network-based asynchronous design is an architectural approach for decorrelating
the power consumption measurements from the secret values handled in the device
by exploiting non-deterministic execution. This processor organisation is a network
of functional units that can perform data-forwarding in a randomised fashion and in
which the control and the state are distributed. Data-forwarding is used to both im-
prove performance and achieve non-deterministic instruction execution by introducing
instruction interleavings through the randomised routing of register values in the net-
work. This design features a fast in-order issue unit, a network of functional units
capable of concurrent non-deterministic execution and forwarding of results, and out-
of-order completion and write-back. Its datapath is characterised by instructions that
run as fast as their data requirements are fulfilled, may overtake each other and compete
for resources.
The next chapter presents the evaluation framework and the results of the secu-
rity and performance evaluations. It presents the stochastic event-driven asynchronous
simulation platform geared towards obtaining power and execution performance fig-
ures for the execution of algorithms under different architectural configurations. Fur-
ther, the next chapter presents the security and performance evaluation results and




Chapter 5 presented the design of a network-based asynchronous architecture for ex-
ploiting non-deterministic execution targeted at secure cryptographic devices. The
goal is to render power-based side-channel attacks on the proposed architecture more
difficult, or even infeasible. The aim of this chapter is to provide quantitative mea-
sures in order to evaluate the proposed approach through simulation and to observe the
influence of different architectural configurations.
Section 6.2 presents the simulation platform for investigating the effectiveness of
randomised and non-deterministic execution for thwarting side-channel attacks. The
evaluation framework is parametrised and can be configured to cover a range of ar-
chitectural configurations in which different parameters, including the network topol-
ogy and component delays, can be varied. The architecture was modelled at the
instruction-set level and simulated in a stochastic event-driven simulator built on top of
the AVT simulation platform [120]. It executes assembly-level instructions compiled
from source code using the SUIF compiler [128]. In order to investigate the correla-
tion of the power traces to the source code, the simulator was equipped with power and
execution profiling features.
Next, the security and performance evaluation results of the network-based asyn-
chronous architecture are presented. These are divided into two sections: (1) results
based on performing differential power analysis attacks on power traces obtained from
simulating the execution of AES and DES cryptographic algorithms on different ar-
chitectural configurations (Section 6.3); and (2) results based on measuring the perfor-
mance improvements of the network-based approach (Section 6.4).
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6.2 Evaluation framework
6.2.1 Asynchronous event-driven simulator
The architecture was modelled at the instruction-set level and simulated in a stochas-
tic event-driven simulator developed on top of the AVT simulation environment [120].
It executes assembly-level instructions compiled from the source programs using the
SUIF compiler [128]. The AVT simulator (AVTSIM) is an event-driven sequential sim-
ulator for distributed asynchronous systems [120]. AVTSIM models a distributed sys-
tem consisting of processors connected by a network. Components (functional blocks)
of the architectural datapath are simulated as processors (also called entities) of the
AVT environment. Each entity has a number of inport and outport unidirectional con-
nections to other entities of the architecture. The number and type of these connec-
tions depend on the particular entity and its functionality. For example, the entity that
simulates the issue unit (IU) has N (the number of functional units (FU)) outport con-
nections used to transfer instructions to the communication units (CU), an inport from
the fetch and branch unit (FBU) used to transfer instructions into the instruction buffer
(IB), and another N connections to CUs used to initiate data-forwarding operations (as
shown in Figure 5.2 and Section 5.5.2).
The AVT simulation algorithm views the system under simulation as a collection
of logical processes (LP). The simulation is realised through communication and co-
operation of LPs, each of which simulates a part, in space and time, of the simulation
model. The simulation models in AVTSIM are described in terms of LPs (entities),
inputs and outputs, implemented by the classes Entity, InPort and OutPort, respec-
tively. Entities can have an arbitrary number of inputs and outputs. In the simulator for
the network-based architecture1 inports and outports are simulated using AsyncInPort
and AsyncOutPort classes. These classes are used to simulate the asynchronous com-
munication and asynchronous channels based on bundled data (single-rail) encoding
and the four-phase handshaking protocol (see Section 4.4 for description of encoding
schemes and handshaking protocols). This encoding scheme was chosen because it is
known not to be secure against side-channel analysis [136, 103], and one of the objec-
tives of this research is to investigate to what extent the non-determinism introduced
by the architecture improves resistance to power analysis. The choice of unprotected
implementation is, therefore, appropriate from this perspective. Each inport connec-
1The simulator for the network-based architecture is in the rest of this chapter referred to as the
simulator, and is not to be confused with AVT simulator, AVTSIM.
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where InPortTrace and OutPortTrace are classes inherited from InPort and OutPort
classes, respectively, and are used to intercept and record all the signal value changes
as a part of the execution profiling mechanism.
In the architectural simulator, each functional block is modelled as a separate LP.
The LPs communicate with each other by a mechanism (part of AVTSIM) that is used
to synchronise activities, receive and propagate events. Each LP maintains a local sim-
ulation time clock, which indicates the time-stamp of the most recent event processed,
some local state, and a list of time-stamped events that have not yet been processed.
Entities react when they perceive a change at one or more input ports. An event-
message carrying the same value as before is not considered to be an event. The in-
coming events are processed in time-stamped order. The incoming event may cause
the local state to be updated, and outport events to be generated and propagated. The
time-stamp of the generated outport events must be greater than or equal to the simula-
tion time when the inport event was received and processed. The number of generated
outport events depends on the inport event and the entity’s functionality. For example,
when an instructions is received in the CU, the CU might generate grantRead and
reserveLock requests (see Section 5.5.4.1 for details) at the outports connected to the
register bank arbiter (RBA) or in case of a store instruction, for which the source
operands are forwarded (i.e. in the case of an instruction that does not have a destina-
tion operand and the source operands are not obtained from the register file), it does
not generate any events, but waits for the operand value(s) to be forwarded. The de-
lays on the output ports depend on the events and on the entity, as will be explained in
Section 6.2.2. Message delay, as defined in [120], is the amount of simulated real time
required to send an event-message from one processor to another. In the architectural
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simulator included in the message delay is the figure for the delay of the functional
block that had generated the event. Further details are given in Section 6.2.2.
At the highest level the architectural model is described in a structural form, de-
tailing the interconnections between datapath components. The AVT provides the plat-
form for exchanging messages between entities and time-keeping. The AVTSIM main-
tains the global time and associates a time reference with each event. The simulator
progresses with time and executes those events that have the same time-stamp. The
simulation finishes when the event list in the AVTSIM becomes empty. The simulated
time is measured in so-called virtual time units (VTU) [120], which do not exactly
correspond to real-world time units, but are interpreted for the particular simulation
model. It should be noted that comparisons were made for a common underlying simu-
lation model with different architectural configurations and, thus, a particular meaning
to VTUs was not given in the architectural simulator.
The functionality of the architectural components was modelled at the micro-operation
and register transfer level, providing explicit description of the interaction between
components of the datapath, but the architecture was not modelled at the gate level.
The functionality of an entity is described in method evaluate() which is called each
time at least one value on the inports of the entity changes. During the current call
of evaluate(), the entity can generate none, one or more events on its outports, and
is considered busy until the time-stamp of the last output generated. The handshake
based communication between entities ensures that the handshake that has been started
will have no messages lost, but some events could be lost if (due to the busy state of
the entity) the initial requests of the handshake is not perceived. This is undesirable
characteristic of the AVTSIM especially when simulating a processor architecture. A
solution to this problem in the architectural simulator required restriction on the length
of message delays, providing more balanced message delays. In this way, it is ensured
that the time period during which the entity is considered busy is not longer than the
delays of incoming events. Although this solution is ad-hoc and somewhat reduces the
possibility for exploring the variety of delays, it is considered acceptable in the current
simulation model.
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6.2.2 Parametric model
The description of the architecture is parametrised in order to include different types
of functional units and different connectivities between them. The following can be
configured:
• Network topology
• Network size (i.e. number of functional units)
• Number of shares used in data-forwarding
• Component delays
• Power consumption figures for various components and buses
• Size of the register bank
• Size of the data memory
Although the size of the register bank and the data memory can be specified in the
configuration file, they are not as freely varied as the network topology and size, be-
cause the former depend on the requirements of the compiled programs that are run
on the architecture. However, these parameters are configurable and the architectural
configuration can be easily adjusted to accommodate the requirements of the code that
runs on it.
The instruction set (listed in Appendix B) and the implemented functionality of
each functional unit type are hard-coded. The number of source and destination operands
is set to a maximum number of two, while the second destination operand is used
only in the case of PC-related instructions, in which the first operand is the PC reg-
ister (pcReg) and the second operand is the link register (linkReg) (the purpose of
the linkReg is explained in Section 5.5.5.2). All other instructions have none or one
destination operand.
The completion time of a functional unit in an asynchronous architecture depends
on both static and dynamic factors [118]. The type of the functional unit determines
the static factor, whereas the type of functional unit operation determines a range of
delays, which are used to model dynamic factors such as input data. The overall delay
of the functional unit is, therefore, specified to be a value in a range bounded by a min-
imum and a maximum value, as shown in Figure 6.1. Some of these values are based
on SPICE simulations from a prototype of a micronet datapath [21]. Unfortunately,
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more accurate values were not available for this implementation. In the experimenta-
tion, two delay models were used: one where delays are fixed (non-variable), and one
where the delays were chosen to be a random value from the specified range, as given
in Figure 6.1. The random model attempts to reflect delay values with reasonable vari-
ances, so that operations are not considered to complete in fixed times. To reduce the
number of power readings required to successfully perform the attacks, and still give
an accurate evaluation, power simulations were most extensively run for configurations
with non-variable delays. In addition, this delay model provides the measure of non-
determinism that is due to execution rather than the data. The random delay model is
somewhat optimistic as the actual delays of operations would be data-dependent rather
than random. In addition, when performing the timing analysis evaluation this type of
model would be inadequate. However, this model has not taken a significant part in the
experimentation so its inaccuracy is less crucial. The impact of a true data-dependent
delay model on security of the architecture would be more present in the evaluation
of the security against timing analysis which is not part of this research. From the
standpoint of power analysis, data-dependent delays could be useful in evaluation but
are not crucial, as the strength of the attack is in ability to align operations that deal
with sensitive data. In the delay model with fixed delays this process is even easier.
The separate issue is the vulnerability of asynchronous logic to timing analysis which
is not part of this research.
The delays specified in the Figure 6.1 imply that some operations are more ex-
pensive than others. This configuration presents arithmetic and logic units which are
relatively faster than the memory unit, since a memory operation may include an ad-
dition, and the actual process of loading from, and storing into, memory is relatively
slow [118]. Similarly, multiplications are considered more costly than arithmetic or
logic operations. The fetch and branch unit and the issue unit are considered faster
then any other component in order to model a fast single-issue architecture in which
functional units are kept busy.
All significant operations in the architectural simulator, such as computing results
and sending event-messages, are assigned costs. The assigned cost is given in the form
of a delay and power. When an event is created a delay is assigned to it. This delay
specifies the time after which the AVT scheduler will process the generated event. The
power profiling features are not part of the AVTSIM environment and are implemented
separately. The architecture was implemented to support two power models: Hamming
weight model and the transition count model, which are explained in Section 6.3.1.
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COMPONENT TYPE COMPONENT DELAY
MIN MAX
ARITHMETIC UNIT (AU) 2 4
LOGIC UNIT (LU) 2 4
MULTIPLIER UNIT (MULT) 4 8
MEMORY UNIT (MU) 10 20
REGISTER BANK (RB) 2 4
OTHER (FBU, IU, RBA, MA) 1 2
Figure 6.1: Delay distribution for different architectural components in virtual time units
(VTUs).
The assigned power cost depends on the power model implemented. For example, the
generation of an event in the configuration with the Hamming weight power model,
consists of the following operations:
/*place the data on the bus and consider it available after the delay */
outport->data.presentAfterDelay(data, delay);
/*record the power assigned with this operation*/
power logger->logPowerEvent(Hamming Weight(data)*base power,
start time, start time + delay, entity name, inst tag);
/*trigger the request signal after the delay */
outport->req.triggerAfterDelay(1, delay);
/*record the power associated with this operation*/
power logger->logPowerEvent(base power, start time, start time
+ delay, entity name, inst tag);
The simulator also implements the execution profiling features, and records every
change of the signals on the wires. This allows for all events specific to a particular
instruction to be easily extracted. Each time an event is placed on the output port, the
change on the bus (wire) is recorded in the event logger:
/*record the change on the wire at start time */
event logger->logEvent(start time, entity name, inst tag, colour,
data);
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6.2.3 SUIF compiler
The Stanford University Intermediate Format (SUIF) [128] is a compiler development
framework, which provides the necessary infrastructure for performing a range of com-
piler optimisations, from high-level transformations to dataflow optimisations. The
optimisation transformations can be performed progressively and interchangeably over
multiple passes, each producing the same output format. This enables the passes to be
reordered by running them in a different order. The SUIF toolkit contains a variety
of compiler passes, which can be inserted freely at any point during the compilation.
An ANSI C front end is available to translate source programs into SUIF intermedi-
ate representation, and after passing a number of SUIF passes, the system can directly
produce MIPS code. The assembly-level code run on the architectural simulator is
SUIF-generated MIPS code compiled from C implementations.
6.2.4 Power profiling
To investigate the correlation of the power traces to the source code the simulation was
equipped with power and execution profiling features. Power dissipation in CMOS
circuits largely depends on the switching activity caused by changes in input data [49],
and the power profiling was implemented accordingly. However, the power profiles
represent the worst-case scenario where all the noise produced by the processor has
been removed. Due to the independent data-driven operation of each subcircuit, asyn-
chronous architectures have random timing variations, which make signal averaging
in the differential power analysis problematic. To reduce the number of power read-
ings required to successfully perform the attacks, and still give an accurate evaluation,
power simulations were most extensively run for configurations with non-variable de-
lays. In this way a smaller number of power traces were needed for (in some cases)
successful application of power-based attacks. In addition, non-variable delay con-
figurations provide a measure of the introduced non-determinism. The architectural
simulator is implemented to support both variable and non-variable delays, and the
results of both types of simulations are given in Section 6.3.
6.3. Security evaluation 175
6.3 Security evaluation
The security evaluation process is given in Figure 6.2. This process starts with the
C implementation of the cryptographic algorithm, which is then compiled into MIPS
code that is run on the architecture simulator. The outputs of the architectural simula-
tion are the execution and power profiles that used to generate the power traces used
in power analysis. If successful, the analysis should yield the values of the secret key.
The following section gives further details about the experimental setup.
Figure 6.2: Security evaluation process.
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6.3.1 Experimental setup
The goal of the research presented in this thesis is to investigate the impact to the
security of non-determinism introduced in the execution of the network-based asyn-
chronous architecture. In order to investigate the amount of non-determinism that dif-
ferent architectural configurations yield, differential power analysis attacks were per-
formed on power traces obtained from simulating a number of different configurations
in which the following parameters were varied:
1. Network topology and size: The architecture is implemented to support two net-
work topologies: binary hypercubes and binary de Bruijn networks, as explained
in Section 5.6.1. The definition of binary hypercube is extended to support any
number of nodes, and is termed partial binary hypercube. The vertices of a par-
tial binary hypercube of size N, PH(N), are labelled with n-bit integers from 0
to N− 1, where 2n−1 ≤ N ≤ 2n. A vertex x = (xn−1,xn−2, . . . ,x0) in PH(N) is
adjacent to vertices:
x′ = (xn−1,xn−2, . . . ,xi+1, x̄i,xi−1, . . . ,x0), i f x
′ ≤ N,
and
x′′ = (0,xn−2, . . . ,xi+1, x̄i,xi−1, . . . ,x0), s.t. x
′′ 6= x and x′′ 6= x′, otherwise,
for 0≤ i≤ n−1.
The vertices of a binary de Bruijn network of size N, DB(N), are labelled with
integers modulo N. An edge is drawn from vertex x to vertex y, if
y≡ 2x+α (mod N), α ∈ {0,1}.
This choice of network topologies was made because: (1) routing in these topolo-
gies is oblivious, i.e., the path taken by a packet through the network is a function
of its origin and destination; (2) randomised routing protocols can be efficiently
implemented in these topologies.
In the experiments the size of the network was varied and the distribution of
different functional units in each of these variations is shown in Figure 6.3.
2. Cryptographic algorithm / side-channel attack: Detailed power simulations of
AES and DES cryptographic algorithms were performed. The power traces ob-
tained from simulating AES were subjected to a variation of the covariance at-
tack [35], that is based on observing the covariance between the plaintext bits
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#FU #AU #LU #MULT #MU
4 1 1 1 1
6 2 2 1 1
7 2 2 1 2
Figure 6.3: Distribution of functional units (FU) among arithmetic (AU), logic (LU), mul-
tiplier (MULT) and memory (MU) units.
and the power values of the initial key addition at every sample point for each
key bit. The power traces obtained from simulating DES were subject to the DPA
attack [78], that is based on observing the differential power trace of the guessed
key bits of the two distributions of power curves specified by the guessed key
bits.
3. Power model: The architecture is implemented to support two power mod-
els [97]:
(a) Hamming weight model, in which the power consumed is proportional to
the number of 1s written onto the bus.
(b) Transition count model, in which the power consumed is proportional to
the number of bits that change on the bus.
These two power models have been observed by Messerges et al. in [97] and
resemble the two types of data bus information leakage. The power profiling
in this implementation takes into account the power consumed by data buses,
the register bank and the memory, according to one of these two power mod-
els. The power leakage from the computational logic is taken into account, but
it is considered fixed for each functional unit and is not data-dependent. The
importance of the leakage from the computational logic is not diminished in this
way, but rather, on this level of architectural implementation, observing this type
of leakage would not be possible to simulate and any other model is likely to
be unrealistic. The leakage from the computational logic is data-dependent and
simulating it would require a gate-level implementation of the architecture. Fur-
thermore, this type of experimental evaluation of resistance to power analysis
would not possible at that level as it would be extremely time consuming. De-
signing logic gates that do not leak information during computation is outside
the scope of this research which focused on the architectural aspects.
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4. Data-forwarding mode: Forwarding critical register values through the network
induces power consumption directly dependent on the sensitive data. An idea to
remove this direct contribution was to split data into shares. Data-forwarding in
the form of k data-shares consists of generating k−1 random values: r1,. . . , rk−1,
and forwarding k values: d⊕ r1⊕·· ·⊕ rk−1, r1, . . . , rk−1, where d is the register
value. This provides blinding of critical register values that are written onto the
forwarding buses multiple times during data-forwarding. In addition, this pro-
cess increases the network activity (congestion), which results in further timing
variations and increased noise in the power traces. In the simulations the number
of shares was varied to characterise configurations with data-sharing, in which
the number of shares is k = 2, and configurations without data-sharing, in which
number of shares is k = 1.
The experiments consisted of varying these parameters over the following sic architec-
tural configurations:
PIPE: A linear single-pipeline asynchronous architecture. Data-forwarding is not
implemented in this configuration, but the result of the previous instruction is
reused. This is simulated with the configuration of the network-based architec-
ture in which the number of functional units is equal to one.
PHN: A configuration of the network-based asynchronous architecture in which the
network is a partial hypercube of size N, PH(N). The number of shares in data-
forwarding is equal to one, i.e., data-forwarding does not support data-sharing.
PHSN: A configuration of the network-based asynchronous architecture in which the
network is a partial hypercube of size N, PH(N). The number of shares in data-
forwarding is equal to two.
DBN: A configuration of the network-based asynchronous architecture in which the
network is a de Bruijn network of size N, DB(N). The number of shares in data-
forwarding is equal to one, i.e. data-forwarding does not support data-sharing.
DBSN: A configuration of the network-based asynchronous architecture in which the
network is a de Bruijn network of size N, DB(N). The number of shares in
data-forwarding is equal to two.
ASYNCN: An asynchronous architecture with N functional units which supports
concurrent execution in the same manner as network-based asynchronous archi-
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tecture but in which data-forwarding is turned off, and the network effectively
does not exist. Similar to the PIPE configuration, the result of the previous
instruction in each of the functional units can be reused.
6.3.2 Covariance attack on AES
The covariance attack [35] was performed on the runs of AES. The covariance of the
two variates is defined as follows:
Definition 6.3.1. Given two sets of variates X = {xi} and Y = {y j} the covariance,
σi j ≡ cov(xi,y j), is defined as:
cov(xi,y j)≡ 〈(xi−µX)(y j−µY )〉,
where 〈·〉 represents the mean operation and µX = 〈xi〉 and µY = 〈y j〉 are means of X
and Y , respectively.
The covariance of two variates provides a measure of how strongly these variates
are correlated. Thus, the covariance of the two independent variates is equal to zero.
If cov(xi,y j) > 0, then Y tends to increase as X increases, and if cov(xi,y j) < 0, then Y
tends to decrease as X increases.
The covariance attack performed on the runs of AES can be summarised in the
following three steps:
Step 1 – Obtain the power samples of the initial key addition for several encryptions
with the same key and different plaintexts.
Step 2 – For each bit i in the plaintext input, calculate the covariance between the bit
and power samples of the runs at every sample point.
Step 3 – For each bit i, investigate the covariance plot for all the sample points. It
should be flat except for a few strong peaks. The first significant peak should
correspond to the write of the plaintext to the register bank. The peak at another
important sample point should correspond to the write to the register bank of
the result of the initial key addition. If these peaks have the same sign, then the
i-th key bit is equal to zero, otherwise it is equal to one.
The covariance attack is based on observing the differences in the covariance values
derived from the power traces for the initial key addition at several reference points,
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for each key (plaintext) bit. The covariance plot for the i-th plaintext bit measures
the covariance between the values of the i-th plaintext bit and the power values at each
sample point. The two critical sample points, that are observed in the plots, correspond
to the covariance between the plaintext bit value and the power value before and after
the initial key addition, i.e., before and after the plaintext bit bi was XORed with the
key bit ki. The signs of the two peaks determine whether the value of the plaintext bit
was flipped during the XOR operation, thus the plot for the i-th plaintext bit reveals
the value of the i-th key bit. Namely, if the two peaks have different signs, then the
value of the plaintext bits was flipped during the initial key addition operation, and the
value of the corresponding key bit is equal to one. If the two peaks have the same sign,
then the value of the plaintext bit was not flipped, and the key bit is equal to zero. This
attack is based on the assumption that the contributions to the power mean when zero
and one bits are written on the bus (register bank) are different. Otherwise, the attack
would not be successful [35].
6.3.2.1 Results
The covariance attack was first performed on the single-pipeline asynchronous archi-
tecture, PIPE, with the Hamming weight power model and non-variable delays. The
covariance plots revealed the secret key with as few as 200 power profiles. A sample
covariance plot obtained from this experiment is shown in Figure 6.4. The covariance
plot is as expected, and specified in the attack description, mostly flat except for a few
strong peaks and correspond to the initial key addition.
















Figure 6.4: A sample covariance plot for the PIPE configuration with the Hamming
weight power model and non-variable delays, derived from 200 power profiles.
Figure 6.5(a) shows the portion of covariance plot for the first key bit that corre-
sponds to the initial key addition. The same sign of the two marked peaks suggests
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that the value of the first key bit is equal to zero. Similarly, Figure 6.5(b) shows the
same portion of the covariance plot for the fourth key bit. The different signs of the
two peaks suggest that the value of the fourth key bit is equal to one. This experiment
demonstrates that the single-pipeline architectural configuration with the Hamming
weight power model and non-variable delays is unprotected against the covariance
attack, which was easily mounted using only 200 power samples.

































(b) 4th key bit - value 1.
Figure 6.5: The covariance attack on the PIPE configuration with the Hamming weight
power model and non-variable delays.
In the PIPE configuration the instructions were executed one at a time on a single-
pipeline architecture. The instruction issue and completion are in-order. In order to
investigate whether concurrent execution on its own yields any security improvements,
the covariance attacks were performed on configurations of the network-based archi-
tecture in which data-forwarding is turned off, namely ASYNC4 and ASYNC6 con-
figurations, with the Hamming weight power model and non-variable delays. In these
configurations the network effectively does not exist: the instructions operate concur-
rently, but communicate only through the register bank. The instructions are issued
in-order to multiple units that operate at their own pace, but again, due to fixed delays,
the non-determinism that is found in asynchronous architectures executing in this man-
ner is not present. The goal was to investigate whether parallel execution can contribute
enough noise to make the attack more difficult to apply. Figures 6.6 and 6.8 show sam-
ple covariance plots for configurations ASYNC4 and ASYNC6, respectively. These
plots are mostly flat with a number of peaks that correspond to the operations when
the value of the plaintext bit was manipulated, i.e. initial key addition. Performing
the attack on these configurations has shown that 300 power samples were sufficient
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to read the secret key from the covariance plots. Figures 6.7 and 6.9 demonstrate the
ease with which the key bit values can be extracted from the covariance plots for each
of the configurations. Considering that the AES was broken with a low number (300)
of power samples in both cases, these results lead to conclusion that the parallelised
(non-randomised) execution on it own does not contribute sufficient noise to provide
any security improvements.



















Figure 6.6: A sample covariance plot for the ASYNC4 configuration with the Hamming

































(b) 3rd key bit - value 1.
Figure 6.7: The covariance attack on the ASYNC4 configuration with the Hamming
weight power model and non-variable delays.
Next, the covariance attack was performed on three configurations of the network-
based architecture in which data is not forwarded in the form of data-shares and the net-
work topology is a partial hypercube, i.e., PH4, PH6 and PH7 configurations with the
Hamming weight power model and non-variable delays. Configuration PH4 specifies
a network-based architecture with four functional units: arithmetic, logic, multiplier
and memory unit. The delays are non-variable, which on one hand reduces the number
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time
initial key addition













Figure 6.8: A sample covariance plot for the ASYNC6 configuration with the Hamming















(a) 1st key bit - value 0.
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(b) 3rd key bit - value 1.
Figure 6.9: The covariance attack on the ASYNC6 configuration with the Hamming
weight power model and non-variable delays.
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of necessary readings to successfully perform the attack, and on the other hand, demon-
strated the direct contribution of randomised data-forwarding to non-deterministic ex-
ecution. In the covariance attack on the PH4 configuration, 5000 power profiles were
needed to derive covariance plots from which the values of the secret key could be
read. A sample covariance plot obtained from this experiment is shown in Figure 6.10.
The portion of the covariance plot that corresponds to the initial key addition can be
easily observed, while the rest of the plot is mostly flat. Figures 6.11(a) and 6.11(b)
show portions of the covariance plots for the first and fourth key bit, respectively, that
correspond to the initial key addition. The signs of the peaks revealed that the value of


















Figure 6.10: A sample covariance plot for the PH4 configuration with the Hamming
weight power model and non-variable delays, derived from 5000 power profiles.





























(b) 4th key bit - value 1.
Figure 6.11: The covariance attack on the PH4 configuration with the Hamming weight
power model and non-variable delays.
As the majority of operations in the AES implementation were arithmetic and logic
operations, instruction-level parallelism was expected to be exploited to a higher ex-
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tent with an increase in arithmetic and logic units. Thus, the attack was performed
on configurations PH6 and PH7 (PH6: 2 AUs, 2 LUs , 1 MULT and 1 MU; PH7: 2
AUs, 2 LUs, 1 MULT and 2 MUs) with the Hamming weight power model and non-
variable delays. For configurations PH6 and PH7, 25000 and 50000 power profiles,
respectively, were needed to derive covariance plots from which the values of the key
bits could be read. Although the covariance plots were considerably noisy, the por-
tion of the traces that corresponded to the initial key addition could be pin-pointed, as
shown in Figures 6.12 and 6.15. However, it was difficult to distinguish the covariance
plots for different key bit values, as the two peaks (or groups of peaks) that correspond
to the two critical operations in the attack were smeared across the covariance plots.
By carefully comparing covariance plots for several key bits, the plots for the bits of
value zero were distinguished from the ones for the bits of value one, which was then
used to discover other key bits. Figures 6.13 and 6.16, which represent the compar-
isons of covariance plots for the first key bit (value 0) and the fourth key bit (value 1),


















Figure 6.12: A sample covariance plot for the PH6 configuration with the Hamming
weight power model and non-variable delays, derived from 25000 power profiles.
Figure 6.14 shows the comparison of covariance plots for the first and the fourth
key bits derived from 5000 power samples from the PH6 configuration. No significant
difference between the two plots can be noticed from this comparison. This exam-
ples demonstrate what is meant by “observing” the covariance plots and shows that
the covariance plots derived from the same number of power samples, as those for
configuration PH4, in this case did not provide any key bit information.
To measure the contribution of data-forwarding to data-dependent power consump-
tion, attacks were performed on configurations where data is forwarded in the form
of two data-shares, i.e., configurations PHS4, PHS6 and PHS7 with the Hamming
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Figure 6.13: The covariance attack on the PH6 configuration with the Hamming weight
power model and non-variable delays. COV1 and COV4 are covariance plots for the
1st (value 0) and the 4th key bit (value 1).
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Figure 6.14: The covariance attack on the PH6 configuration with the Hamming weight
power model and non-variable delays using 5000 power samples. COV1 and COV4
are covariance plots for the 1st (value 0) and the 4th key bit (value 1).
time

















Figure 6.15: A sample covariance plot for the PH7 configuration with the Hamming
weight power model and non-variable delays, derived from 50000 power profiles.




















Figure 6.16: The covariance attack on the PH7 configuration with the Hamming weight
power model and non-variable delays. COV1 and COV4 are covariance plots for the
1st (value 0) and the 4th key bit (value 1).
weight power model and non-variable delays. The enhancement to the architecture to
support data-forwarding with two data-shares consisted of generating a random value
r and forwarding two messages: d⊕ r and r, where d is the data value. This increases
the number of messages in the network and introduces additional non-determinism as
the progress of each packet in the network depends on the number of messages that
are routed. The number of power samples required to successfully perform the attack
increased to 35000, 60000 and 75000 for PHS4, PHS6 and PHS7 configurations, re-
spectively. Figures 6.17, 6.18 and 6.19 show the comparisons of covariance plots for
different key bits for each of these configurations. These results show that although
parallel execution and randomised data-forwarding hide the information leaked in the
form of data-dependent power consumption, data-forwarding contributes its own data-
dependent leakage. As demonstrated, by splitting the data into shares, this leakage can
be reduced and the attack threshold further increased.
The covariance attack was also performed on the de Bruijn network configura-
tions, i.e., DB and DBS configurations, with the Hamming weight power model and
non-variable delays. The sample covariance plot for the DB4 configuration shown
Figure 6.20 was generated from 35000 power profiles. When compared to the plot for
PH4 configuration (Figure 6.10) that was obtained from 5000 power profiles, it was
observed that this plot is much noisier. Further observation was that the difference
between the covariance plots for different key bits is in this case finer, and it was con-
siderably harder to distinguish the covariance plots for different key bits. The peaks
that correspond to critical operations are now further smeared across the covariance
plot and were not as easy to spot.
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Figure 6.17: The covariance attack on the PHS4 configuration with the Hamming
weight power model and non-variable delays derived from 35000 power profiles. COV1
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Figure 6.18: The covariance attack on the PHS6 configuration with the Hamming
weight power model and non-variable delays, derived from 60000 power profiles. COV1
and COV4 are covariance plots for the 1st (value 0) and the 4th key bit (value 1).




















Figure 6.19: The covariance attack on the PHS7 configuration with the Hamming
weight power model and non-variable delays, derived from 75000 power profiles. COV1
and COV4 are covariance plots for the 1st (value 0) and the 4th key bit (value 1).

















Figure 6.20: A sample covariance plot for the DB4 configuration with the Hamming
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Figure 6.21: The covariance attack on the configuration DB4 with the Hamming weight
power model and non-variable delays. COV1 and COV4 are covariance plots for the
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Figure 6.22: The covariance attack on the configuration DB6 with the Hamming weight
power model and non-variable delays, derived from 85000 power profiles. COV1 and
COV4 are covariance plots for the 1st (value 0) and the 4th key bit (value 1).
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Figure 6.21 shows the comparison of covariance plots for the first (value 0) and the
fourth (value 1) key bit, obtained from the covariance attack on configuration DB4.
The covariance plots were derived from 35000 simulations and contained sufficient
information for the plots for different key bit values to be distinguished. Similarly,
Figure 6.22 compares covariance plots for configuration DB6 obtained from 85000
power simulations. The success of this attack was dependent on the ability to deter-
mine the exact portion of the power trace in which the targeted operations took place.
Although the portion that corresponds to the initial key addition can be easily observed
in the plots, as shown in Figure 6.20, it is extremely noisy and peaks that correspond to
critical operations can be confused with other noise. In these experiments, this was fa-
cilitated by the execution profiling feature that the simulation environment provided. In
their absence, the precise knowledge of the algorithm source code and the parameters
of the architecture, or a more sophisticated attack methodology would be necessary.
The complete results of the covariance attacks performed on different de Bruijn
network configurations are given in Figure 6.23. Due to the fact that these experiments
are extremely time-consuming2, final figures for DBS6 and DBS7 configurations were
not obtained, but the ones given suggest that data-sharing improves the resistance to the
covariance attack, and confirms the benefit of using data-sharing in data-forwarding.
A simple comparison of these results and those obtained for hypercube configurations
(Figure 6.25), leads to the conclusion that architectural configurations with de Bruijn
network configurations provide more non-determinism when compared to hypercube
network configurations.
CONFIGURATION NUMBER OF POWER SAMPLES
K=1 K=2
DB4 35000 50000
DB6 85000 > 90000
DB7 120000 > 100000
Figure 6.23: Number of power samples necessary to attack de Bruijn network configu-
rations with the Hamming weight power model and non-variable delays.
2The fastest simulation of a single run of AES on the DB7 configuration on a 2.4 GHz Pentium 4
machine with 1GB of RAM, takes approximately 1 minute. The fastest simulation of a single run of
DES on the DB7 configuration and the same machine, takes approximately 3 minutes. The statistical
post-processing of the obtained data from multiple runs of these algorithms takes between 2 to 48
hours depending on the complexity of the attack, and it requires some manual processing connected to
guessing the key bits from the obtained covariance/differential traces.
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The next set of experiments consisted of performing the covariance attack on the
power traces obtained from running AES on PIPE and PH configurations with the
transition count power model and non-variable delays. The summary of these results
is given in Figure 6.24. In case of the PIPE configuration, most of the key bits were
readable from as little as 200 power plots. The attack on PH4 configuration yielded
the first 16 bits from 30000 power profiles, but the rest of the guessed key bits were
essentially random, if readable at all. The covariance plots from PH6 and PH7 con-
figurations yielded essentially random key bit values, from 50000 and 100000 power
profiles. These figures suggest that the the architectural implementations with the tran-
sition count power model show considerably better security characteristics when com-
pared to those with the Hamming weight power model.





Figure 6.24: Number of power samples used in the attacks on PIPE and PH configura-
tions with the transition count power model and non-variable delays.
The summary of the results of the covariance attacks on AES running on architec-
tural configurations in which the network topology and size, power model and data-
forwarding modes are varied, is given in Figure 6.25.
The architecture was implemented to support both variable and non-variable de-
lays. The security evaluations are most extensively performed for configurations with
non-variable delays, because the number of power samples required to successively
perform the power analysis attacks is much reduced. To illustrate this fact, Figure 6.26
summarised the results of the performed covariance attacks on PH configurations with
variable delays. For configuration PH4 with variable delays, 30000 power samples
were required to extract secret key values from the power plots. In the case of PH6
and PH7 configurations 45000 and 100000, respectively, were not sufficient to cor-
rectly extract all the key bits from respective power samples. Figure 6.26 also shows
the comparison of the number of samples necessary to attack the configurations with
non-variable and variable delays. As expected, the number of samples is much re-
duced for non-variable delays (from 30000 to 5000 power samples for PH4 config-
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CONFIGURATION POWER MODEL
HAMMING WEIGHT TRANSITION
K=1 K=2 COUNT (K=1)
PIPE 200 – 200
ASYNC4 300 – –
ASYNC6 300 – –
PH4 5000 35000 > 30000
PH6 25000 60000 > 50000
PH7 50000 75000 > 100000
DB4 35000 50000 –
DB6 85000 > 90000 –
DB7 120000 > 100000 –
Figure 6.25: Number of power samples used to perform the covariance attack on AES
run on different architectural configurations with non-variable delays.
uration). Since the power simulations were considerably time consuming, the final
figures for configurations PH6 and PH7 were not obtained. However, the presented
figures testify that variability of delays in asynchronous architectures contributes to-
wards complicating the application of the power analysis attacks. In some cases the
variability of delays could be exploited to mount timing attacks [136], as the delays
are data-dependent. However, when combined with non-deterministic execution in the
network-based architecture, variable delays should work as additional noise and the
extraction of information using the timing channel would not be as easy to achieve in
this case.
CONFIGURATION NUMBER OF POWER SAMPLES
NON-VARIABLE DELAYS VARIABLE DELAYS
PH4 5000 30000
PH6 25000 > 45000
PH7 50000 > 10000
Figure 6.26: Number of power samples necessary to attack hypercube network config-
urations with the Hamming weight power model.
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6.3.3 Differential power analysis of DES
This section reports on the results of performing DPA attacks on power samples ob-
tained from running DES on the hypercube network configurations with the Hamming
weight power model and non-variable delays. The DPA attack is performed on the first
round of DES and therefore uses known plaintexts. In each of the 16 rounds of DES 8
S-box lookups are performed. The 6-bit input to each of the S-boxes is generated using
the 6 bits of the round key and 6 bits of the intermediate result (register R). Therefore,
a bit in the 4-bit output of an S-box is influenced by only 6 bits of the round key. As
explained in Section 3.5.2, this fact can be used to discover the 48 bits of the first round
key by repeatedly applying the attack on the outputs of the 8 S-boxes. The remaining 8
bits of the DES key can be discovered using exhaustive search. The steps of the attack
can be summarised as follows (see Section 3.5.2 for further details of DES):
Step 1 – Obtain the power samples of the first rounds of DES for several encryptions
with the same key and different plaintexts.
Step 2 – For each of the 64 (26) possible guesses for the 6 bits of the round key, par-
tition the power traces according to the value of the bit that is output from the
S-box (defined by the selection function) and calculate the differential power
trace of the subpopulations for each partition.
Step 3 – The differential power trace for the correctly guessed 6 bits of the key should
show the largest biases, therefore the correct 6 bits correspond to the differential
power trace with the largest peaks.
By defining the selection function to be equal to the value of the first bit output from
an S-box, the 6 bits of the key that have influenced this bit value can be obtained. By
repeating Steps 2 and 3 for the remaining 7 S-boxes the entire 48 bits of the first round
key can be discovered.
6.3.3.1 Results
The differential power plots obtained from running DES on the PIPE configuration
revealed 42 correct key bits from 750 power samples. No correct guesses were made
from differential traces PH4 and PH6 configurations, derived from 40000 and 35000
power samples, respectively.
Figure 6.27 shows differential power plots for a correct and an incorrect key guess.
The power simulations of the DES implementation in the architecture were extremely
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(b) Differential trace of the incorrect guess.
Figure 6.27: The DPA attack on 35000 power profiles obtained from running DES on
PH6 configuration with the Hamming weight power model and non-variable delays.
time consuming which is the reason why further security evaluation is not carried out.
The figures suggest that the DES algorithm run on the same architectural configura-
tion is more resistant to differential power analysis attack when compared to the AES
algorithm. However, one should bear in mind that the side-channel attacks are based
not on the algorithmic properties of the particular cryptographic algorithm but on the
particular implementation and the physical characteristic of the underlying device that
the algorithm is running on (as discussed in Chapter 3). Therefore, this only means
that the particular implementation is more resistant to power analysis. In addition, the
point of this research is not to compare the resistance of particular implementation of
cryptographic algorithms to power analysis, but to compare the physical characteristics
that different architectural configurations provide. Therefore, the following conclusion
can be drawn: the implementation of DES run on the different configurations of the
network-based architecture shows better resistance to the DPA attack when compared
to the implementation of AES used in the evaluation.




Figure 6.28: Number of power samples used to perform the DPA attack on DES run
on the PIPE and PH configurations of the architecture with the Hamming weight power
model and non-variable delays.
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The results of performing the DPA attack on DES running on hypercube configura-
tions with the Hamming weight power model and non-variable delays are summarised
in Figure 6.28.
6.4 Performance evaluation
This section reports on the dynamics of computation of different architectural config-
urations in which the network topology and network size are varied. The performance
evaluation results are obtained from running AES on different configurations of the
architecture.
Figure 6.29 shows the relative execution times of hypercube architectural config-
urations without and with data-sharing, i.e., PH and PHS configurations. The Fig-
ure 6.29 demonstrates that the performance improves as the network size increases,
and the different distribution of units between arithmetic, logic and memory units,
give slightly different results3. The overhead of using data-sharing is small, between
5% and 11%, as shown in Figure 6.30.
























Figure 6.29: Relative execution times of PH and PHS configurations. DIST1, DIST2
and DIST3 represent different distribution of units.
The architecture was designed as an asynchronous network with the aim of decorre-
lating the power consumption measurements by exploiting the inherent non-determinism
of instructions executing in parallel over a network that uses randomised routing. The
idea was to introduce different instruction interleavings and in that way decorrelate
power consumption measurements. Figure 6.31 shows how the execution times change
3Given the small number of multiplications in the code, there is less scope for exploiting ILP with
greater number of multiplier units.
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Figure 6.30: Performance overheads of data-sharing for PH and PHS configurations.
DIST1, DIST2 and DIST3 represent different distribution of units.
for the successive runs of the same code on the same (hypercube) network configu-
ration. The figure shows that the execution times for 20 runs of AES on the PH7
configuration varied between 15680 and 15760 VTUs, i.e., the observed variation in
execution time is 0.5%. On the other hand, the execution times for 20 runs of AES
on the PHS7 configuration varied between 16880 and 17060 VTUs, i.e., the observed
variation in the execution times is equal to 1.1%. These results confirm that, due to
non-determinism in the execution, different runs of the same code on the same ar-
chitectural configuration have different execution times. In PHS configurations data-
sharing contributes towards decorrelating power consumption measurements from the
data in the following way. Firstly, the increase in the number of forwarded register val-
ues through the network introduces the higher variation in execution times. These in
turn are beneficial for removing time references in the power traces. The existence of
time references in the power traces is crucial for successful application of power-based
attacks. Further, by forwarding register values in the form of data-shares the direct
correlation between the data and the measured power consumption is removed. These
two effects of data-sharing work together towards further decorrelating the power con-
sumption measurements as the results in Section 6.3 have confirmed.
Figures 6.32 and 6.33 show relative execution times and overheads of data-sharing
for de Bruijn network configurations without and with data-sharing, i.e., DB and DBS
configurations. Figure 6.32 shows that for small network sizes, performance improves
with the increase in number of functional units. However, as the Figure 6.32 shows, for
the networks size greater than 8 this trend is not followed. The performance overheads
of data-sharing in the case of de Bruijn network configurations was between 7% and



































Figure 6.31: Variations in execution times of successive runs of the same algorithm for
PH7 and PHS7 configurations.
40% (Figure 6.33). Clearly this overhead is higher than the overhead of data-sharing
for PHS configurations. This higher overhead is the result of routing in de Bruijn
networks. Namely, in a de Bruijn network the path lengths between nodes are on
average longer than the path lengths in a hypercube network of the same size. This
increases the duration of routing, which appears as if a higher number of packets are
being routed, as each packet remains in the network for a longer period of time. This
causes forwarding queues to be more populated and, therefore, the routing to be slowed
down. On the other hand, despite the observed performance overhead, DB and DBS
























Figure 6.32: Relative execution times of DB and DBS configurations. DIST1, DIST2
and DIST3 represent different distribution of units.
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Figure 6.33: Performance overheads of data-sharing for DB and DBS configurations.
DIST1, DIST2 and DIST3 represent different distributions of units.
Figure 6.34 shows the variation in execution times for successive runs of the same
code on the same de Bruijn network configuration. The execution time for 20 runs
on the DB7 configuration varied between 16160 and 16280 VTUs, i.e., the observed
variation is the execution times is 0.75%. On the other hand, the execution time for
20 runs on the DBS7 configuration varied between 20000 and 20450 VTUs, i.e., the
variation in the execution times is 2.25%. This shows that de Bruijn network con-
figurations provide more variation in execution times when compared to hypercube




































Figure 6.34: Variations in execution times of successive runs of the same algorithm for
DB7 and DBS7 configurations.
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Figure 6.35 compares five different configurations of the architecture as the num-
ber of functional units changes. Figure 6.35 clearly shows that data-forwarding does
improve the performance (plot ASYNC is above all other plots). When comparing
configurations with data-forwarding, the best performance show PH configurations
and the worst DBS configurations. For the small number of units (≤ 8) the perfor-
mance progressively improves for all five architectural configurations. This figure
shows that the network-based organisation, besides providing considerable security


















Figure 6.35: Performance comparisons of five architectural configurations.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter the results of the security and performance evaluations for different
configurations of the network-based architecture were presented. The results were
obtained from running implementations of AES and DES cryptographic algorithms.
Since the obtained results depend both on the architectural platform and the algorithm
implementation, and since different implementations of the same cryptographic algo-
rithm can show different security features, the security features of AES and DES when
run on the architecture were not compared. The goal of this research is not to show
whether these algorithms are resistant to the power analysis, but to use them as bench-
marks for measuring the introduced non-determinism in the execution of the network-
based architecture. The two algorithms were selected for the security evaluation due
to their historical and practical importance.
In the current experimentation different configurations of the architecture in which
different parameters are varied, were compared. The parametric model was based on
200 Chapter 6. Evaluation
the delay and power figures that were available at the time of the experimentation.
However, any further investigation of the security and performance features of the
proposed architecture would require more detailed data-dependent delay and power
information.
Although the precise figures for a few of the security evaluation experiments were
not obtained, the following conclusions can be drawn:
• De Bruijn network configurations provide more scope for non-deterministic exe-
cution than hypercube configurations. This is due to the fact that the path lengths
in de Bruijn networks are longer than those of a partial hypercube, and provide
more variation in the execution times and, therefore, more randomness in the
execution.
• The increase in the network size provides more scope for non-deterministic exe-
cution, but it also has a positive effect on performance as shown in Figures 6.29
and 6.32.
• Data-forwarding in the form of data-shares improves resistance to power analy-
sis attacks. Not only is the direct contribution to the power of routing sensitive
register values removed in this way, but also further variations in execution times
are introduced, as shown in Figures 6.31 and 6.34. However, routing more regis-
ter values introduces performance overheads, as shown in Figures 6.29 and 6.32.
This suggests that the trade-off between the desired level of security and perfor-
mance might have to be made.
• If the power model of an architecture is characterised with the transition count
power model, then the architecture is more resistant to power analysis than the
one with the Hamming weight power model.
• Non-deterministic execution and forwarding register values through the network
of functional units does not produce a performance overhead as shown in Fig-
ure 6.35. However, the performance improvements do not necessarily improve
with the increase of the network size, i.e., number of functional units.
These results confirm that the network-based architecture is indeed more robust to
differential power analysis than the simple pipelined alternatives. By implementing
the architecture as a network both higher security and performance improvements are
gained, which should make this approach attractive for cryptographic devices.
Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
7.1 Summary
With the introduction of side-channel analysis and the development of different side-
channel attack strategies the challenge of improving the security of cryptographic de-
vices has become increasingly important. While most practical implementations seem
ad-hoc, even theoretically sound solutions show weaknesses when implemented. As
the question of achieving tightly secure cryptographic systems (in theory and practice)
remains open, one of the approaches to consider is to increase the cost of performing
side-channel attacks.
One of the proposed ideas toward increasing the cost of performing side-channel at-
tacks was to introduce randomness and non-determinism in the execution [80, 78, 36, 91].
Some of the investigations into this idea [91, 92, 66] have demonstrated that the
paradigm of randomising the execution can help make the side-channel attacks more
difficult to apply. These solutions harness the algorithm’s instruction level parallelism
(ILP) in order to achieve non-deterministic execution and obscure the compromising
information in the power traces.
This thesis presented the network-based asynchronous architecture in which ex-
ecution is non-deterministic. The network-based architecture presents a novel archi-
tectural idea in which functional units in the processor datapath are connected as an
asynchronous network rather than as a linear pipeline. The architecture is a network
of functional units that operate concurrently and communicate register values through
the network. The non-deterministic execution is achieved by: (1) exploiting fine-grain
instruction level parallelism, where concurrent execution of both instruction with and
without data-dependencies is utilised; and (2) performing data-forwarding using ran-
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domised routing of register values through the network. The investigations performed
in this thesis focused on exploring architectural principles which could be beneficial
for efficiently and effectively decorrelating power consumption measurements, rather
than on providing a detailed and complete low-level architectural description.
In [91] non-deterministic execution is achieved by exploiting instruction level par-
allelism in the algorithm. Namely, independent instructions are grouped together and
issued in random order, thus removing the correlation between features in the DPA
profile and the algorithm source code. This approach is further combined with random
register renaming [92] and the addition of random operations to the algorithm [66] in
order to increase the noise in the device’s power profile. In the network-based archi-
tecture a different approach is taken in order to achieve a similar goal. The instructions
are issued in-order to multiple functional units which operate concurrently. The de-
pendencies between instructions, that would normally cause synchronisations or stalls
in the issue stage, are exploited in order to enable both concurrent and randomised
execution. The instructions execute at their own pace, and may overtake one another,
compete for resources, and complete different execution stages out-of-order and, thus,
render the execution non-deterministic.
In most implementations data-dependencies impose serialisation in the execution
of instructions and, thus, restrain the scope for exploiting ILP. For example, read-after-
write (RAW) dependencies require the completion of the instruction before its result
can be used by a dependent instruction. In hardware, the data-forwarding mechanism
was conceived to avoid the penalty of having to write the result to the register bank,
and some time later read the result from it. Thus, the ILP can be exploited by issuing
instructions without data-dependences in parallel and by forwarding register values
between instructions with data-dependencies. This general paradigm was used in the
design of the network-based architecture, but exploiting fine-grain parallelism even
between instructions with data dependencies is also achieved.
In the micronet architecture [116] the instruction issue rate is limited by data-
dependencies and the availability of functional units. In the network-based architec-
ture, stalls in the instruction issue stage due to data-dependencies are not present, and
the issue rate is effectively limited only by the availability of functional units. Al-
though the instructions are issued one at a time, the issue unit operates at a faster speed
than the rest of the components, which emulates multiple instruction issue.
The instructions are issued in-order rapidly to the functional units of the appropriate
type. The instruction issue initiates a series of micro-operations in the respective com-
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munication units (that are part of the target functional units) that deal with the given
instruction. The processes of identifying data-dependencies (instruction compound-
ing) and initialising data-forwarding operations is also performed in the issue unit. A
small table is used to store the information about a number of previously issued in-
structions and determine dependencies between instructions. If no dependencies are
found, then the instruction is able to progress at its own pace without synchronising
with the execution stages of other instructions. If data-dependencies are found, then
the issue unit initiates data-forwarding operation(s) to the producer unit(s). The mutual
exclusion of instructions with data-dependencies is not enforced, but rather, they are
issued successively, and allow them to execute concurrently subject to availability of
operands. This leads to efficient utilisation of functional units, further distribution of
both state and control, and minimisation of high-level synchronisations and stalls that
are usually caused by data-dependencies.
Although the performance gains of data-forwarding are evident (as shown in Sec-
tion 6.4), they are not the primary goal of this design. The focus is on the variation
in execution times and power signatures that the network-based design introduces.
Namely, the data is routed according to a randomised routing protocol, that depends
on the implemented network topology. In general, the routing consists of two parts: (1)
the data is routed to a randomly chosen unit, and (2) the data follows the deterministic
route to its destination (the consumer unit). The randomised routing introduces varia-
tions in instruction execution times. Asynchronous execution and randomised routing
introduce different execution times even when the same instruction with the same input
data is observed.
Therefore, the order in which different micro-operations are performed changes
from one run to the other, allowing the results of instructions to be available out of
program order. In-order write-back to the register bank was not enforced as it would
be a performance overhead and could introduce synchronisations. Out-of-order in-
struction completion and write-back is beneficial from the security point of view, as
writes to the register bank are often targeted in attacks. An example of this was seen
in the case of covariance attack performed on the runs of AES (see Section 6.3.2).
The security evaluation results (presented in Section 6.3) have shown that, when
compared to simple pipelined configurations, the resistance to power analysis of algo-
rithms running on the networked configurations is considerably improved. The level of
improvement depends on a number of parameters: network topology and the amount
of randomness that it provides, the size of the network, the data-forwarding imple-
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mentation, and the algorithm implementation. Both AES and DES were simulated and
subjected to power-based attacks. Although cracking DES was more difficult when
compared to AES, the purpose of this research was not to compare these algorithms, or
their (unprotected) implementations, but to measure the non-determinism introduced
by the network-based architectural approach. The simulated results in the case of both
algorithms have confirmed that the introduced non-determinism considerably increases
the cost of performing the power analysis attacks.
The evaluation results also included the performance comparisons (Section 6.4) of
different architectural configurations, and have shown that the network-based organisa-
tion provides performance improvements. The performance gains, similarly to security
improvements, depend on the network configuration, number of functional units in the
network, the distribution of functional unit types, and the number of data-shares used
in the data-forwarding. However, one should remember that performance is not the pri-
mary goal of this design, and that tradeoffs between performance and security might
be necessary, depending on the desired level of security/performance.
7.2 Future work
Future research could proceed in a number of different directions. A further and more
detailed evaluation of both performance and security features can be performed. How-
ever, these investigations would require more detailed delay and power consumption
figures, which were not available for the current experimentation. Also, comparisons
of the presented approach could be made with existing techniques for increasing the
cost of side-channel analysis attacks. For example, this approach could be compared
with the secret-sharing scheme (see Section 3.5.7.5).
A further exploration of possible improvements to the architectural implementa-
tion could also be beneficial. Besides exploring ways for achieving non-deterministic
execution, this thesis has presented a novel approach for distributing the control and
execution in asynchronous architectures. The non-deterministic execution is achieved
through exploiting the fine-grain ILP of instructions both with and without data de-
pendencies. However, the current implementation does not implement any of the con-
ventional techniques for increasing ILP and parallelism in general. One of the issues
that can be investigated is the relation of the design of the network-based architecture
to performance improving dynamic techniques in microprocessors, such as specula-
tive execution, instruction and data caches, speculative branches and multithreading.
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When addressing these, an important issue would also be to investigate the expected
overheads in terms of hardware implementation.
Correct operation in the presence of data-dependencies often requires serialisation
in the execution of instructions, which in turn limits the scope for exploiting paral-
lelism. This is particularly true in case of RAW dependences, which require the com-
pletion of the instruction before its result can be used by a dependent instruction. One
of the hardware approaches to this problem is data-forwarding. In software, the effect
of true dependencies could be minimised through the use of instruction scheduling. In
the case of the network-based architecture instruction scheduling could be also used
to remove both resource contention and stalls in the operand fetch and branch stage.
Namely, if the result of the producer instruction is already available when forward-
ing requests are initiated, then the instruction execution could be further improved and
stalls reduced. Stalls are also undesirable from the security point of view as they can be
easily observed in the power traces. Electromagnetic attacks are even more threatening
as they can exploit locality information.
In the network-based asynchronous architecture, if the size of the dependency table
in the issue unit is equal to the number of functional units, then all RAW dependences
between non-control transfer instructions are covered by data-forwarding. This is be-
cause RAW hazards occur only between instructions that are currently in execution.
Having the operand fetch stage distributed to the communication units, the number of
instructions that are in flight at any point is bounded from above by twice the num-
ber of functional units. This can be characterised as the theoretical throughput of the
architecture. The actual (average) throughput depends on the particular code. This is
another area where scheduling could be used: to improve the throughput of architec-
tures and potentially bring it closer to its theoretical best, which could have a positive
effect on non-deterministic execution and performance.
The number of instructions that can be affected by RAW hazards is equal to the
number of instructions that are currently in the operand fetch and lock stage and is
bounded by the number of functional units. Therefore, appropriately adjusting the size
of the dependency table (see Section 5.5.2) eliminates most of the RAW hazards at
no additional cost. RAW hazards between control transfer instructions and the rest of
the instruction set are not removed this way. Exploring techniques for removing these
dependencies could also be one of the future tasks.
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7.3 Conclusions
This thesis presented the design and evaluation of the network-based asynchronous
architecture. It focused on exploring a particular hardware paradigm for exploiting
non-deterministic execution in order to benefit cryptographic devices. These investi-
gations confirmed that the level of introduced non-determinism increases resistance to
power analysis, when compared to simple pipelined configurations, as it makes power
analysis attacks considerably more difficult to apply. In addition, the non-deterministic
execution does not present a performance overhead, although a tradeoff between the
desired level of the non-determinism (i.e. security) and performance might need to
made for a particular implementation.
This thesis introduced a general approach for achieving non-deterministic execu-
tion in processors. This approach can be complementary to and combined with exist-
ing software and/or hardware countermeasures in order to achieve further resistance to
side-channel analysis. For instance, it could be combined with the randomised schedul-
ing techniques presented in [91, 92, 66] to further randomise the execution; or it could
be implemented using balanced asynchronous logic as a possible way to hide the sen-
sitive information in the power and electromagnetic traces, which is still found to be
present in balanced systems [49]. Electromagnetic attacks are of particular concern as
they have proven to be able to extract information even when the power channel pro-
vides no information. The non-deterministic and distributed manner of operation of
the network-based architecture could potentially be beneficial against electromagnetic
attacks and their ability to exploit the locality information.
Although asynchronous circuits have been shown to be a suitable platform for ex-
ploiting non-deterministic execution, some characteristics of asynchrony can be ex-
ploited in side-channel analysis. For example, data-dependent latencies could be a
source of information. One of the aims of this approach is to introduce fine-grain exe-
cution timing variations through randomised routing, which can help reduce this type
of information leakage.
In summary, the investigations performed in this thesis have shown that the in-
troduced level of non-determinism considerably complicates the application of power
analysis attacks and suggests that the introduced architectural concepts could be bene-
ficial to cryptographic devices.
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li $rd, I rd.word = I;
la $rd, I ( $rs ) rd.word = I + rs.word;
lai $rd, I1 ( I2 ) rd.word = I1 + I2;
move $d, $rs rd. word = rs.word;
add $rd, $rs, $rt rd.word = rs.word + rt.word;
addi $rd, $rs, I rd.word = rs.word + I;
sub $rd, $rs, $rt rd.word = rs.word - rt.word;
subi $rd, $rs, I rd.word = rs.word - I;
seq $rd, $rs, $rt rd.word = rs.word == rt.word;
seqi $rd, $rs, I rd.word = rs.word == I;
sge $rd, $rs, $rt rd.word = rs.word >= rt.word;
sgei $rd, $rs, I rd.word = rs.word >= I;
sgt $rd, $rs, $rt rd.word = rs.word > rt.word;
sgti $rd, $rs, I rd.word = rs.word > I;
sle $rd, $rs, $rt rd.word = rs.word <= rt.word;
slei $rd, $rs, I rd.word = rs.word <= I;
slt $rd, $rs, $rt rd.word = rs.word < rt.word;
slti $rd, $rs, I rd.word = rs.word < I;
sne $rd, $rs, $rt rd.word = rs.word != rt.word;
snei $rd, $rs, I rd.word = rs.word != I;
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Logic instructions
INSTRUCTION DESCRIPTION
and $rd, $rs, $rt rd.word = rs.word & rt.word;
andi $rd, $rs, I rd.word = rs.word & I;
or $rd, $rs, $rt rd.word = rs.word | rt.word;
xor $rd, $rs, $rt rd.word = rs.word ˆ rt.word;
sll $rd, $rs, I rd.word = rs.word << I;
srl $rd, $rs, I rd.word = rs.word >> I;
Multiplication instructions
INSTRUCTION DESCRIPTION
mul $rd, $rs, $rt rd.word = rs.word * rt.word;
muli $rd, $rs, I rd.word = rs.word * I;
div $rd, $rs, $rt rd.word = rs.word / rt.word;
divi $rd, $rs, I rd.word = rs.word / I;
rem $rd, $rs, $rt rd.word = rs.word % rt.word;
remi $d, $s0, I rd.word = rs.word % I;
Memory instructions
INSTRUCTION DESCRIPTION
lw $rd, I ( $rs ) rd.word = readData ( I + rs.word, 4 );
lh $rd, I ( $rs ) rd.word = readData(I + rs.word, 2);
lb $rd, I($rs) rd.word = readData(I + rs.word, 1);
sw $rs, I($rt) writeData(I + rt.word, rs.word, 4);
sh $rs, I($rt) writeData(I + rt.word, rs.word, 2);
sb $rs, I($rt) writeData(I + rt.word, rs.word, 1);
lwi $d, I1, I2 rd.word = readData(I1 + I2, 4);




bra L pcReg.word = L;
j L pcReg.word = L;
jr $rs pcReg.word = rs.word;
jal L linkReg.word = pcReg.word + 4;
pcReg.word = L;
jalr $rs linkReg.word = pcReg.word + 4;
pcReg.word = rs.word;
beq $rs, $rt, L rs.word == rt.word ? pcReg.word = L : {};
bne $rs, $rt, L rs.word != rt.word ? pcReg.word = L : {};
ble $s0, $s1, L rs.word <= rt.word ? pcReg.word = L : {};
blt $rs, $rt, L rs.word < rt.word ? pcReg.word = L : {};
bge $rs, $rt, L rs.word >= rt.word ? pcReg.word = L : {};
bgt $rs, $rt, L rs.word > rt.word ? pcReg.word = L : {};
beqz $rs, L rs.word == 0 ? pcReg.word = L : {};
bnez $rs, L rs.word != 0 ? pcReg.word = L : {};
blez $rs, L rs.word <= 0 ? pcReg.word = L : {};
bltz $rs, L rs.word < 0 ? pcReg.word = L : {};
bgez $rs, L rs.word >= 0 ? pcReg.word = L : {};
bgtz $rs, L rs.word > 0 ? pcReg.word = L : {};
Appendix C
Rijndael and DES Tables
Nr Nb = 4 Nb = 6 Nb = 8
Nk = 4 10 12 14
Nk = 6 12 12 14
Nk = 8 14 14 14
Figure C.1: Rijndael: Number of rounds as a function of the block and key length.
Nb C1 C2 C3
4 1 2 3
6 1 2 3
8 1 3 4
Figure C.2: Rijndael: Shift offsets for different block lengths
225
226 Appendix C. Rijndael and DES Tables
32 1 2 3 4 5
4 5 6 7 8 9
8 9 10 11 12 13
12 13 14 15 16 17
16 17 18 19 20 21
20 21 22 23 24 25
24 25 26 27 28 29
28 29 30 31 32 1
Figure C.3: DES: E bit-selection table.
57 49 41 33 25 17 9
1 58 50 42 34 26 18
10 2 59 51 43 35 27
19 11 3 60 52 44 36
63 55 47 39 31 23 15
7 62 54 46 38 30 22
14 6 61 53 45 37 29
21 13 5 28 20 12 4
Figure C.4: DES: Key schedule permuted choice 1.
14 17 11 24 1 5
3 28 15 6 21 10
23 19 12 4 26 8
16 7 27 20 13 2
41 52 31 37 47 55
30 40 51 45 33 48
44 49 39 56 34 53
46 42 50 36 29 32
Figure C.5: DES: Key schedule permuted choice 2.
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Figure C.6: DES: Key schedule left shift order.
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Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Cryptographic Hard-
ware and Embedded Systems (CHES 2000), volume 1965-LNCS, pages 252–ff.
Springer-Verlag, 2000.
[40] J.-S. Coron. Resistance Against Differential Power Analysis for Elliptic Curve
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